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The part played by warshipbuilding in sustaining the Clyde shipbuilding 
industry between 1889 and 1939 has received less attention than it 
deserves. Only a minority of firms undertook warshipbuilding in 
peacetime but they included some of the leading shipyards an the Clyde. 
This study, based on a detailed examination of accounts and cost records, 
shows that naval work was of critical importance for these firms from the 
1890's onwards. 
All of the firms which took advantage of the expansion in the 
demand for warships in the 1890's were in financial difficulties and 
profitable naval contracts were largely responsible for reviving their 
-fortunes. From then until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, 
naval work constituted a major part of their output and the most 
profitable part of it. By 19149 all of the warshipbuilders had expanded 
their capacity and provided expensive new facilities largely an the 
strength of the demand for warships and the three biggest yards were 
owned by armaments manufacturers who were primarily interested in 
--shipyards for their warshipbuilding capability. 
After the war, the demand for armaments contracted and the 
warshipbuilders were faced with the problem of finding profitable 
employment for capacity designed for building warships and warship 
engines. This proved to be impossible and the relative dearth of naval 
contracts in the 1920's and early 1930's was the primary cause of the 
severe financial difficulties in which they found themselves when the 
onset of the world financial crisis in 1931 brought merchant shipbuilding 
to a standstill. Only Beardmore's succumbed but, had rearmament not 
been in the offing, it is doubtful if many of the warshipbuilding yards 
would have survived the ensuing crisis. As it was the survivors 
regained their financial stability by 1939 only because of the revival in 
the demand for warships. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION. 
A number of writers have remarked upon the important part 
played by naval work in tiding the Clyde shipbuilding 
industry over the great depression of the 1930's. Dr. N. K. 
Buxton, in his comparative study of the Scottish shipbuilding 
industry in the inter-war periodv has suggested that a high 
share of naval orders helped cushion the Clyde against the 
full impact of market forces with the result that it suffered 
less acutely from the slump than other shipbuilding districts 
in the United Kingdom and recovered more rapidly from it. 
1 
Professor R. H. Campbell, in an overview of the problems of the 
Scottish economy in the inter-war period, has noted the 
importance of naval work in providing a 'basis of activity' 
for Clyde shipyards in the mid and--late 1930's when other 
work was in short supply. 
2 In a later study, 'the same 
author has suggested that 'only demand for naval vessels kept 
the industry active'. 3 Professor A. Slaven, from the 
different perspective of a study of the experience of one of 
the leading Clyde firms in the the inter-war period, has 
described naval orders as providing an 'infusion of 
profitable work' which played a major part in saving the 
ailing Clydebank yard of John Brown a Co. from extinction in 
the 1930, s. 4 
For Clydebank, as for most of the Clyde firms which 
benefited from the revival in naval demand in the 19301s. 
2 
warshipbuilding was not a new departure. It was rather a 
fresh opportunity to exercise skills and make use of 
expensive facilities acquired before the First World War. 
The foundations of the Clyde warshipbuilding industry 
had been laid in the middle of the nineteenth century when 
Robert Napier, the 'Father' of the modern Clyde shipbuilding 
industry, built a succession of major warships, including one 
of the Royal Navy's first two lironclads' - HMS BýACK 
PRINCE. Up to 1889 the opportunities for private firms to 
build warships for the Royal Navy were limited as the Royal 
Dockyards had first call on Admiralty orders and extensive 
use was made of private yards only in an emergency. 
Nevertheless, a number of firms on the Clyde followed 
Napier's example in seeking Admiralty orders and the 
experience gained i-n the thirty years following the 
introduction of the 'ironclad' in 1859 enabled these firms to 
take ruli advantage of the much more favourable conditions 
which prevailed from 1889 onwards when a massive expansion of 
the Royal Navy necessitated extensive use of private yards. 
In the twenty-five years between 1889 and the outbreak or the 
First World War in 1914 Clyde firms secured Admiralty orders 
for warships aggregating 793,481 tons, 44.560% of the total 
tonnage put out to contract by the Admiralty. 5 After the 
First World War, the British Government's decision to adopt a 
policy of arms limitation by international agreement denied 
Clyde firms the opportunity of continuing warshipbuilding on 
a large scale but the experience gained before and during the 
war, when the Clyde's warshipbuilding capacity had been fully 
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extended in meeting 49.261A of the Admiralty's wartime orders 
for warships. 6 stood them in good stead when the demand for 
warships revived with the beginnings or rearmament in the 
early 1930's. In the inter-war period, as before, the Clyde 
was, as Dr. Buxton remarks, 'the most important single 
private producer of naval tonnage for the Admiralty'. 
7 
Until recently, this aspect of the Clyde shipbuilding 
industry has received little attention from historians. 
Warshipbuilding has long featured prominently in the 
histories of individual firms, 8 but, apart fron a paper 
delivered by Sir John Biles in 1909,9 nothing has been 
written of the importance of the Clyde as a warshipbuilding 
centre before the First World War and Professor Campbell has 
broken new ground by making extensive reference to 
warshipbuilding in a recent study of the performance of the 
Clyde shipbuilding industry up to 1939.10 Economic 
histories published before 1980 make little mention of 
warshipbuilding in dealing with this phase of the Clyde- 
sh-ipbuilding industry's developnent. Professor Campbell, 
writing in 1965, merely noted in passing that naval orders 
contributed to the industry's pre-war prosperity. " Some 
accounts of the industry's development up to 1914 make no 
mention of warshipbuilding at all. 12 Significantly, most 
references to the importance of naval work appear only in 
relation to the period after 1931 when the onset of the great 
depression brought merchant shipbuilding to a virtual 
standstill. 
Viewed from the perspective of the Clyde shipbuilding 
4 
industry as a whole, the importance of warshipbuilding is not 
immediately apparent. The Clyde owed its meteoric rise, 
from being a relatively unimportant provincial shipbuilding 
centre in the early nineteenth century to its pre-eminent 
position at the hub of the world's shipbuilding industry 
little more than half a century later, to the technical 
achievements of the local engineers and shipbuilders, who led 
the way in the application of steam power to marine 
propulsion and in the building of ships of iron and steel. - 
Naval work made a minimal contribution to these 
developments. Success brought the Clyde to the attention of 
the Admiralty and paved the way for later naval orders but it 
was the patronage of merchant shipowners which was largely 
responsible for the spectacular growth of the industry. 13 
From 1889 onwards naval work was of more importance than it 
had been previously and it is generally agreed that output 
figures which equalle one displacement ton of warship with one 
gross ton of merchant'ship understate the relative value of 
naval work. 14 Even so, warships still accounted for no more 
than a fraction of the total output of the Clyde shipbuilding 
industry in peacetime. In no year between 1889 and 1913 or 
between 1920 and 1938 did warships account for more than 
14.5% of the total tonnage launched on the Clyde and in both 
the five years before the First World War and the five years 
before the Second World War, when the demand for warships was 
at its height, merchant work accounted for over 91% of the 
tonnage launched. 15 More important, warshipbuilding in 
peacetime involved only a minority of the firms in the 
5 
industry. Virtually all of the warships built on the Clyde 
in peacetime between 1889 and 1939 were the work of one of 
only eight firms and no more than seven of these firms were 
actively engaged in warshipbuilding at any one time. 16 
Warshipbuilding assumes greater significance when 
account is taken of the importance of these firms. They 
were the technical elite of the Clyde shipbuilding 
industry. All were able to combine warshipbuilding with the 
highest classes of merchant work and most of them did. 
17 In 
consequence a large part of the total merchant output of the 
Clyde shipbuilding industry was produced in yards which 
combined naval and merchant work. Treating the firms 
involved in warshipbuilding before and after the First World 
War as separate groups, they accounted for 23.56% of the 
Clyde's total merchant output between 1894-1913 and for no 
less than 29.251. of its total merchant output in the 
inter-war period. 18 Given the value of their naval work and 
the higher quality and correspondingly greater value per ton 
of their merchant output compared with most merchant ships 
built on the Clyde, it is likely that the warshipbuilding 
firms were responsible for upwards of 40% of the total value 
of all the work undertaken by the Clyde shipbuilding industry 
between 1889 and 1939.19 If, as Professor Campbell's recent 
study suqqests, many of these firms depended on naval work 
for their prosperity in the years before the First World War 
the case for a reassessment of the importance of 
warshipbuilding is compelling. 20 
This study explores the circumstances under which an 
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important sector of the Clyde shipbuilding industry chose to 
specialise in naval work and tries to assess the extent to 
which the choice of warshipbuilding as a specialisation 
sustained them in the years before the First World War and 
disadvantaged them in the inter-war period when the demand 
for warships was less buoyant. Methodologically, it depends 
heavily an an analysis of material extracted from the 
accounting records of the firms then-selves. These records 
are of three main types. First, formal sets of annual 
financial statements designed for publication and produced to 
satisfy statutory requirements; second, informal accounts and 
working papers prepared for the information of management; 
third, the financial and cost records from which the first 
two were prepared. Complete sets of records covering the 
whole of the fifty year period are rare and, in practice, 
relatively complete sets of accounting records survive for 
only three of the leading firms. 21 Further, even where they 
are available, such records need to be used with 
discretion. As Professor Marriner has pointed out, 
published annual financial statements are, at best, 
relatively uninformative and, at worst, positively misleading 
as historical documents: 22 informal accounts and working 
papers may be informative but, in the absence of the records 
from which they were prepared they need to be interpreted 
with great care: the financial and cost records themselves 
are as likely to mislead as to inform anyone who lacks at 
least's thorough working knowledge of book-keeping if not a 
formal training in accountancy. Nevertheless, the records 
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which have survived contain a wealth of information and 
careful examination of them has yielded a mass of accounting 
and cost data. 
Full details of the sources used and the methodology 
employed are given in Appendices E&F which contain the 
details of the warshipbuilders' financial and cost accounts 
23 but, in view of the importance of the material contained 
in these appendices and its use in the main text, an outline 
of the format in which the date is presented is appropriate 
at the start. 
The financial accounts of the warshipbuilding yards 
contained-in APPENDIX E comprise annual profit and loss 
accounts and balance sheets laid out in a standardised format 
together with schedules detailing the composition of the 
trading profit, of exceptional items and of net additions to 
fixed assets. The data relating to costs and profit and 
losses on contracts undertaken by the warshipbuilding yards 
contained in APPENDIX F consists of the yard number, name and 
invoice price of each contract, the costs of materials, 
labour and overheads (differentiating in each case between 
costs incurred in the shipyard and costs incurred in the 
engine and boiler works), the contribution to overheads and 
profit as computed by the author, the net profit or loss as 
computed by the firm and the year of completion. 
Except where otherwise stated, all accounting data used 
in the text is drawn from one or other of these two 
appendices and readers seeking further details of 
unattributed financial and cost figures used in the text are 
-8 
referred to the relevant section of whichever of these two 
appendices is appropriate. In all cases where the outcome 
of a contract is mentioned in the text, care has been taken 
to ensure that either the name of the ship or its yard 
number is provided in the text or by way of footnote to 
facilitate cross reference but the contents of both APPENDIX 
E and APPENDIX F should be treated by the reader as an 
integral part of the text. 
While all of the terms used in the standardisation of 
accounts and costs are defined in the appropriate place in 
the appendices, some of them deserve special mention here if 
only because they are also used extensively in the text and 
it is open to misinterpretation if the these key terms are 
not accorded the specific meaning given to them by the author 
for the purposes of this study. TRADING PROFIT, the 
sta6dard measure of profitability used in the appendices and 
throughout the text is defined as the operating profit 
excluding exceptfonal items and before ded ucting provisions 
for depreciation of fixed assets, bank and loan interest, 
debenture interest and taxation. In striking the trading 
profit before providing for depreciation of fixed assets, the 
author is aware that he is at adds with modern accounting 
practice but, at the time in question, provisions for 
depreciation were generally viewed as appropriations of 
profit and it was unusual for firms to include depreciation 
in overheads for costing purposes. The exclusion of 
exceptional items, which are defined as all amounts written 
off investments, all profits and lasses on the sale of 
9 
investments, and material items of a non-recurring nature 
whose inclusion in trading profits would give a distorted 
view of the trading results, is less controversial but there 
is roon for disagreement as to whether specific items are 
'non-recurring' and the reader is directed to the details of 
all exceptional items provided in the appropriate sections of 
Appendix E. NET ADDITIONS TO FIXED ASSETS are defined as 
fixed assets purchased less the book value of fixed assets 
sold or scrapped. This has been chosen as the standard 
measure of capital expenditure in preference to gross capital 
expenditure primarily because the book value of disposals is 
extremely difficult to determine without reference to 
detailed plant registers which are not always available. 
As regards the profitability of contracts there are two 
distinct measures available. The first, NET PROFIT OR ? -OSS, 
is the net profit or loss on the contract as calculated by 
the managements of the firms themselves. The second, 
CONTRIBUTION TO OVERHEADS AND PROFIT is defined as the 
balance remaining after deducting from invoice price, amounts 
reserved for agents and levies and the costs of materials and 
labour only. Both terms are used in the text, the former 
where it is appropriate to give an indication of management's 
perception of the outcome of a contract, the latter as the 
standard measure of the profitability of contracts for the 
purposes of both inter-firm and intra-firm comparison. This 
distinction is vital as the net profit or loss computed by 
management is struck after deducting overhead charges 
allocated to contracts on arbitrary bases which varied not 
10 
only between different firms but within the same firm over 
time and even between one contract and another. 
24 
The study is arranged in chronological order so that the 
actions of the warshipbuilders can be seen not only in the 
context of their own immediate situation but also in the 
wider contexts of fluctuations in the fortunes of the Clyde 
shipbuilding industry as a whole and the evolution of 
Admiralty policy in response to changing political, strategic 
and technical-priorities. 
The next two chapters examine the links which were 
forged between the Clyde shipbuilding industry and the 
Admiralty in the decades before 1889 when Admiralty orders 
were relatively scarce. CHAPTER-TWO concentrates on the 
. 
seminal role of Robert Napier as the founder of the Clyde 
warshipbuilding industry. CHAPTER THREE explores the 
interest shown by other Clyde shipbuilders in naval contracts 
at a time when conditions made Admiralty work_less attractive 
than 'it subsequently became. 
The three chapters which follow cover the period between 
1889 and 1914. CHAPTER FOUR deals with the response of 
Clyde firms to the opportunities which opened up as a result 
of the expansion of the Royal Navy 'in the 1890's with 
particular emphasis on the circumstances in which individual 
firms found themselves at the time. CHAPTER FIVE traces the 
rapid growth of the Clyde warshipbuilding industry between 
1899 and 1907 and the effect of the intervention of the great 
armaments manufacturers on its development. CHAPTER SIX 
examines the experience of the Clyde warshipbuilders between 
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1907 and 1914 when a short period*of relatively low naval 
demand was followed by what proved to be a profitless boom as 
the naval arms race with Germany gathered momentum. 
The following four chapters cover the period from 1914 
to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. CHAPTER 
SEVEN, which covers the the First World War and its immediate 
aftermath, explores the extent to which the Clyde 
warshipbuilders' contribution to the war effort placed them 
at a disadvantage at the end of the war and assesses their 
situation in 1921 when the Washington Treaty heralded the 
beginning of an era of arms limitation. CHAPTERS EIGHT and 
NINE deal with the problems created by arms limitation in the 
period between 1921 and 1934. CHAPTER EIGHT, 
_which 
deals 
with the period between 1921 and 1929 , highlights the 
problems which the Clyde warshipbuilders faced in finding 
profitable employment for their facilities even when merchant 
work was relatively plentiful. CHAPTER NINE, which deals 
with the crisis which ensued when a further reduction in 
naval programmes was followed by the total collapse of 
merchant demand in the early 1930's. highlights the extent to 
which the financial stability of some of the leading Clyde 
warshipbuilders had been compromised by the post-war 
disintegration or the armaments industry. CHAPTER TEN 
examines the extent to which rearmament had resolved the 
warshipbuilders' problems by the outbreak of war in 1939. 
Finally, CHAPTER ELEVEN reviews the salient features of 
the development of the Clyde warshipbuilding industry up to 
1939 and demonstrates that naval work not only sustained an 
12 
important part of the Clyde shipbuilding industry before the 
First World War but also enabled it to survive the inter-war 
period. 
Despite their pre-eminence, all of the firms which took 
advantage of the expansion in the demand for warships in the 
1890's were in financial difficulties and profitable naval 
contracts were largely responsible for reviving their 
fortunes. From then until the outbreak of the First World 
War in 1914, naval work constituted a major part of their 
output and the most profitable part of it. The 
profitability of warships varied between firms and over time 
but, throughout the period between 1889 and 1914, naval 
contracts were always more profitable than merchant contracts 
undertaken in the same yard at the same time. By 1914, all 
of the warshipbuilders had expanded their capacity and 
provided expensive new facilities largely on the strength of 
the demand for warships, and the three biggest yards were 
owned by armaments manufacturers who were primarily 
interested in shipyards for their warshipbuilding 
capability. After the First World War, the pre-war 
armanents industry went into decline and the warshipbuilders 
were faced with the problem of finding profitable work for 
capacity designed for the building of warships and warship 
engines. This proved to be impossible and the relative 
dearth of naval contracts in the 1920's and early 1930's was 
the primary cause of the severe financial difficulties in 
which the warshipbuilders found themselves when the onset of 
13 
the world financial crisis in 1931 brought merchant 
shipbuilding to a standstill. Had rearmament not been in 
the offing, it is doubtful if many of the warshipbuilding 
yards on the Clyde would have survived the ensuing crisis. 
All of the warshipbuilders owed their subsequent recovery to 
the revival in naval demand associated with rearmament. 
Whether the warshipbuilders' dependence on naval work 
was altogether healthy may be questioned. Arguably it was 
sy-mptomatic of their declining competitiveness. Certainly 
it left them vulnerable to any contraction in the demand for 
warships. Howevert nothing in the warshipbuilders' 
experience between 1889 and 1939 suggests that they would 
have been better served by concentrating an merchant 
shipbuilding at that time. On the contrary all the evidence 
points to the conclusion that between 1889 and 1939 a 
significant proportion of the Clyde's merchant output was__ 
produced in yards which survived only because they were able 
to combine merchant work with more profitable naval work. 
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20) Campbell, The Rise and Fall of Scottish Industry, p. 61. 
21) Clydebank, Fairfield and Scott's. 
22) S. Marriner, 'Company Financial Statements as Source 
Material for Business Historians', Business History, 
Vol. XXII (1980). 
23) Appendices A, B, C and D contain respectively analyses of 
Admiralty Shipbuilding Programmes, warships laid down in 
British shipyards on account of foreign powers, warships 
built on Clydeside and the output of the Clyde 
shipbuilding industry. Appendix G contains the 
accounts of a number of Clydeside shipyards and marine 
engineers which confined themselves to merchant work. 
While these accounts, which include those of Russell & 
Co. /Lithgow Ltd. 9 are provided for the purpose of 
comparison only, they follow the same format as the 
warshipbuilders' accounts in Appendix E. 
24) For a more detailed discussion of this problem see 
R. H. Campbell 'Overhead Costs and Profitability: A Note 
of Some Uses of Business Records, Scottish Industrial 
History, 1 (1977) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ROBERT NAPIER AND- THE fOUNDATION 
V THE C! -Y. )E WARSqIPB; 
Jl'-DING INDUSTRY. 
The credit for laying the foundations of the Clyde warshipbuilding 
industry belongs to Robert Napier. Scott's of Greenock were the 
builders of a wooden sloop commissioned during the Napoleonic 
Warsl but, at that time, there was little to distinguish Clyde 
shipbuilders from the numerous small-scale enterprises which had 
cone into existence during the eighteenth century to serve the 
local needs of other Scottish seaports2 and Scott's had little 
claim to being more than one of many provincial shipyards capable 
of building wooden hulls which met Admiralty requirements in time 
of war. By contrast Robert Napier brought to naval work the 
reputation of one of the world's foremost experts on steam 
propulsion and his warships were built in one of the first of the 
great new iron shipyards which made the Clyde the world's leading 
shipbuilding district in the late nineteenth century. 
Robert Napier, born in 1789. -was the son of a blacksmith. 
Having followed his father's trade he set up in business on his 
own account in Glasgow in 1815 when narine engineering was still 
in its infancy. 3 In 1812 Robert Napier's cousin and 
brother-in-law David Napier had been reponsible for the boilers of 
Henry Bell's Comet 4 and, in 1618, the ROB ROY, for which David 
Napier designed the hull and provided the machinery, was the first 
stean-powered snip to operate a regular service on the open 
sea. 5 Robert Napier probably gained from his relationship with 
17 
David Napier but in these early days it was not exceptional for 
me-chanics with a working knowledge of factory machinery to be 
commissioned to supply the engines for a ship 6 and, although 
Robert Napier undertook to make the engines for his first 
steamship in 1823,7 two years after moving to the works at 
Camlachie from which David Napier had supplied the machinery for 
the ROB ROY. 8 he established his personal reputation in 1827 when 
ships powered by his engines took the first two places in a race 
to determine the fastest steamer on the Clyde. 9 
Napier's achievement enabled him to exploit the opportunities 
which were opening up as a result of the pioneering of the new 
technology an the Clyde 'a and, having moved to more convenient 
premises in central 'Glasgow, he proceeded to equip them with heavy 
machine tools for manufacturing larger engines in 1830.11 As a 
result his business prospered and during the 1830's he added to 
his growing personal reputation by un dertaking the cons truction of 
the engines for some of the largest steamships of the time. The 
patronage of T. Assheton Smith, for whom he built a series of 
steam yachts, led to- his being entrusted with the order for the 
engines of the East India Company's BERENICE in 1835 12 and, 
although he was initially unsuccessful in his bid to supply the 
engines of the BRITISH QUEEN, a transatlantic steamer of 19862 
tons then being built on the Thames, the work r*everted to him when 
the successful bidder was unable to complete the contract. 13 
Success in this venture further enhanced his reputation and the 
experience gained in supplying the engines for the BRITISH QUEENt 
together with the connection with the East India Company, led to 
an approach by Samuel Cunard, the Halifax agent of the East India 
18 
Company, who sought Napier's advice on the design of steamships 
for a projected transatlantic mail service. Napier's 
contribution was crucial to the successful launching of Cunard's 
British and North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Company in the 
early 18401s. At a time when steamships were still notoriously 
unreliable, Napier designed the ships and provided the engines 
which fulfilled the exacting requirements of the mail contract. 
On his advice the ships were made larger and more powerful than 
Cunard had originally contemplated and he was instrumental in 
persuading wealthy shipowners to back his judgement by putting up 
the extra capital needed to finance the venture. 
14 Not only did 
much of the credit fur the success of the venture accrue to him, 
he also gained an important customer who was to fpvour him with 
prestigious contracts for the next twenty years. 
Up to this time Napier had confined himself- to designing the 
ships and providing the machinery, leaving it to others to build 
the hulls, but, by the early 18401s, it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to construct wooden hulls capable of withstanding the 
stresses imposed by the largest steam engines and Napier was 
having difficulty with the subcontractors to whom he entrusted the 
building of his hulls. 
15 As a result Napier was one of the first 
of the Clyde engineers to take an active interest in building iron 
ships. 16 which opened the way for larger and more powerful 
vessels. 17 In 1841 he purchased the small iron shipyard founded 
by McArthur and Alexander 18 and began iron shipbuilding on his 
own account. 19 At first the output of the shipyard was modest by 
comparison with the capacity of Napier's engine and boiler shops, 
which were now centred on the Lancefield Works, first leased and 
19 
then purchased from his cousin David after the latter's departure 
for London in 1836,20 and Napier's first iron steamer - the 
VANGUARD - launched in 1843 amounted to only 681 tons 
21 but, by 
the early 1850's, the growing demand for iron ships 22 encouraged 
Napier to purchase more ground at Govan an which he laid out a new 
yard capable of building vessels up to 400 feet long. 
23 
Meanwhile, to secure a supply of forgings for his shipyard and 
engine works, 24 he had also acquired, nominally on behalf of his 
sons, the Parkhead Forge previously owned by his now bankrupt 
cousin David. 25 
The firm of Robert Napier & Sons therefore gradually assumed 
the character of a fully integrated shipbuilding and engineering 
business and, although there is no reason to suppose that Napier 
had any intention of doing more than fitting himself for the task 
of building the large iron steamers required by such customers as 
Cunard, for whom he built the 3,300 ton PERSIA in 1354,26 the 
facilities he had created also enabled him to undertake the 
building of the great iron warships which were to absorb most of 
his energies in the closing years of his life. 
Robert Napier had been cultivating a connection with the 
Admiralty since the 1830's when he had first sought to secure 
contracts for the engines or naval ships. 27 The Royal Navy's 
ships were not generally fitted with steam engines until after the 
Crimean War, by which time the development of screw propulsion 
removed the need for paddle-drive which obstructed a warship's 
broadside and the introduction of more compact upright engines 
allowed machinery to be housed below the waterline where it was 
less vulnerable in battle. 28 Nevertheless, the Navy had ordered 
20 
its first steam tug as early as 1821 
29 and, by the 1830's, the 
growing demand for engines for small naval ships made it 
worthwhile for an enterprising engine builder to seek a share of 
Admiralty business. 
At first Napier's attempts to establish himself-as an 
Admiralty contractor were frustrated by the tendency of the naval 
authorities to favour specialist firms in the London area with 
whom they had already established a good working relationship 
but, after he had successfully completed the engines for the 
BERENICE for the East India Company and started an the machinery 
for the BRITISH QUEEN, his claims could not be ignored and he was 
awarded the contracts for the engines of two naval ships in 
1838.30 Providing the engines for HMS . VESUVIUS and HMS STROMBOLI 
did not end Napier's difficulties and only when a friendly pp 
31 
forced the Admiralty to admit that Napier's engines were proving 
to be trouble-free and less costly to maintain than those of his 
competitors was he given further opportunities to undertake naval 
work. 32 However, once Napier had overcome the Admiralty's 
initial reluctance to grant him recognition, his position as an 
Admiralty contractor was assured. First, as Melville, the 
Secretary of the East India Company, pointed out to Samuel Cunard 
in advising him to take Napier's advice on the machinery required 
for his transatlantic steamers: 
He was the great authority an steam navigation 
and -knew much more 
about the subject than the 
Admiralty. 33 
Second, his acknowledged mastery or steam propulsion, together 
with his possession of an iron shipyard in the early 1840's, made 
21 
him a strong contender when the Admiralty was seeking contractors 
to undertake the building of iron warships. 
In the age of wooden warships, warshipbuilding had been the 
jealously guarded prerogative of the Royal Dockyards. In time of 
war or great national emergency their resources were sometimes 
augmented by subcontracting work to private yards, as in 
refurbishing the fleet at the end of the American War and again 
during the protracted struggle with Napoleonic France, 34 but, 
under normal circumstances, there had been little reason for the 
Admiralty to look beyond the ample resources of its own 
establishments. When the essential characteristics of naval 
ships had changed little in two hundred years 35 and the 
maintenance of British seapower, resting as it did an her 
possession of a large fleet of wooden warships, called for little 
more than regular refits and the occasional replacement of ships 
nearing the end of what was normally a very long working life, 36 
no private yard could hope to match the skill and expertise of 
dockyard craftsmen who could draw an the fund or experience which 
the Royal Dockyards possessed through having been engaged 
continuously in repairing and building the Navy's ships since 
Tudor times. This established order was overturned by the advent 
or iron shipbuilding and, although the Admiralty was 
understandably reluctant to pioneer a development which would 
render their existing rleet obsolete, it could not ignore the 
possibility that Britain's naval supremacy might be lost ir 
another power took advantage of the new technology and gained a 
decisive advantage by building iron warships. Accordingly the 
Admiralty was forced to explore the reasibility or iron warships 
22 
and as iron shipbuilding called for a blend of skills which the 
Royal Dockyards did not as yet possess, it was necessary to 
subcontract the work to private firms. 
Admiralty orders for some of the Royal Navy's earliest 
ironships laid tne foundations of Robert Napier's fame as a 
warshipbuilder. In 1843 he was commissioned to build the Navy's 
first three paddle-driven iron steamers 
37 and the following year 
he received the more important order for HMS SIMOON, one of five 
experimental iron-h-ulled screw frigates ordered from private 
contractors in that year. 
38 Napier's first experience of 
warshipbuilding was far from encouraging. HMS SIMOON, laid down 
in December 1845, was not launched until May 1849 because of 
repeated changes of mind on the part of the Admiralty 
39 and, 
although Napier received sone fInancial conpensation for the 
delay, he apparently did not consider the amount sufficient to 
compensate for the inconvenience to which he had been put. 
40 
Nevertheless he was undeterred and the absence of further orders 
for iron warships until 1855 probably owed less to his 
unwillingness to undertake the work than to the Admiralty's 
temporary loss of interest in iron warships. 
When the Admiralty had ordered the five iron frigates in 1844 
it had been hoped that iron hulls would afford warships greater 
protection against gunfire. This prový-dnot to be the case. 
Tests subsequently showed that damage caused by solid round shot 
was as serious in iron-hulled ships as in the existing wooden 
hulls. 41 As a result the Royal Navy dropped all thought of iron 
warships until the experience of the Crimean War reminded them of 
the vulnerability of wooden warships to shellfire. 
42 The French 
23 
led the way in demonstrating that specially thickened iron plates 
afforded an effective measure of protection for the floating 
batteries employed in the siege of Sebastapol and the Admiralty 
followed their example. Napier's HMS EREBUS and her sister ship, 
HMS TERROR, built by Palmer's on the Tyne, were designed as copies 
of the French vessels. 43 I-aunched in 1856, they were not. 
completed in time to see service in the Crimeaq and floating 
batteries had no place in the Royal Navy in peacetime. 
Nevertheless, they were the Navy's first armoured vessels and 
their builders, who had accepted contracts which involved a 
penalty of L1,000 per day for late delivery. 44 gained some useful 
insights into the technical problems associated with the 
manufacture of armoured plates 45 in advance of the building of 
the first 'ironclad' battleship which followed in 1859. 
The introduction of armour plate into ships of the line was 
forced upon the Admiralty by France's action in ordering the 
world's first armoured wooden battleship - the GLOIRE - in 
1858.46 Till then the British naval authorities had resolutely 
declined to entertain any idea of building shot-proof warships on 
the grounds that: 
It is not in the interest of Great Britain - 
possessing as she does so large a navy - to 
adopt any important change in the construction 
of ships of war which night have the effect of 
rendering necessary the introduction of a new 
class of very costly vessels. 47 
When the French announced their intention of building the GLOIRE, 
the Admiralty was actively engaged in refurbishing its existing 
24 
fleet of wooden men of war by converting them to steam. 48 But, 
when it became necessary to respond to the French initiativer the 
naval authorities plumped for the revolutionary alternative of 
combining armour plating with an iron hull and powerful steam 
engines, -thereby regaining the technical initiative at the expense 
of making all existing capital ships obsolete. 
49 Tactically, 
this was a masterstroke as no foreign power could match Britain's 
capacity to build iron steamships. Practically, it involved a 
huge programme of new construction which could be carried out only 
with the active assistance of private shipbuilders and engineers 
and everything depended on the willingness of such firms as Robert 
Napier Sons to undertake warshipbuilding an a greatly increased 
scale. 
In the spring or 1859 Napier was invited to submit proposals 
for the new class of warship. The Admiralty specification was for 
A shot proof frigate of 36 guns cased with 
4 1/2 inch armour plates from thi upper deck 
to five feet below the waterline, to steam 
13 1/2 knots and to be capable or carrying 
weights amounting to 1,200 tons in addition 
to coal for at least seven days full steaming. 
5a 
It called for a ship much larger, heavier and more complicated 
than anything he or anyone else on the Clyde or elsewhere had ever 
attempted before. Napier responded positively to the technical 
challenge and, having taken steps to buy more ground at Covan for 
a further extension of the shipyard, 
51 he instructed one of his 
senior employees to begin an exhaustive series of tests to prove 
Parkhead's fitness to supply the necessary iron forgings and 
25 
armour plate. 52 
Napier's enterprise and enthusiasm were rewarded with the 
order for the Royal Navy's second 'ironclad' - HMS W. ACK PRINCE - 
launched in February 1861 after the upper Clyde had been specially 
dredged to take a ship 420 feet long and displacing 9,250 
tons. 53 As it transpired Napier had seriously underestimated'the 
difficulty or building a ship containing so many novel features 
and, despite his efforts to prepare for the task of manufactigring 
iron plates weighin, g four tons each'54 Parkhead succeded in - 
producing plates or the required quality only after the ship had 
been launched. 55 In consequence Napier's tender of E283,000 56 
proved to be woefully inadequate and, as costs mounted and the 
firm's liquidity became increasingly strained, the firm's 
financial resources were stretched to meet the demands made upon 
them. As early. as April 1860 Napier took steps to reduce his 
commitments by divesting himself or control of the Parkhead 
Forge. 57 By October 1860 the creditworthiness of his main 
business was in question and the Bank of Scotland was hesitant 
about agreeinij to finance the completion of the contract. 58 The 
firm survived the immediate crisis but, in the spring of 1861, 
Napier - bravely or foolhardily - accepted the contract for a 
second 'ironclad' - the 6,710 ton HMS HECTOR - and by 1863 the 
firm's lost, from the Bank of Scotland had grown to L130, CGO. 59 
While Napier was eventually awarded grants of L35,000 each in 
respect of both HMS B, ACK PRINCE and HMS HECTOR in compensation 
for the heavy losses which he had incurred in undertaking the two 
contracts: 
When there were very few firms which had 
26 
built ironclad ships at all ... there were 
no firms in a position to make a satisfactory 
estimate 
60 
his fortunes never fully recovered from the debacle. Following 
the building of the two ironclads for the Royal Navy, Napier was 
able to secure a number of orders for warships for foreign 
governments -a1,320 ton armoured turret ship for Denmark, three 
6,400 ton 'ironclad' frigates for Turkey, a 2,284 ton turret ram 
-and a 1,427 ton mon-itor for Holland 
61 
- and in 1865 he built the 
two fast 3,227 ton screw steamers with which the Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique wrested the 'blue riband' for the fastest 
crossing of the North Atlantic from British owners for the first 
time 62 but, in the last ten years of his life, Robert Napier's 
business was beset with problems. 
Napier's difficulties were partly attributable to his refusal 
to compromise on the standard of his workmanship. As Willian 
Pearce remarked after leaving Napier's employ in 1870: 
Such questions as 'What time will this take? ' 
or 'What will this cost? ' were always subordinate 
to the crucial one 'Is this the best?. 63 
In the 1830's and 1840's these attitudes had been an asset. 
Early steam engines were notoriously unreliable and Napier had 
prospered by following his own advice that: 
I would have everything connected with machinery 
very strong and of the best materials, it being 
of the utmost importance to give confidence at 
first. 64 
By the 1860's steam propulsion and iron shipbuilding had both 
27 
advanced beyond the stage where quality of workmanship alone 
commanded premium prices and, as the Clyde output of steam tonnage 
soared from 81,400 tons in 1841-50 to 798,400 tons in 1860-70,65 
Napier faced mounting competition from new yards, many of them 
founded by men who had imitated Napier's example in taking up 
shipbuilding after first making their names as marine engineers. 
66 
More fundamentally, Napier's problems were symptomatic of a 
long-term-decline in his ability to compete. By the 1860's he 
had lost any claim -to being considered 'the great authority an 
steam navigation. ' As early as the 185U's three other Clyde 
firms, Denny's, Thomson's and Caird's, had all been commissioned 
to build iron-hulled screw steamers for Napier's best customer 
Cunard; 67 while he had gone an building the largest paddle 
steamers, John Elder was busy pioneering the development of the 
compound engine which, with the introduction of the surface 
condenser, led to fuel economies of as much as 50 per cent. 68 
Napier's extensive experience of naval work still gave him some 
advantage in tendering for naval contracts, particularly in 
building the largest warships, but this experience was of limited 
value in winning contracts for fast passenger ships and it was 
notable that, from 1860 onwards, the engines of many of the major 
warships built by Napier were supplied by other firms. 69 
Against this background warshipbuilding came to be the main 
support of Napier's declining fortunes. During the last ten 
years of his life the output of his yard still contained a useful 
leavening or merchant work. Sir Donald Currie was a regular 
customer from 1863 onwards. 70 the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company, with whom he had severed relations after a quarrel in the 
28 
1850's eventually returned to him, 
71 and in the early 1670's he 
had a number or orders fron Dutch owners, 
72 but Cunard ravoured 
him with no Further orders after 1863.73 He produced no record 
breaking transatlantic steamers arter 1865 and erforts to take 
advantage of an upturn in the demand for merchant ships during the 
Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71 were frustrated by the 
unwillingness of his bankers to Finance prospective contracts. 
74 
Warships therefore constituted the major part of his output. 
In contrast to-the period up to the mid 1360's 
warshipbuilding in the final phase of Napier's long career was 
noted less for its novelty than for its volume, but he retained 
the confidence of the naval authorities and Admiralty orders were 
sufficiently numerous to keep the business reasonably well 
employed. Two 6,010 ton central battery ironclads - H14S 
AUDACIOUS and HMS INVINCIBILE - laid down in 1867 were followed by 
the order for the hull and machinery of the 4,331 ton turret ram 
HMS HOTSPUR in 1868, and, two years later, there were orders for 
the hull of the 3,480 ton monitor HMS HYDRA, the machinery for the 
dockyard-built turret ram HIIS RUPERT and two small flatiron 
gunboats. 75 Thereafter Napier received only one more major 
Admiralty contract - the order for the 7,630 ton armoured cruiser 
HMS NORTHAMPTON-laid down in 1874 -'but his continued interest in 
warshipbuilding was reflected in a succession of smaller naval 
orders: the hull and machinery of two composite gun vessels in 
1873; 76 the engines for a composite corvette in 1874; 
77 the hulls 
of two composite sloops and the hulls and machinery of two small 
composite gunboats in 1875,78 the year before Napier's death. 
This final phase of Robert Napier's career may have done 
29 
little to enhance his reputation but it did not detract from the 
fame of his earlier achievements as a warshipbuilder and, although 
there is no evidence that naval work. ever became particularly 
profitable, neither had it proved entirely ruinous to a firm-in 
straitened circumstances. In consequence Robert Napier's death 
was not fatal to the Clyde's interest in warshipbuilding. On the 
contrary, in this, as in much else, others followed where he led 
and his example was pervasive because many of the leading figures 
of the next generation of Clyde shipbuilders had learned their 
trade in his workshops and shipyard. 79 
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CHAPTER THREE 
- ROBERT NAPIER'S SUCCESSORS AND WARSHIPBUILDING 
ON THE C! -YDE 
PRIOR TO 1889. 
In the thirty years between the buildinq or the first 'ironclad, in 
1859 and the Navy Defence Act in 1889, the Clyde produced for the 
Royal Navy fifty warships and sixty-three sets of warship engines 
aggregating 124,164 tons and 135,644 horse-power respectively. As 
shown in Table 3.1,. apart fron Robert Napier himself, who was 
responsible for fifteen -of the wars7hips and'seventeen of the sets of 
engine s, most of this output came from three firms, Robert Napier 
i 
Sons, John Elder & Co,, which became the Fairfield Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Co ý. td in 1826, and J&G Thomson. 
TABLE 3.1 
ADMIRA! -TY CONTRACTS UNDERTAKEN BY CLYDE FIRMS 1859-1889 
WARSHIPS ENGINES 
NO. TONNAGE %10. H. P. 
ROBERT NAPIER & SONS 
ROBERT NAPIER 15 418 , 339 17 
31,936 
HIS SUCCESSORS 5 24,1CO 6 2s, 52O 
JOHN E'-DER & CO/ýAIRFIEI-D 12 29,926 11 28,5114 
J&G THOMSON 12 la, 863 14 34,280 
OTHERS 6 2,936 15 12,354 
(Source: Abstracted fron Appendix Cla) 
Two firms which were to become major warshipbuilders af ter 1889 - 
Scott's of Greenock and the London & Glasgow Engineering and Iran 
Shipbuilding Co !. td. - were only minor contributors 
to the output of 
the period. 
As the builders of the wooden sloop HMS THRUSH, which was 
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commissioned into the Navy during the Napoleonic Wars, l and the 
owners of a foundry which produced its first engine in 182592 
Scott's of Greenock had rivalled Robert Napier as an Admiralty 
contractor in the early days of steam and iron. In 1838-39 Scott's 
Greenock roundry supplied the engines for the paddle-driven sloops 
HMS HECATE and HMS HEC!. A, the first dockyard-built warships to be 
fitted with engines made on the Clyde, 
3 and their 1875 ton iron 
screw frigate HMS GREENOCK was contemporaneous with Napier's HMS 
SIMOON launched in -1849.4 By 1659, when Napi er built his first 
'ironclad'. the shipyard of Scott & Co., which continued a family 
tradition of shipbuilding at Greenock dating back to 1711, was 
otherwise engaged in building tea clippers. Six years later, in 
1865, t he Scotts found an alternative outlet for their enterprise by 
building the hulls and supplying the compound engines for the 
AGAMEMNON, AJAX and ACHII-LES with which Alfred Holt & Co. 
innaugurated a steam service to China. 5 but over the next thirty 
years the firm's total contribution'to the Clyde's output of 
warships was two composite gunboats lai'd down in 1888-69.6 In the 
interval, the familyl. s engine works, the Greenock Foundry Co, which 
retained a separate identity until 1901, maintained the Admiralty 
connection by supplying the engines for six dockyard-built wooden 
sloops laid down between 1859 and 1861,7 but it too undertook no 
further Admiralty contracts until 1887-88, when it supplied the 
machinery for two composite sloops. 8 
The London & Glasgow, which was to take advantage of the Navy 
Defence Act in 1889 to secure the first of a series or cruiser 
contracts which gave the yard a significant share of the warships 
built on the Clyde between 1889-19129 played little part in 
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warshipbuilding prior to 1889. The firm's contribution amounted to 
a single composite gun vessel laid down in 1866-67,9 two years after 
the company had been formed to take over-the iron shipbuilding yard 
founded by Smith & Rodger in 1842.10 
John Elder & Co. was the more successful of the two new firms 
which shared the bulk or the Admiralty orders with Robert Napier & 
Sons. Its origins were in the partnership of Randclph & Elder, 
formed in September 1852 when John Elder gave up his position as 
Robert Napier's dra-wing-office manager to join the-well-established 
engine manu fac turers , Randolph , Elliot t& Co ., fo unded 
by Cha r les 
Randolph in 1834.11 As with Robert Napier some thirty years 
earlier, Randolph and Elder initially confined themselves to marine 
engineering. Up to 1860, when they commenced shipbuilding on a 
modest scale, their repuýation rested largely on John Elder's work 
in developing the compound engine. 12 However the partners' 
reputation as marine engineers, combined with their enterprise in 
acquiring a 'green field' site at Fairfield, where they began laying 
out a great new shipyard equipped with its own engine and boiler 
shops in 1864,13 were the foundations of the firm's subsequent 
success. By the time the new shipyard was completed in 1871, John 
Elder, the last of the original partners, was dead, but an his death 
the property had 'passed to his wife, and, in July 1870, John Ure, 
her brother ,J1. Jamieson, the manager of the engine works, and 
William Pearce, formerly manager of Robert Napier & Sons shipyard, 
had gone into partnership to carry on the business. 
14 
Endowed with splendid new facilties and with an unrivalled 
experience of designing and manufacturing compound engines, the new 
firm of John Elder & Co prospered and the Admiralty was among its 
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most important early customers. As in much else, John Elder & Co, 
owed its success as an Admiralty contractor to the enterprise of 
Randolph & Elder who had provided the Admiralty with a set of 
compound engines for experimental purposes in the early 1860's. In 
1865, after extensive trials of the engines, which had been fitted 
in the wooden frigate HMS CONSTANCE, the naval authorities had 
concluded that compound engines were as yet insufficiently reliable 
and much too complicated for naval engine-staffs to operate 
successfully, 15 but the greatly increased range of operation 
resulting from the use of engines which offered substantial 
economies in fuel consumption could not be ignored. -The Admiralty 
re t urned to E1 de rIafor one of th r ee se ts of compo und engines ri t ted 
in dockyard-built corvettes completed between 1869 and 1872.16 
This experiment, like its predecessor, was only a qualified success 
but in-the early 1870's the Admiralty fitted compound engines in a 
number of other new warships and John Elder and Co. which had 
displayed its-mastery of the new technology by providing the most 
satisfactory of the three sets of engines fitted in the corvettes, 17 
supplied two more sets of engines for the armoured monitors HIIS 
CYCLOPS and HMS HYDRA laid down in 1870. This in turn paved the 
way For the prestigious contract to supply the machinery for the 
11,880 ton dockyard-built turret ship HMS INFI-EXIBLE, the heaviest 
man-of-war yet conceived when it was laid down in 1874.18 
Meanwhile, the adoption of compound engines had opened the way for 
the building of steam-powered cruisers with long-range endurance. 
In 1874, possibly at thýe prompting of William Pearce, who had 
acquired the requisite experience of warshipb-uilding at Napier's. 19 
the firm undertook the building of one of the Royal Navy's first 
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armoured cruisers - the 7,473 ton HMS NELSON - designed to steam 
7,500 miles at 7 knots. 20 Unlike her-sister ship HMS NORTHAMPTON, 
built by Napier's, HMS NV. SON was fitted with engines supplied by 
its builder and this contract, together with another for six Comus 
class timber-clad steel-framed frigates ladnched in 1876.21 set John 
Elder & Co well on the way to supplanting Robert Napier & Sons as 
the leading warshipbuilder on the Clyde. 
Having established itself as a major Admiralty contractor, John 
Elder & Co was regularly invited to tender for any naval work put 
out to contract. In 1884, it was the only Clyde firm, apart from 
Robert Napier & Sons, listed by the Admiralty both as being capable 
of building the largest warships and as 'always' being invited to 
tender for machinery. 22 Nevertheless from 1876 to 1889, 
warshipbuilding made only a modest contribution to the firm's 
output. This was not for lack of interest on the part or 
management. William Pearce, who became sole partner an the retiral 
of Ure and Jamieson in 1878,23 continued to take a keen interest in 
naval work up to his untimely death in 1888. As a parliamentary 
candidate at Govan in 1885 he made the need for a strong Navy one of 
the features of his election addresses 24 and, immediately prior to 
his election to Parliament in 1885 the firm was reconstituted as a 
private limited company so that it might continue to tender for 
Admiralty contracts. 25 Nor was the lack of warship orders because 
the firm was unable or unwilling to compete on price for the largest 
contracts. On the contrary, Elder's submitted the lowest price for 
two battleships put out to tender in April 1885 only to be denied 
the contract on other grounds. As was customary at this time, the 
Admiralty had invited firms to submit alternative designs for 
37 
machinery and some of Elder's competitors had proposed more powerful 
engines than those originally specified. When the tenders were 
opened, and it became apparent that the Admiralty favoured these 
alternative proposals, Elder's made frantic efforts to retrieve the 
situation by submitting alternative designs of their own but it was 
all to no avail. Although the Admiralty was offered the choice of 
having, for the price quoted, either engines of comparable power 
with an increase in weight of one hundred tons or engines of 
slightly less power. with no increase in weight , the contract-s went 
elsewhere. 26 
On the other hand, Elder's were not always competitive on price 
and the tenders which the firm submitted for the machinery of a 
succession of dockyard-built warships in the early 1880's suggest 
that it was either hopelessly uncompetitive or, more probably, 
disinterested in this class of work. 27 Under the management of 
Willian Pearce the firm had been extraordinarily successful in 
building up the merchant side of the business and it could afford to 
be selective. Particularly between 1879 and 1884 when it was 
engaged in building a succession of fast passenger liners - most 
notably the 'Atl*antic Greyhounds' ARIZONA, A16ASKA and OREGON for the 
Guion line and the 19 1/2 knot liners UMBRIA and ETRURIA for Cunard 
- there was little need of other work to keep both the shipyard and 
engine works busy. Failure to secure the order for one or both of 
the two battleships in 1885 was annoying, as it would have provided 
another major contract to follow on the building of the two 
Cunarders, but the lack of naval work did not halt the firm's 
growth. As shown in Table 3.2, while Elder's intake of Admiralty 
orders between 1876 and 1889 comprised only two small composite gun 
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vessels laid down in 1879-80 
28 and the hulls of the 2,950 ton 
second-class cruisers HMS MARATHON and HMS MAGICIENNE laid down in 
1887-88, the firm's total output in the decade 1881-90 was higher 
than it had been in the decade 1B71-80. 
TABLE 3.2 
JOHN ELDER & CO'S OUTPUT 1861-1890 
DECADE TONNAGE OF HORSE POWER VALUE OF 
VESSE'-S OF ENGINES WORK 
LAUNCHED COMPLETED COMPLETED 
z 
1861-70 80,558 79,146 2,782,150 
1871-80 219 230 189 284 7,093,190 
1881-90 248,257 386,682 7,910,490 
(Source: The Fairfield Shipbuilding & Enqineering Works, p15) 
In contrast to John Elder & Co., which made its major 
contribution to the Clyde's output or warships in the 1870's, J&G 
Thomson showed little interest in warshipbuilding until the - 
1880's. Along with Elder's-and the London & Glasgow, the firm had 
been entrusted with the building of a composite gun vessel in 
1666-67 29 but, up to 1884, its only other contributions to the 
Clyde's output of Admiralty work had been to build two small 
composite gunboats laid down in 1875-76 30 and to supply the engines 
for the dockyard-built composite corvette HMS EMERA!. D laid down in 
1874-75. Technically, J&G Thomson's record as a shipbuilder bore 
comparison with that of any shipyard on the Clyde but up to 1884 the 
bias of its interest was towards merchant shipbuilding. 
Founded in 1347 by James Thomson, who had moved from Manchester 
to take up employment as one of Robert Napier's managers in 1828, 
and his brother George Thomson, who had followed him into Robert 
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Napier's employ some years later. 31 the firm of J&G Thomson had 
been engaged in shipbuilding since 1851. The firm's emergence as a 
shipbuilder of the first rank dated from the 1860's when it 
supplanted Robert Napier & Sons as the builder of Cunard's biggest 
and fastest ships. Having started with the advantage of being the 
brother of Robert Thomson, who had been Cunard's first 
superintendent engineer. 32 James and George Thomson had been 
regularly employed in building screw-driven steamers for Cunard 
since 1854,33 but i. t was not until Cunard finally abandoned 
paddle-drive In the 1860's that they had the opportunity to try 
their hand at building its flagships. The 2,959 ton single screw 
liner RUSSIA launched in 1867 was J&G Thomson's first 'blue 
riband' holder. 34 Thereafter the firm chose to specialise in 
building fast ocean-going ships. In 1871, when the brothers James 
R Thomson and George P Thomson, who had fallen heir to the business 
an the death of their father George in 1366, moved the shipyard 
downriver from Mavisbank to Clydebank it was with the avowed 
intention or facilitating the building of larger ships. As they 
remarked: 
For years past ... the only vessels that have 
been at all remunerative are the larger classes 
of screw steamers and especially those for mail 
services. 36 
In the 1870's the firm's enterprise was not particularly 
well-rewarded as there was not always sufficient work to keep the 
shipyard well-employed but the firm persevered and in the early 
1880's it was rewarded with the orders for a number of notable ships 
including the 515 foot long 7,392 ton SERVIA, Cunard's first 
1 
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all-steel liner, 37 launched in 1881, and the 9,50-0 ton Cunard liner 
AURANIA and the record breaking National '-ine's AMERICA, both 
launched in 1883. Up to this time, only the firm's shipyard had 
been sited at Clydebank but, in 1881, no doubt encouraged by the 
buoyant demand, the firm started the construction of new engine and 
boiler works at Clydebank, specifically designed to accommodate the 
building of'the largest-triple-expansion engines. 38 
Finding work for these expanded facilities between 1883 and 
1889 proved to be extremely difficult. In 1893 the output of the 
Clyde shipbuilding industry had reached a peak of 419,664 tons, a 
level not to be surpassed until 1896, but the boom years of 1881-83 
were followed by a severe slump which lasted until 1888. At its 
worst, in 1886, the output of all the Clyde yards was only 172,440 
tons, a_level which was low even by the standards of the 1870'st 39 
and one which the Clyde shipbuilding industry was not to experience 
again until the 19301s. Even before the onset of this slump, J&G 
Thomson had suffered a major reverse at the hands of John Elder- & Co 
which had secured the contract for the Cunard liners UMBRIA and 
ETRURIA. For twenty years J&G Thomson had built all of Cunard's 
most important ships and between 1863 and 1883 twenty-one or the 
twenty-eight ships added to the Cunard fleet had been built in their 
yard. 40 When denand for all types of merchant ships fell away, the 
situation became critical. While John Elder & Co survived the 
crisis by building ships on their own account or accepting shares in 
part payment for the work done, 41 J&G Thomson appear to have been 
unable or unwilling to follow suit. Between January 1864 and 
December 1686 the firm's total intake of merchant work amounted to 
four small vessels. 42 
41 
Understandably, against this background J&G Thomson was eager 
to tender for any naval work which became available but, in seeking 
Admiralty contracts to replenish its order book, the firm was 
handicapped by a lack of what the Admiralty considered to be 
relevant experience. While it was invited to tender for the 
largest contractst the Admiralty had no intention of entrusting the 
firm with any order which involved the manufacture of large 
engines. Admiralty contractors were expected to start with small 
engines and work their way up and, while J&G Thomson was 
acknowledged to have built engines of up to 12,000 horse power for 
merchant customersl it was rated as being fit to build naval engines 
of up to only 4,000 horse power 'simply because they have not 
hitherto made large engines for the Navy'. 43 The contract for the 
5,500 horse-power engines of the dockyard-built armoured cruiser HMS 
AURORA in February 1886 was a first step towards removing this 
disability but, at the same time, the Admiralty overlooked the 
firm's highly competitive tender for the engines of two battleships 
on the grounds that the design was 'unsatisfactory' and the firm 
'had no experience of this type of machinery'. 44 In consequence J 
&G Thomson's share of warship orders placed by the Admiralty on the 
Clyde between 1884 and 1889 comprised only a succession of nine 
third-class cruisers ranging in size between 1,580 tons and 2,575 
tons. While these contracts, and particularly those for the 1,580 
ton torpedo cruiser HMS SCOUT laid down in January 1884 and six more 
1,770 ton torpedo cruisers laid down in February 1885,45 were 
invaluable in keeping the yard going when it had little other work 
on hand, they were a meagre return for a great deal of effort. 
Further, they did not prevent J&G Thomson's suffering trading 
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losses from 1885 onwards. 46 
By 1889, Robert Napier & Sons, the third of the major Clyde 
warshipbuilders, was in even greater difficul. ties, The decline in 
the firm's affairs which had been apparent during Robert Napier's 
lifetime continued after his death. The brothers John and James 
Hamilton and A. C. Kirk, formerly engine ship manager of John Elder 
Co. who took over in 1879, managed to keep the business going but 
from the outset their room for manoeuvre was limited by the need to 
borrow L160,000 from Robert Napier's trustees to finance the 
purchase of assets and goodwill valued at E270,000.47 For a few 
years Kirk's work in developing the triple expansion engine helped 
to keep the yard reasonably well-employed 48 but hopes of a 
sustained improvement in the firm's fortunes disappeared with the 
onset of the severe depression of the mid-1880's. In 1880, when 
temporarily short of work, the firm managed to secure an Admiralty 
contract for three 4,300 ton second-class cruisers 49 to keep it 
going and in 1885, despite the late delivery of the earlier ships, 
it won the contract for the 5,600 ton Orlando class armoured 
cruisers HMS AUSTRP. IA and HMS GA'-ATEA but neither contract was of 
much assistance. The first ran into difficulties on account of 
shortages of labour when the demand for merchant work revived; 
50 the 
second was taken at a price which can have left little if any margin 
for profit as Napier's tender of E215,000 per ship was not only 
L15,000 below that of J&C Thomson and L20,000 below that of John 
Elder & Co but also the lowest or all the tenders submitted. 51 
Meanwhile, indicative of Robert Napier & Sons declining 
capabilities, it was not invited to tender for any of the 
battleships put out to contract by the Admiralty in the 18801s. 52 
43 
Short of work, handicapped by ageing plant and facilties 
inconveniently split between the shipyard at Govan and engine works 
at Lancefield Street on the other side of the Clyde, and saddled 
with a burden of debt which made the firm uncomfortably highly 
geared and precluded the raising or new capital for much needed 
modernisation, Robert Napier & Sons survived but by 1889 it was 
nearing the end of its tether. Five years later Kirk was dead and 
the surviving partners had to admit that they were no longer able to 
meet their obligati. ons. 
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In seeking Admiralty work to compensate for the dearth of 
merchant orders in the mid-18801s, 3&G Thomson and Robert Napier & 
Sons were fortunate that public alarm at the prospec. t of war with 
Russia in 1884 had rorced the Liberal Governme. nt of the day to 
authorise the Northbrook Progranme which provided for the building 
or two battleships, five armoured cruisers. and six torpedo cruisers 
in private shipyards. For most of the 1870's and 1880's Admiralty 
orders were in extremely short supply. In seven of the twenty 
years between 1869-70 and 1888-89 no 'major' warships were laid down 
by the Admiralty in private yards and, excluding the Northbrook 
programme, the volume of such orders exceeded 20,000 tons in one 
year an only two occasions. 54 This shortage of naval work owed 
less to any reduction in the size of naval programmes than to the 
re-emergence of the Royal 'Dockyards as the-Navy's primary source of 
supply. In 1859 when the Admiralty decided to build lironclads' it 
had no alternative but to entrust the work to private shipyards as 
the Royal Dockyards were not equipped for iron shipbuilding. As 
soon as it was decided to introduce iron-hulled capital ships into 
the Royal Navy, urgent steps were taken to equip the Dockyards to 
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build them. The first dockyard-built 'ironclad' was laid down at 
Chatham as early as August 1861 55 and, although it was some years 
before other dockyards were ready to commence production, Pembroke 
and Portsmouth were considered fit to be entrusted with the building 
of large armoured ships by 1865 and 1869 respectively. 
56 Table 3.3 
shows the effect of the revival or the Dockyards an the allocation 
of major warship orders between them and private suppliers between 
1859 and 1889. 
TABI-E 3.3 
AUCCATION OF MAJOR WARSHIP OROERS 1859-1889 57 
ROYAL DOCKYARDS PRIVATE YARDS 
WOODEN OTHER Aý-'- OTHER 
LAID DOWN NO TONNAGE NO TONNAGE NO TONNAGE 
1859-64 20 48,704 2 17 380 10 79,788 
1864-69 15 26,072 7 47,461 15 63,117 
1869-74 6 15,178 13 82,083 7 19,260 
1874-79 23 69 185 14 40,123 
1879-34 30 123,830 9 29 670 
NORTHBROOK 13 60,560 
1884-89 3B 103,403 16 35,405 
(Source: detail abstracted from Conway's 
All the World's Fightino Ships 1860-1905) 
The traditionally-minded Royal Dockyards may not have been 
particularly efficient producers of iron ships. Up to the 1880's, 
when belated steps were taken to overhaul their manaqement and weed 
out inefficient practices, " it -is doubtful whether their 
performance would have stood comparison with that of the more 
efficient private yards. They did not need to be. As an integral 
part of the Admiralty establishment, the Royal Dockyards were not 
required to compete with private yards. The Admiralty was in a 
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position to allocate them such orders as it saw fit. Further, as 
the Admiralty was quick to point out when pressed, the interests of 
econony did not require that they should be able to compete with 
private yards in terms of cost of production. lt-was sufficient 
that the additional costs they incurred in shipbuilding did not 
exceed the prices charged by outside suppliers. As the Navy's 
Chief Constructor, Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, pointed out to the 
Ravensworth Committee in 1884: 
The establishment exists, the staff exists 
and we therefore compare our actual outlay 
upon the work with that which we pay outside; 
although that outside payment includes profit 
and general-expenditure for plant and 
supervision. 59 
The revival of the dockyards did not enable the Admiralty to 
dispense with the services of private firms altogether. First, 
they were required to supply the engines for all dockyard-built 
warships as the Admiralty possessed neither the facilities nor the 
expertise to produce their own. 60 Second, Britain's naval 
supremacy could no longer be taken for granted and it was expedient 
to allow private shipyards a leavening of warship orders so that a 
nucleus of firms would be Familiar with the work which they would be 
required to undertake if It became necessary to outbuild a rival 
power in an emergency. Nevertheless, the role ascribed to the 
private shipbuilder in the 1870's and 1880's was not a particularly 
attractive one. Supplying engines for dockyard-built warships had 
limited appeal for firms such as those on the Clyde which sought 
work for both shipyard and engine works and the volume and character 
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of warship orders allocated to private yards was inadequate to 
provide them with regular employment. Excluding the Northbrook 
Programme, th e volume of major warship laid down in private yards 
averaged only 6,223 tons per annum between 1869 and 1889, compared 
with 14,290 tons per annum in the decade following the introduction 
of the 'ironclad, 61 and only four armoured warships - one 
battleship and three armoured cruisers 
62 
- were built outside the 
Royal Dockyards between 1870 and 1889. To compound the private 
warshipbuilders' problems any orders which they did manage to obtain 
were liable to be subject to frequent changes in specification and 
time-consuming delays in production as the Admiralty insisted on 
trying to incorporate the latest developments in gunnery and 
appliances into every ship that was built. 63 
Depite these defects there was no shortage of fir-ms willing to 
undertake the work. In 1885 when the Admiralty placed the orders 
for the five-armoured cruisers authorised by the Northbrook 
Programme it received serious bids from nine of the eleven firms 
invited to tender. 64 This may have been an exceptional case as 
merchant work was in particularly short supply at this time and the 
large number or ships on offer aroused a great deal of interest, but 
Admiralty contracts were almost always subject to competitive tender 
and the competition to secure thm was fierce. Whether, as Sir 
Nathanial Barnaby claimed in 1884, the competition was so intense 
that 'a Government contract for building a ship of war ... almost 
always results in a loss,, 65 is dubious. William I-aird, the senior 
partner of Laird Brothers, the Birkenhead warshipbuilders, who spoke 
from personal experience, was probably more accurate when he told 
the same Parliamentary Committee that: 
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A very large proportion of the contracts 
given out in late years have not been very 
profitable to the contractD"rs. 
66 
Certainly no one suggested that losses were an a sc5le comparable to 
those incurred an the first lironclads' when the builders had no 
previous experience to guide them in framing their estimates. 
Neverthelessv there was a grain of truth in the assertation of John 
Field, the general manager of Palmers of Jarrow, that by the early 
1880's no builder would take Admiralty work when he could get 
merchant work $upon anything like reasonable terms'. 
67 A 
preference for merchant work was implicit in the behaviour not only 
of John Elder & Cc and J&G Thonson but also of other Clyde firms 
which played little or no part in warshipbuilding. Scott's 6f 
Greenock apparently found developing a new specialisation in 
steamers for the Far East trade more profitable than building on its 
Admiralty connection. Other firms may not have had the same 
opportunity but at least one Clyde firm, Caird & Cc of Greenock, 
which had been awarded the contract for a monitor in 1870 before 
begging to be excused, 68 expressed its disinterest in naval work in 
1885 by submitted an outrageously high price when invited to tender 
for the Orlando class cruisers. 69 Possibly John Elder & Cc was the 
only Clyde shipbuilder apart from Robert Napier to have taken 
Admiralty orders out or choice rather-th-an necessity. 
Whatever their motivation, the action of John Elder & CO and J 
&G Thomson in taking up warshipbuilding prior to 1889 made a major 
contribution to the development of the Clyde warshipbuilding 
industry. Neither firm came close to matching the achievements of 
Robert Napier by 1889 but they brought new blood to the industry. 
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Robert Napier had been pre-eminent among the generation of Clyde 
shipbuilders and engineers which had laid the foundations of the 
local shipbuilding industry's success by pioneering the use of steam 
and iron, but his achievements belonged increasingly to the past and 
his interest in warshipbuilding could be dismissed as a personal 
idiosyncracy. By contrast, John Elder & Co and J&GT. homson were 
closely identified with the development of the compound engine and 
the building of steel ships 70 which consolidated th-e Clyde's 
position as the world's foremost shipbuilding centre. They 
possessed the largest and best-equipped shipyards and engine works 
on the river and, unlike Robert Napier & Sons, they had the 
potential to build the largest warships if the opportunity presented 
itself. Meanwhile they had demonstrated that they could compete on 
price, they had established themselves as reliable Admiralty 
contractors and they had acquired a useful experience of buIlding 
cruisers, a new class of work for which there was to be high demand 
in the future. While warshipbuilding played a relatively modest 
part in the growth of the Clyde shipbuilding industry in the 1870's 
and 1880's there was no discontinuity between Robert Napier's 
pioneering work and the emergence of the Clyde as a major 
warshipbuilding centre in the 18901s. On the contrary, as Table 
3.4 overleaf shows, the Clyde's output of Admiralty contracts for 
warships and engines grew and any decline in the importance of 
warshipbuilding between 1859 and 1889 was relative rather than 
absolute. 
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TABýE 3.4 
-CI. YDESIDE'S INTAKE OF ADMIRA'LTY CONTRACTS 1859-1689 
ýAID DOWN WARSHIPS ENGINES 
NO TONNAGE NO I. H. P. 
1859-1869 9 34,723 19 26,542 
1869-1879 19 38,691 21 44,062 
1879-1889 22 50,750 23 67,040 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix Cla) 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
1889-1899: THE NAVY DEFENCE ACT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. 
The private warshipbuilders' prospects were transformed by the 
Navy Defence Act of 1889 which made financial provision for the 
building in private shipyards of a total of four battleships, 
five protected cruisers, seventeen second-class cruisers and 
six torpedo gunboats. These ships were the private 
warshipbuilders' share of a massive five-year programme costing 
L21.5 millions, which called for the building of no less than 
seventy new warships aggregating 335,060 tons. More 
important, they were the product of renewed public and 
political interest in the Royal Navy which augured well for the 
future level of demand. 
Pressure to increase spending on the Royal Navy had been 
building up since 1881 when a Royal Commission on the defence 
of British possessions*and commerce abroad, appointed in the 
aftermer_math of the Balkan crisis of 1878, reported that 'the 
strength of the navy should be increased with as little delay 
as possible'. 1 At the time no action was taken and the report 
itself was suppressed, but the issue resurfaced in 1884 when 
information supplied by serving naval officers inspired a 
series of highly critical articles in The Pallmall Gazette. 2 
On this occasion the combination of press agitation and renewed 
fears of war with Russia forced the then First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Lord Northbrookq to act, although the critics of 
naval policy were far from being satisfied with the scale of 
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the 'Northbrook* Programme which provided for the building of 
only two battleships, five protected cruisers, six torpedo 
cruisers and fourteen torpedo boats at a cost of L3.1 
millions. 3 In January 1888, ýord Charles Beresford, the 
Fourth Sea Lord, resigned his post to campaign for a larger and 
better organised Navy. 4 The previous year, the Jubilee Review 
had shown the fleet to be a motley collection of ships, many of 
them barely seaworthy far less serviceable as effective 
fighting unif's. 5 The complacent tone of the evidence given by 
the Sea Lords to the House of Commons Select Committee on the 
1888 Naval Estimates did nothing to allay mounting public 
concern and, in 1880, the London Chamber of Commerce'added its 
influential voice to those demanding the strengthening of the 
Navy. 6 By 1889 the pressure had become irresistible. No one 
had ever denied the importance of maintaining Britain's naval 
supremacy and the report on the 1888 Navy Manoeuvres contained 
the warning that the existing fleet was: 
Altogether inadequate to take the offensive 
I 
in a war with only one great power and, 
supposing a combination or two powers to be 
allied as her enemies, the balance of maritime 
strength would be against England. 7 
In parlianent, party controversy an the Governnent's 
proposals centred on the unorthodox character of the financial 
arrangements rather than on the-progranme itself and a vital 
consensus emerged on the need to maintain a 'Two Power 
Standard'. The statement by the Unionist First Lord of the 
Admiralty, '-ord George Hamilton, that: 
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Llur establishment should be an such a 
scale that it should at least be equal 
to the naval strength of any two other 
countries 8 
was explicitly accepted by the opposition spokesman, the future 
!. iberal leader and Prime Minister, Henry Campbell-8annerman, 
9 
Originally directed against a possible combination of France 
and Russia, the 'Two Power Standard, was to be the ba sis of all 
naval provision for the next quarter of a century. In 1909, 
the then Prime I-linister, Henry Asquith, deprecated the tendency: 
-ro treat the Two-Power Standard as though 
it had a sort of sacred sacro-sanctity and 
immutable authority which sheltered it from 
all criticism 
10 
and the formula was subsequently modified to deal with the 
situation cri-a--ted by the rise of the Imperial German Navy 
fl 
but, up to 1914, no government dared admit publicly that the 
principle of a 'Two Power Standard' had been compromised. 
The adoption of a 'Two Power Standard' had far-reaching 
consequences for the subsequent level of naval construction. 
Even before the 1889 ptogramme was completed fears of a 
Franco-Russian alliance had led to agitation for a further 
addition to naval strength. In December 1893, when the 
1-iberal Government which had taken office in 1892 faced an 
opposition motion that 'a considerable addition should be at 
once made to the Navy', the Prime Minister, Mr Gladstoneq was 
virtually the only member of the cabinet who believed further 
expenditure to be unnecessary. 12 By March 1894 he had retired 
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and the incoming Rosebery administration had announced a najor 
new five-year building programme - the Spencer Programme - 
which provided for the immediate commencement of seven more 
battleships and six more cruisers, with the implicit promise 
that further cruisers would follow in succeeding years. 
13 The 
return of a Unionist Government at the 1895 election did 
nothing to lessen the commitment to a big navy. Year by year 
the Naval Estimates made provision for the building of further 
battleships and crui. sers and in both 1897 and 1898 there were 
supplementary estimates to cover the building of yet more 
warships to satisfy the requirements of the 'Two Power 
Standard'. which demanded that Britain should respond in kind 
to the building plans of the French and Russian Governments. 
In July 1897 a new French cruiser programme was countered by 
orders for four cruisers and three destroyers. Similarly, in 
July 1698, provision had to be made for the building of a 
further four battleships, four cruisers and nine destroyers 
following the announcement of Russia's future building plans. 
The escalating arms race had a dramatic impact on the 
volume of warshipbuilding available to private shipyards. In 
1889, and again under the Spencer Programme of 1894-95, the 
largest share of the work was allocated to the Royal Dockyards 
but there was a limit to how much work they"could handle. The 
larger the naval construction programmes became, the greater 
the volume of Admiralty work which had to be put out to 
contract. In 1898-99, when the original programme called for 
the building of eleven ships aggregating 104jl2a tons, six of 
the ships aggregating 59,710 tons were allocated to the Royal 
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Dockyards, but when it became necessary to provide for the 
building of another seventeen ships aggregating a further 
101,230 tons, only two more ships aggregating 19,600 tons could 
be accommodated in the Navy's own establishments. Meanwhile 
the introduction of the torpedo boat destroyer in 1893-94 had 
created a class or work for which the dockyards were ill-suited 
and the Admiralty decided to leave the design and construction 
of these small fast ships to private firms. 14 Equally 
important, the conditions under which private firms were 
expected to undertake Admiralty work were much more favourable 
than they had been prior to 1889. Contracts were no longer 
subject to frustrating delays while the Admiralty sorted out 
changes in specification and made up its mind on matters of 
detail. The emphasis was now on speed of production and steps 
were taken to prevent such delays from occurring: 
It was decided after careful consideration 
to give the Dockyard-built ships of each 
type a sensible start upýn the contract-built 
ships of similar type in order that all 
details of fitting and equipment might 
be thoroughly worked out in the dockyards 
by naval and professional officers and thus 
be available for guidance in the construction 
of the contract ships. 
15 
For some contractors the building of a number of ships to a 
common design may have been a mixed blessing as the Admiralty 
tightened up an matters of detail, leaving builders with less 
room for discretion, 16 but this was not a change which worried 
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the more eff_icient of their number. Further, since 
contractors were no longer expected to submit alternative 
engine designs17 and the Admiralty now provided the outline 
drawings for both ships and engines, tendering for Admiralty 
contracts became less of a lottery. This made the work much 
more attractive and, despite the Admiralty's insistence on the 
highest standard of workmanship, contractors who could compete 
on price prospered. 
. None of this was7 apparent to priV3te 
firm s at the outset. 
On the Clyde renewed interest in warshipbuilding in the 1890's 
probably owed more to the situation in which individual firms 
found themselves than to any conscious decision to exploit a 
favourable opportunity. Nevertheless, the Navy Defence Act of 
1889 afforded Admiralty contractors an exceptional opportunity 
to tender successfully for a share of naval work. Apart from 
the warships specifically allotted to private firms under the 
terms of the Act, it was neceSS3ry to make extensive use of 
private firms to provide the engines for dockyard-built 
ships. Seven sets of engines were manufactured in the Royal 
Dockyards, using manpower and machinery provided for the 
purpose of repairing naval engines in an emergency, 
18 but 
private firms supplied the rest. As a result the Admiralty 
found itself having to place orders for thirty-one sets of 
machinery for dockyard-built ships as well as for the 
simultaneous building of thirty-two warships totalling 157,510 
tons, a situation which called for the participation of an 
exceptionally large number of private firms. As was 
customary, the distribution of orders was determined by 
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competitive tender and none of th"e Admiralty's regular 
suppliers was assured of a share of the work but, in practice, 
virtually all of the Admiralty's most experienced contractors 
had some share of the orders and only one of the nineteen firms 
favoured with a contract appears to have been entirely new to 
naval work. 19 
On Clydeside, five firms participated in the five-year 
programme started in 1889. J&G Thomson which became J&G 
Thomson ýtd. in 1890, and traded as the Clydebank Engineering & 
Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. fron 1896 to 1899 before becoming the 
Clydebank division of John Srown & Co. Ltd. (hereafter referred 
to simply as Clydebank to avoid confusion); the Fairfield 
Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd. (hereafter referred to 
simply as Fairfield); Robert Napier & Sons (hereafter referred 
to simply as Napier's); the London & Glasgow Engineering &-Iron 
Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. (hereafter referred to simply as the 
London & Glasgow) and the Greenock Foundry Co. which merged 
with Scott & Co. to form Scott's Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. 
'-td. in 1901 (thereafter referred to simply as Scott's 
Of the five firms, the principal beneficiary was Clydebank 
which received orders worth L1,023,071 for the building of 
three 3,400 ton Apollo class second-class cruisers, 20 the 
14,150 ton Royal Sovereign class battleship HMS RAMP-LIES. and 
the machinery of the dockyard-built cruiser HMS HERMIONE. Of 
the four other Clyde firms which participated in the programme, 
the ! London & Glasgow, with an order For three 3,600 ton 
second-class cruisers, 21 did as well as could be expected of a 
relatively small firm with little previous experience of naval 
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work and an order for the engines of two dockyard-built 
battleships 22 admitted Greenock Foundry to the select group of 
firms which the Admiralty considered fit to undertake the 
building of the largest naval engines. Napier's, nearing the 
end of its long career as an Admiralty contractor, declined the 
opportunity to build more than one 7,700 ton Edgar class 
protected cruiser 23 and Fairfield, which had expected an order 
for cruisers, 24 and might reasonably have hoped for more, 
succeeded only in securing contracts for tne construction of 
the machinery for two dockyard-built cruisers and one 
dockyard-built torpedo gunboat. 25 
. 
While the disparity between the volume of orders received 
by Clydebank and Fairfield under the 1889 programme may not 
ha ve been intentional, it was an accurate reflection of the 
very different circumstances in which the two firms Found 
themselves in 1889 when most of the contracts were put out to 
tenderg differences which were apparent in the circumstances 
under which each of them became public companies - Fairfield in 
July 1889 and Clydebank in March 189U. 
When Fairfield came to the market in 1889 it was still a 
thriving concern. The firm had suffered ayf major loss in the 
untimely death of Sir William Pearce in 1888 as neither his 
business partner, Richard Barnwell, who served as managing 
director until his death in 1898, nor Sir William George 
Pearce, who succeeded his Father as chairman, possessed Sir 
William's extraordinary flair for business which had made 
Fairfield the most successful shipbuilder on the Clyde, but the 
change in management did not prevent Fairfield from being 
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valued at L750,000 including an unspecified amount for goodwill 
in the value of L279,537 attached to land. It would appear 
that the decision to 'go public' was primarily intended to 
allow the Pearce family to realise part of their fortune 
without relinquishing control. In any event, all of the 
benefits of the public issue appear to have accrued to the 
vendors. The capital of the new company was divided into 
25,000 ordinary shares of E10 each, E250,000 of 6% prefence 
shares and L250,000-of 4 14 debentures, and the vendors, who 
were allocated all of the ordinary shares and Z139,390 of 
debentures, also received Z391,804 in cash, 26 
By contrast, when the firm of J&C Thomson was 
reconstituted as J&G Thomson Ltd., in March 1890, there was 
no conparable element of goodwill in its valuation at 
L400,000.27 An issue of L150,000 of 5% debentures was needed 
to refinance the business and the vendors retained nominal 
control only by the grace of their bankers who advanced them 
L250,000 to take up all of the ordinary shares in the new 
. -ati son . pany. Since 1885 J&G Than had suffered trading losses 
of L84,860.28 By ýMarch 1890 there was no alternative to the 
winding-up of the partnership. The partners' capital accounts 
were overdrawn by L78,841, the Inman Line was withholding 
ZlOO, OO0 pending the settlement of outstanding claims an the 
12,950 ton liners CITY Or' NEW YORK and CITY OF PARIS launched 
in 1888, and the firm was heavily in debt to its bankers. By 
March 1891, after a settlement with the Inman Line costinq 
. E45,000, the deficiency on the partners' capital accounts had 
increased to Z112,556.29 Although they continued to be 
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- employed as directors of the new company, the Thomson brothers 
never regained full control of the business. By 1896, when 
the company's name was changed to the Clydebank'Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. the fami ly interest was negligible. 30 
By the winter of 1893-94v when major Admiralty orders were 
next put out to tender, Fairfield had as much need of the work 
as Clydebank. In part, this was due to a slump in merchant 
demand. In contrast to 1889, when the Navy Defence Act had 
coincided with a boon in nerchant shipbuilding, the renewed 
demand for warships in the winter of 1893-94 occurred what) 
merchant work was in short supply. The volume of 
steam-powered merchant ships launched in the United Kingdom had 
declined steadily from a peak of 717,582 tons in 1889 to 
460,600. tons in 1893.31 By December 1893, The Glesqow Herald, 
which, a year earlier, had remarked an the fact that much of 
the 1892 output had been in an advanced state of'completion in 
December 1891,32 was in no doubt as to the outlook: 
The returns from every quarter tell 
or a depression which is slowly but 
surely settling on the industry and 
the decline in trade generally precludes 
the immediate possibility of anything 
like a genuine revival. 
33 
The ineptitude of Fairfield's management made matters worse. 
Over the three years to 30th June 1892, Fairfield's merchant 
order book had-kept the company proritably employed. Despite 
providing Z35,338 for depreciation, Z33,750 for debenture 
interest and Z44,675 for preference dividends, the directors 
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had been able to recommend the payment of annual dividends or 
10% on the ordinary shares and the transfer of a total or 
00,000 to reserve but, as early as September 1890, the 
auditors observed that the costs of the shipbuilding dep'artment 
in the year to 30th June 1890 had exceeded estimate by 
L20,687.34 The board ought to have realised that something 
was amiss when the engine and boiler shops, under the 
management of Andrew Laing, earned profits of Z135,014 in the 
three years to 30th -June 1892 while the shipbuilding 
department, under the management of J. Sexton White barely 
broke even, 35 but no action was taken until 1892-93, when it 
became apparent that the contract for the building of the 
12,950 ton liners CAMPANIA and I-UCANIA for Cunard was going 
badly wrong. By June 1893, when White was finally asked to 
resign, it was too late to prevent a najor reverse, 
Profitability declined sharply in the year to 30th June 1893; 
the directo rs were obliged to pass the ordinary dividend and 
draw on reserves to cover the preference dividend. 
Thereafter, the situation became increasingly bleak. By 
October 1893, when the directors revealed that the Cunard 
contract would result in a loss, 
36 the company had received a 
claim for damages amounting to L165,000 in respect of 
deficiencies in the vessels' deadweight carrying c*ip-acity. 
The board considered this claim 'monstrous' as, in their view, 
the deficiency was 'in a great measure I due to the extra weight 
or the engines ritted in the ships in response to Cunard Is 
request for more speed, 37 but, contractually, Fairfield was in 
a weak position. With Cunard withholding the balance of the 
a 
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purchase price, the amount of the company's indebtedness was 
assuming such worrying proportions that, in July 1893, its 
bankers asked for a personal guarantee from the chairman in 
respect of the company's overdraft. 
38 Meanwhile, the yard was 
running short of work and rairfield was experiencing the 
greatest difficulty in competing for any new merchant orders 
which became available. Richard Barnwell informed the board 
in June 1893 that a tender for Burrell & Sons was: 
Greatly in excess of other Clyde yards 
despite (his) having taken it upon himself 
to eliminate all profit and a proportion of 
charges. 39 
Faced wi-th this situation the Fairfield board took an 
active interest in the naval work which became available in 'the 
winter of 1893-94. A few months earlier, on the advice or 
Francis Elgar, late Director of the Royal Dockyards, 40 who had 
joined the Fairfield board in September 1891, Barnwell had 
halted preparat ions of a bid for destroyers 41 but, in December 
1893, after tenders for the machinery or two dockyard-built 
battleships based on 20% charges and no profit 42 and for a 
Powerful class cruiser had both proved abortive, the board 
decided to tender for destroyers on the prompting of the 
chairman, w1io urged them to 'use every endeavourl to secure 
such a contract. 43 In February 1894, Fairfield was rewarded 
with an order for three. 44 While most welcome, as the firm's 
order book for delivery after June 1894 comprised only the 
steam yacht GERULDA for Mr. H. B. L. McCalmont and the S. S. 
ARUNDEI- CASTI-E for Sir Donald Currie, this order did not 
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resolve the company's problems. Despite the appointment of a 
new shipyard manager, and a determined effort to cut costs, new 
work continued to be hard to find. Eventually, Fairfield 
succeeded in securing the order for the 5,600 ton Eclipse class 
cruisers WIS DIANA and HýS VENUS in Ap. ril 1894 and, following a 
settlem. ent with Cunard which limited the loss on the contract 
for the CAMPANIA and ýUCANIA to L89,022, the company was able 
to continue trading with the assistance of the Pearce family 
who paid in :. 90,000 to cover the deficiency in the accounts at 
30th June 1894, but the weakness of Fairfield's competitive 
situation was evident in the outcone of the tenders for a 
Majestic class battleship in February 1894. Having submitted 
a bid of L446,129, the board was sufficiently anxious to secure 
the work that it 
; 
educed its price to C430,000 when the 
Admiralty Inquired whether Fairfield was prepared to accept the 
order at a lower price but it did not feel able to accept 
L417,000, the price the Admiralty apparently was willing to 
pay - 
45 In consequence the orders were awarded to !. aird's of 
Birkenhead and to Clydebank which had already beaten rairfield 
in securing the order for the Powerful class cruiser HMS 
TERRIBLE in December 1893. 
Clydebank's success in securing the orders for both the 
14,200 ton protected cruiser MIS TERRIBýE and the 14,725 ton 
battleship HMS JUPITER in the winter of 1893-94 was not 
achieved at the expense of accepting the work at what, for 
Clydebank, would have been unremunerative prices. The cruiser 
HMS TERRIBLE produced a contribution to overheads and profit of 
L144,056 on an invoiced price of L561,111 despite the problems 
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associated with building engines to drive a 14,200 ton ship at 
22 knots. The battleship HMS JUPITER which was priced at 
L435,855, Z58, C29 below the price received For the battleship 
HMS RAMII-LIES ordered in 1889, still yielded a contribution to 
overheads and profit of L111,150. Nor was Clydebank's success 
in securing orders because it was better placed than rairfield 
to take risks in tendering for major naval contracts. On the 
contrary, in the winter of 1893-94, it too was in financial 
difficulties and, un-like Fairfield, it did not have the Pearce 
family fortune to fall back on. 
rrom the outset the fortunes of the new company had been 
heavily dependent on its success as a warshipbuilder. Unlike 
Fairfield, which had taken orders for 23,350 tons of merchant 
ships worth E756,576 between the death of Sir William Pearce in 
1888 and July 1889.46 Clyde. bank had derived little benefit from 
the buoyant demand for merchant ships in 1888-89. Its total 
intake of merchant work between the receipt of the Inman Line 
order in 1887 and the passing of the Navy Defence Act in 1889 
comprised two ships aggregating 9,119 tons. 47 As a result 
Clydebank's order book had continued to be dominated by naval 
work and its success in securing a major share of the orders 
placed by the Admiralty under the Navy Defence Act had been of 
critical importance for the success of the capital 
reconstruction which followed. With warships accounting for 
seven of the eleven contracts taken over from the Thomson 
partnership, the works were described in the prospectus for the 
issue of debentures as being capable of producing either 30,000 
tons of first-class steam ships or 20,000 tons of warships per 
K 
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annum. 48 In addition, the'orders secured under the Navy 
Defence Act had provided the new company with three years of 
extremely profitable work. Profits of L49,571 an the three 
second class cruisers, HMS TERPSICHORE, HMS THETIS and HMS 
TRIBUNE, and Z6U, OOO on account of a final profit of Z93,767 on 
the battleship HMS RAMII-I-IES, resulted in trading profits 
totalling Z137,961 before providing E38,621 for depreciation 
and Z16,928 for debenture interest in the three years to 31st 
March 1993. By 1893-94 tnis period of prosperity appeared to 
be coning to an end.. Clydebank had virtually exhausted its 
naval order book ancl the difficulty of finding a satisfactory 
substitute was underlined by the scale of the losses which the 
yard suffered in executing its first major merchant contracts 
since 1888. The 5v946 ton steamers NII-E and DANUBE, built for 
tne Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. at an average price of Z126,405 
each, failed to recover prime cost and resulted in losses of 
Z23,143 and L20,565 respectively, While the 8,669 ton 
KENSINGTON built - for the International Steam Navigation Co. at 
a price of E1509960 ended in a loss of Z5,949. The directors 
were able to blame the resulting trading loss of E26,281 in the 
year to 31st March 1894 on a prolonged strike of the workforce 
in 1893 but, after distributing L50,000 in dividends to the 
ordinary shareholders over the previous three years, the 
company's profit and loss account was overdrawn by L109027, 
rortunately, by tne time the extent of its difficulties became 
public knowledge, the company had been able to replenish its 
order book with Admiralty contracts but in the winter of 
1893-94 it had come dangerously close to running out of work 
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altogether. In March 1894 its entire order book consisted of 
naval orders taken since Novembir 1893. Clydebank owed its 
prosperity over the next five years to these orders and to the 
further Admiralty orders which followed. 
While none of the firms which undertook naval work in the 
winter of 1893-94 had any assurance that Admiralty orders would 
be more plentiful in the future than they had been in the past, 
and their availability continued to depend on the size or each 
year's naval programme, warship design was more stable than it 
had been prior to 1889v and the Admiralty was inclined to 
favour established contractors. These conditions favoured Firms 
with previous experience of a particular class of work and, in 
practice, Clydebank, Fairfield and the London & Glasgow were 
all regularly employed on naval work from. 1894 onwards. 
Clydebank, which had received orders for three destroyers49 
as well as the 14,200 ton protected cruiser HIMS TERRIBýE under 
the 1893-94 progranme went on to undertake the building or the 
14,750 ton battleship HMS JUPITER in 1894-95, the 11,000 ton 
protected cruiser HMS EUROPA, engines for the dockyard-built 
third-class cruiser HMS PE! _ORUS and 
four destroyers 50 in 
1895-96, another 11,000 ton protected cruiser - HMS ARIADNE 
and two more destroyers_51 in 1896-97, the 12,000 ton armoured 
cruiser HMS SUTI. EJ in 1897-98 and the 12,000 ton armoure d 
cruiser HMS BACCHANTE, the l4vl5O ton armoured cruiser MIS 
ýEVIATHAN and the engines for the dockyard-built cruiser HMS 
ESSEX in 1898-99. Similarly Fairfield, which started with the 
construction of its first three destroyers in 1893-94 and the 
5,600 ton second-class cruisers HMS DIANA and HMS VENUS in 
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1894-95, received an order for the 11,000 ton protected cruiser 
HMS DIADEM in 1895-96, another 11,000 ton protected cruiser 
HMS ARGONAUT - together with the 5,650 ton second-class 
cruisers HMS HERMES and HIGHFI_YER and three destroyers 
52 in 
1896-97, the 12,000 ton armoured cruisers HMS CRESSY and MIS 
ABOUKIR and a destroyer 53 in 1897-98 and the 14,150 ton 
armoured cruiser HMS GOOD HOPE and two more destroyers 54 in 
1898-99. The third Clyde warshipbuilder, the I. ondon & 
Glasgow, received fewer orders but the 5,600 ton second-class 
cruisers H14S DIDO and HMS ISIS in 1894-95 were followed by the 
5,650 ton second-class cruiser HMS HYACINTH in 1896-97 and two 
710 ton gunboats 55 in 1897-98. This represented a 
significant volume of work for a relatively small yard, 
-sufficient to ensure that at no time between 1894 and 1899 was 
it too without some naval work on hand. 
In all, the three Clyde yards received orders for a total 
of thirty-nine warships aggregating 196,150-tons as a result of 
the naval programmes for the six years 1893-94 to 1898-99, an 
average of 32,692 tons per year* This amount uf work 
represented a spectacular increase oveý the volume of naval 
work undertaken by Clyde yards at any time in the past, the 
district's share of the orders placed under the five-year 
programme authorised by the Navy Defence Act having amounted to 
only 42,850 tons in total. It also represented a significant 
volume of work in relation to the total output or the Clyde 
shipbuilding industry which averaged 329,025 tons per annum 
between 1890 and 1894 and 415,787 tons per annum between 1895 
and 1899.56 More important, from the point of view of the 
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individual contractor, the work was generally profitable. 
Clydebank , which undertook seventeen contracts worth 
L4,067 9477 
between April 1893 and March 1699, eventually suffered losses 
on three or the destroyers 
57 but all of the yard's major 
contracts yielded good profits, the net profit of E43,475 
earned an the L438,668 contract for the protected cruiser HMS 
ARIADNE being the lowest net profit earned on any of its seven 
armoured or protected ships. Similarly, Fairfield, with 
nineteen contracts worth Z4,006,552 in the same period, appears 
to have earned profits on seventeen of them, the exceptions 
being the second-class cruiser HMS HERMES and the engines for 
the dockyard-built cruiser HMS PIONEER on which it appears to 
have suffered losses of E1,543 and L6,263 respectively. 
The profitability of naval work may have owed something to 
collusion between contractors. In March 1896, Richard 
Barnwell of Fairfield had a meeting with his counterparts at 
Jarrow and Barrow at which they arranged to concert their bids 
for thirty-knot destroyers by submitting tenders or L52,000, 
Z51,900 and L51,800 respectively and to meet again before 
tendering for thirty-three-knot boats. 58 There is no record 
of any further meetings having taken place but it is unlikely 
that this was an isolated occurence. Common membership of 
bodies such as the Society or Naval Architects afforded leading 
warshipbuilders the opportunity to meet regularly on an 
informal basis and to exchange information and concert their 
bids if they had a mind to do so. Whether such a, rrangements 
were effective in raising prices is more questionable. As far 
as destroyers were concerned, effective price-fixing would have 
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required an arrangement which satisfied most of the twelve 
firms which were actively involved in the business and in July 
1897 at least one leading warshipbuilder - Clydebank - refused 
to participate in an arrangement to compare prices and ballot 
for orders proposed by Mr Adamson of Barrow. 
59 Further, if 
there was wi-despread collusion an prices, it did not prevent 
some Admiralty contractors from suffering heavy losses on naval 
contracts undertaken in the 1890's. Admittedly, Palmer's or 
Jarrow, which was forced to write down its capital in 1896, had 
encountered difficulties only as a result of having taken a 
contract for two battleships at uneconomic prices in 1889-90, 
when large naval contracts were still something of a novelty, 
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while Earle & Co. of Hull and t4audslay,. Son & Field of London, 
which both went bankrupt in 1899-1900, were heavily involved in 
the manufacture of machinery for dockyard-built warships, 
61 a 
class of work which even the more efficient Clyde yards did not 
find particularly profitable. The positive evidence thFit the 
high profits earned by Clyde yards an major Admiralty contracts 
in the 1890's was the result or price fixing is thin. On two 
or the three occasions between April 1893 and March 1899, when 
Clydebank and Fairfield secured orders for large cruisers of 
the same class at the same time, their prices were remarkably 
similar but this may have been a coincidence and the high 
profits earned by these two yards on a succession of large 
cruiser contracts may simply have reflected their particular 
aptitude for this class of work. SigniFicantly, while both 
firms were extraordinarily successful in earning large profits 
an the contracts for big cruisers, which had much in common 
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with the building or fast passenger liners in terms of size and 
speed, Clydebank in particular had difficulty with destroyers, 
which called For a totally different blend of skills. 62 
Whatever the reasons For the profitability of their naval 
orders, regular and profitable Admiralty orders resulted in a 
dramatic improvement in the trading results of the two major 
Clyde warshipbuilders between 1894 and 1899. Clydebank's 
trading profit before depreciation, which had averaged Z45,987 
in the three years to 31st March 1893 before slumping into a 
loss or L26,281 in the following year, recovered to E31,587 in 
1894-959 Z86,491 in 1395-96 and an average of no less than 
E125,557 per annum in the three ypars to 31st March 1899. 
rairfield too ysas consisten. tly profitable. After suffering a 
trading loss before depreciation of L17,519 in the year to 30th 
June 1894, the company returned to profitability with a trading 
profit before depreciation of L35,625 in 1894-95. The 
following year, trading profits before depreciation of L75,245 
exceeded those of any of the three relatively prosperous years 
at the beginning of the decade and between 1896-97 and 1898-99 
they averaged L89,893 per annum, 
The revival in the fortunes of rairfield and Clydebank owed 
little to merchant shipbuilding. The demand for first-class 
merchant ships recovered slowly from the depression of 
1893-94. Apart from 1897, when the growth in output was 
checked by a prolonged lock-out of engineering workers, the 
total tonnage of ships launched on the Clyde increased steadily 
from 280,160 tons in 1893 to 491,074 tons in 1899, but, as The 
Glasqow Herald remarked in 1896, there was a notable shortage 
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of first-class merchant work for much of the period. 63 In 
1898, 'a year of great plenty, 64 and 1899, a year in which 
the resources of the British-shipbuilding industry were 
described as being 'taxed to the full' to meet the demand, 65 
high class merchant work was in more plentiful supply and 
Clydebank, in particular, took advantage of the opportunity 
by taking orders for the 14,280 ton liner SAXONIA for 
Cunard, the 11,667 ton liners VADERLAND and ZEELAND for the 
Red Star Line, the 11,635 ton liner HAVERFORD for the 
International Navigation Co. and the 11,621 ton liner MERION 
for the Dominion Line but these orders came too late to make 
a significant contribution to Clydebank's profitability up 
to March 1899 and they were untypical of the merchant ships 
produced by both Clydebank and Fairfield between 1894 and 
1899. Apart from two steamers for the Russian Volunteer 
Fleet 66 and two 5,672 ton, cargo ships built for Turnbull & 
Martin, 67 the merchant contracts completed by Clydebank in 
the five years to 31st March 1899 comprised only nine 
railway ferries and pleasure steamers, four yachts and 
twenty barges and the total value of the yard's merchant 
output amounted only to L1,002,894. Fairfield produced a 
rather higher volume of merchant work in the five years to 
30th June 1899 only because Sir Donald Currie had favoured 
the yard with five contracts worth L732,260.68 The 8,291 
ton liner OMRAH, built for the Orient Line at a price of 
L224p816, which failed to recover prime cost by L7,686, was 
the only other major merchant contract completed by 
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Fairfield in this period. Theremainder of the yard's merchant 
output comprised three small ships for the Scottish Oriental 
Co., six ferries and pleasure steamers and two yachts worth in 
all L507,444. As Table 4.1 shows, while the total value of 
Fairfield's output in the five years to 30th June 1899 differed 
little from that of the previous five years the balance between 
merchant and naval work was strikingly different. 
TABLE 4.1 
CONTRACTS COMPLETED BY FAIRFIELD 1889-1899 
1889-1894 
No L 
MERCHANT 33 3,400,891 
NAVAL 3 229,589 
36 2_, 630,480 
1894-1899 
No L 
17 1,657,375 
14 2.196,630 
31 3,854,005 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix FII) 
Overall, the value of Clydebank's output in the five years 
to 31st March 1899 was broadly similar to that of Fairfield 
ince a succession of small warships built for the Spanish 
overnment helped to make up for the lower volume of merchant 
work but its dependence on warshipbuilding was all the 
greater. As Table 4.2 shows 71.8% of sales and 83.1% of the 
contribution to overheads and profit derived from all the 
contracts completed between April 1894 and March 1899 were 
attributable to naval work. 
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TABLE 4.2 
CONTRACTS COMPLETED BY CLYDEBANK 1894-1899 
No 
ADMIRALTY 9 
ý'OREIGN WARSHIPS 13 
OTHER WORK 37 
59 
Sales Contribution 
EE 
2,103,108 500,184 
449,450 174,266 
1, CD2,894 137,304 
3.555,452 811.754 
(Source: abstracted fron Appendix FIJI) 
Clydebank's directors were clearly concerned at this 
imbalance between naval and merchant work and, in December 
1896, after discussing the desirability of getting orders for 
merchant ships, they decided in principle to entertain 
proposals which entailed extending credit to customers. 69 
Although this did not produce immediate results, it signalled 
the beginning of a determined effort to revive the yard's 
merchant business. In 1897, having purchased additional land 
to the west of the existing yard, the board embarked on a major 
programme of building and re-equipment which put Clydebank in a 
better position to take advantage of the subsequent upturn in 
the demand for first-class passenger liners. The firm's 
ability to finance net additions to fixed assets, amounting to 
Z246,676 in the three years to 31st March 1899, without having 
to resort to external funding testified both to the 
profitability of warshipbuilding and to the care with which the 
Clydebank directors husbanded tneir resources. After two 
years during which no dividend had been paid on the ordinary 
shares payment was resumed at a rate of 104 in 1896 but 
distributions were limited to 201. in each of the two following 
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years. By March 1899, reserves of L150,000 and a credit 
balance of Z102,876 on the profit and loss account bore 
testimony to their prudence. 
At --airfield a different order of priorities prevailed. 
Here, distributions to ordinary shareholders took'preference 
over everything else. A dividend of 3% in 1894-95 was 
followed by payments of 15%, 13%j 15% and 16% respectively in 
each of the next four years with the result that the total 
profits retained in the business in the five years to 30th June 
1899 amounted to only L24,653. With provisions for 
depreciation of fixed assets restricted to Z3,811 in 1894-95 
and L109000 per annum in each of the following four years and 
the company still in debt to its bankers, -there was little 
scope for capital investment. In 1897-98, after four years 
during which additions to fixed assets amounted to a mere 
L21,566, a modest programme of essential extensions and 
improvements had to be financed by the issue of E1OO, 0OO of 5% 
second debentures. At least one director - rrancis Elgar - 
had some misgivings about the company's policy. He wrote to 
the chairman in October 1898 advising against the payment of a 
dividend larger then 15% an the grounds that it would have a 
bad effect an both the future negotiation of prices with Sir 
Donald Currie and-o-n-the attitude of the workforce while the 
provision for depreciation was 'quite little enough' as: 
We require now to make good as 
opportunities offer the encroachments 
upon depreciation and reserves during 
our bad years. 70 
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However, the Pearce family, as the owners of most of the 
ordinary shares, had a decisive say in such matters. Their 
anxiety to recoup the L90,000 paid in to cover the deficiency 
in the conpany's accounts in June 1894 dictated that high 
distributions should continue until this was achieved. 
Whether the f; ilure to plough a Jarger proportion of 
Fairfield's profits back into the business in these years made 
any significant difference to the company's fortunes In the 
long run is debatable. Fairfield's lack of adequate 
facilities in the opening years of the new century was a factor 
in the re-emergence of Clydebank as the builder of Cunard's 
biggest and fastest liners but, following its unfortunate 
experience with the CAMPANIA and ýUCANIA in the 1890's, 
Fairfield was underst3ndably reluctant even to quote a fixed 
price for such orders. 71 Significantly-, there is no evidence 
that lack of investment had an adverse effect on Fairfield's 
ability to secure major Admiralty contracts then or later. 
Further, while the high distribution policy left tne company 
uncomfortably highly geared thia did not matter as lonq as the 
business continued to be profitable. In July 1899, when the 
company's bankers showed some unease over an overdraft of 
E243,000, Strachan, the company secretary was able to reassure 
them by pointing out that the situation was temporary and that 
payments from customers would reduce the overdraft to less than 
E309000 by the end or August, 
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Meanwhile, Fairfield had fully recovered its 
competitiveness. Under the competent management of Cdmund 
Sharer, who had succeeded White as manager of the shipbuilding 
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department in 1893, and Alexander Gracieg who had becone 
manager or the engine and boiler department after Andrew ýaing 
had his service contract terminated in 1895,73 both sides of 
the business were operating profitably. In March 1899 the 
board's primary concern was to secure Further orders for 
completion by June 1900.74 They were unsuccessful, and, apart 
rron the liners KINFAUNS CASTL. E and KP-DONAN CASP. E for Sir 
Donald Currie, completions in the year to 30th June 1900 
consisted only of th-e destroyers HtlS FAýCON and HMS OSTRICH, 
but the firm was far A 
being short of work. It already had 
orders on hand for the 12,000 ton armoured cruisers HMS CRESSY 
and HMS ABOUKIR, due for completion in 1900-01, and for the 
14,150 ton armoured cruiser HMS GOOD HOPE, which was not due 
for completion until 1901-02. Further, in April 1899, 
ý-'airfield was able to add to its order book by securing the 
order, for the 9,800 ton armoured cruiser HMS BEDFORD, one of 
only 1. Put out to contract at this time. *wo such ships In 
conse-quence, Fairfield's order bouk at 30th June 1899 comprised 
the two liners for Sir Donald Currie, which were wortý 
L547,224, and six naval vessels worth L2,313,022, a total of 
. E2,860,246. 
Clydebank's order book, at 31st I-larch 1899 was even more 
impressive. Apart from the armoured cruisers HMS SUT. EJ, 
HMS BACCHANTE and HMS LEVIATHAN aggregating 38,150 tons, the 
yard had yet to complete six destroyers for the Admiralty and 
three more were being built 'on spec'. 
75 In addition, 
Clydebank was building the 14,150 ton battleship ASAHI for the 
Japanese Government and there were orders an hand for six 
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merchant ships aggregating 61,487 tons. 76 In consequence 
Clydebank's order book was worth L4,518,843 comprising twelve 
orders destined for the Admiralty worth E2,190,035, the 
Japanese battleship worth L876,350 and six merchant ships worth 
E1,452,458. 
After five years of regular Admiralty orders both Clydebank 
and Fairfield could face the future with confidence. Several 
years of profitable work lay behind then, their financial 
situation-was fundamentally sound and they already had enough 
orders on hand to suggest that they were likely to be 
profitably employed for two or three years ahead. The role of 
an Admiralty contractor had become for the first time a highly 
rewarding specialisation and barring unforeseen developments 
there was no reason why they should not continue to prosper. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
1899-1907 - THE INTERVENTION OF THE ARMAMENTS MANUrACTURERS. 
Between 1899 and 1907 the character of the Clyde 
warshipbuilding industry underwent a fundamental change. Up 
to 1899 warshipbuilding on the Clyde had been the work of 
independent shipbuilders and engineers whose interest in 
naval work did not extend beyond the building of warships and 
the supply of warshiP engines. By 1907 the leading 
warshipbuilders on the river formed part of a complex, 
vertically-integrated armaments industry geared not only to 
the building of warships but also to the manufacture of the 
armour plate, ordnance and gun mountings which went into. 
them. John Brown & Co. Ltd., the Sheffield based steel and 
armour plate. manufacturer, l which took over Clydebank in 
18999 subsequently combined with its Sheffield neighbour and 
e rstwhile rival Cammell I-aird & Co. Ltd. to equip the 
latter's Coventry Ordnance Works 2 for the manufacture of the 
biggest naval guns and and gun mountings. By 1907, when 
this project reached fruitiong half of Cammell ýairdls fifty 
percent share in it had passed to Fairfield as part of a deal 
which gave Cammell ! -aird a 
fifty percent interest in the 
ordinary shares of Fairfield itself. Meanwhile, William 
Beardmore & Co. '-td., the Glasgow armour plate and ordnance 
manufacturer, 3 which purchased the shipbuildinq business of 
Robert Napier & Sons in 1900, had built a great new naval 
yard at Dalmuir after merging with Vickers Sons & Maxim ýtd. 
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which already ranked as one of the greatest private armaments 
manufacturers in the world. 4 
The origins of this vertically integrated armaments 
industry lay in the activities of a handful of ambitious 
arnaments manufacturers. The expansion of the Royal -Navy in 
the 1890's gave an enormous stimulus to the private arnaments 
industry. Faced particularly with the problem of obtaining 
large quantities of all-steel armour plate 
5 for its new 
arnoured ships, the Admiralty had encouraged selected firms 
both to expand their capacity and to undertake costly 
research and development on their own account. 6 By 1897 the 
. 
firms which had taken advantage or. this opporCunity were 
extremely prosperous concerns but the Admiralty was unable to 
guarantee its suppliers regular orders, and quasi-official 
arrangements to share out the available work between the - 
firms did not extend to overseas business. Accordingly, 
when Vickers, Sons & Co. Ltd., which had been engaged in the 
manufacture of all-steel armour plate since 1869, took over 
both the Barrow shipyard of the Naval Construction and 
Armaments CO. 7 and the ordnance factories of the Maxim 
Nordenreld Gun and Ammunition Co. in 1897, the other armour 
plate manufacturers were not long in following their example 
particularly when Sir Willian G. Armstrong & Co. Ltd., which 
had combined the manufacture of ordnance with warshipbuilding 
at Elswick on the Tyne since 1884j8 also announced its 
intention of commencing the manufacture of armour plate 
following a merger with Sir Joseph Whitworth & Co., the 
Manchester gun makers and engineers, 9 in 1897. 
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The situation as it appeared to the directors of John 
Brown & Co. !. td. was set out by 14r. J. D. Ellis in his speech 
to the shareholders' meeting which approved arrangements for 
the purchase of Clydebank in June 1899: 
The conpany's armour plate department was 
flourishing, the collieries were doing well 
and the general business was satisfactory 
If the directors had studied their own 
inclinations they would have remained as 
they were. But he could not help 
remembering that slack times came in coal 
and also in the arnour plate trade and at 
these times those who were able to make 
ships were the people to get armour plate 
orders. He could remember times when John 
Brown & Co. had scarcely any orders for Her 
Majesty's Covernment and yet other firms 
received orders for ships carrying armour 
for foreign governments. Messrs. Vickers 
h'ad bought a shipyard and Messrs. Armstrong 
& Co. were going to make armour plate. If 
they took no action they might find 
themselves without orders while their 
neighbours were full of work. 
10 
In Clydebank, John Brown & Co. found a shipyard which 
was ideally suited to its purpose. Apart from being a major 
Admiralty contractor, the yard had extensive experience of 
building warships for foreign governments. J&G Thomson 
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had first undertaken such work in 1884-85 when orders for' the 
166 ton Russian torpedo boat VIBORG, the 348 ton Spanish 
torpedo boat DESTRUCTOR and the 4,725 ton Spanish protected 
- cruiser REUYA RECE-14TE helped to keep Clydebank going at a 
time when it was desperately short of other work. 
11 Orders 
for the 2,400 ton Japanese armoured cruiser CHIYODA and the 
787 ton Dutch gunboat BORNEO followed in 1888 and 1891 
respectively and, although warshipbuilding for foreign 
governnents diminished in relative importance with the growth 
of the yard's Admiralty business in the 1890's, Clydebank 
continued to be a major contender for overseas naval 
contracts in general and Spanish and Japanese contracts in 
particular. At one stage in September 1896, with tenders 
out to 'the Spanish Government for two large armoured 
cruisers, two smaller cruisers and a battleship, 
12 there was 
so much work in prospect for this one customer that the 
Clydebank board, which had already offered to share the 
cruiser contracts with Barrow in exchange for a five percent 
commission, 13 decided to_defer a Final decision on the price 
of a battleship for Japan until the outcome of the Spanish 
tenders became known. 14 As it turned out neither the 
Spanish tenders nor subsequent inquiries fron China; Rumania 
and Costa-Rica 15 bore fruit but in the interval the firm had 
conpleted a further thirteen small warships for Spain. 16 
These contracts, worth L449,450, net of penalties for late 
delivery, yielded a contribution to overheads and profit of 
L174,266 (36.7% of net invoice price ) and, in 1899, the firm 
was in process of building its bigqest Foreign warship to 
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date, the 15,200 ton Japanese battleship ASAHI - an order for 
which John Brown & Co. had already contracted to supply 
armour plate costing L299,409.17 
Equally important, Clydebank's owners were a menable to a 
take-over bid. At the time of John Brown's approach in 1899 
they were apparently contemplating some alternative 
arrangement, most probably a public issue of shares. 18 
", Ihether their intention was to raise additional funds for 
investment in the bu. siness or simply to enable existing 
shareholders to take advantage of the Firm's prosperity to 
realise all or part of their holdings on favourable terms, 
they were receptive to a cash offer. In consequence John 
Brown & Co. was able to acquire the assets of a recently 
madernised warshipbuilding yard for Z923,255, a price which 
was Z191,921 mo: e than their book value but not, it would 
seem, of their real worth, 19 Having acquired Clydebank, 
John Brown & Co. went an to join with Cammell !. aird & Co. 
ý. td., itself the product of the merger in 19C3 of Charles 
Cammell & Co. 's steel and armoured plate business with 1, aird 
Brothers' long-established Birkenhead shipy3rd, 20 in a 
project designed to turn Cammell ýairdls Coventry Ordnance 
Works into a major armaments manufacturer capable of 
producing the largest naval guns and gun mounti-n-gs. 21 
At one time most of the Royal Navy's guns and gun 
mountings had been supplied by Woolwich Arsenal but the War 
Office, which was responsible for the Royal Ordnance Works, 
was slow to develop breech-loading quns and by the 1890's the 
Admiralty was making increasing use of private firms to 
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supply its special needs. 22 By the turn of the century 
Armstrong Whitworth's and Vickers had effectively supplanted 
the Royal Ordnance Works as the Admira. lty's main suppliers 
not only of naval ordnance but also of gun mountings. In 
1899-1900 Woolwich Arsenal's share of Admira lty orders for 
gun mountings amounted to only 10.7%. 23 The manufacture of 
naval guns and gun mountings was big business. By 1907-08, 
the year the Coventry Ordnance ". 1orks project reached 
fruition, Admiralty expenditure on gun mountings alone was 
estimated to amount to L19825j239 
24 and it cannot have 
escaped John Brown & Co. 's notice that Clydebank was likely 
to be at a disadvantage compared with Barrow and Elswick in 
tenderinj for overseas naval contracts as long as only 
Vickers and Armstrong's were able to supply the largest guns 
and gun mountings. 25 
Similar considerations may have been a factor in the 
decision of ýairfieldls owners to sell Cammell ýaird & Co. 
half of their ordinary shares in 1905 since the terms or the 
deal provided for Fairfield to acquire half of Cammell 
I-aird's interest in the Coventry Ordnance Works for 
Z212,500,26 a move which resulted in the Coventry Ordnance 
Works being owned 50% by John Brown and 2509 each by Cammell 
'-aird and Fairfield. As far as Admiralty orders were 
concerned, access to supplieý of guns, gun mountings and 
armour plate an preferential terms made little difference to 
a warshipbuilder's competitive situation. The chronic 
shortage of armour plate in the early 1890's had forced the 
Admiralty to abandon its pre-1889 practice of allowing 
90 . 
contractors to make their own arrangements with suppliers as 
it was essential that: 
The Admiralty ... should be in a 
position to allocate the available 
suppl-y of armour to those vessels 
which most urgently needed it. 
27 
In consequence, from 1889 onwards, Admiralty orders for 
armour plate were almost always placed separately from orders 
for hulls and machin. ery, 28 the shipbuilders effectively 
receiving their supplies of armour plate fron ttie Admiralty 
'free of charge, as was invariably the c9se with supplies of 
guns and gun mountings for Royal Navy ships. Overseas 
war ship orders were another matter. Although Fairfield, 
unlike Clydebank, had never built a warship for a foreign 
power, -it aspired to do so and arrangements had already been 
made for Cammell Laird & Co. to supply any armour plate which 
might be needed in such an eventuality. 29 
On the other hand, Fairfield's investment in the 
Coventry Ordnance Works project may nut have been so much an 
act of deliberate policy as the price which the company paid 
to enable the Pearce family to liquidate half of their 
investment in the company. Certainly the terms of the 
agreement between the Chairman, Sir William G. Pearce, and 
Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. dated 31st October 1905 were not 
formally communicated to the other directors until a special 
board meeting held at Palli Lodqe, Newtonmore on 16th 
November 1905 at which time it was resolved: 
That the clauses affecting the Fairfield 
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Company be and are hereby adopted and 
approved and agreements on behalf of the 
Company to give effect to these clauses 
be prepared. 30 
Either way, the result was the same. Fairfield like 
Clydebank became part of the vertically integrated armaments 
industry. The deal made Fairfield the owner of twenty-five 
percent of a major'ordnance works and effectively transferred 
control of Fairfield itself to Cammell Laird & Co., Sir 
William G. Pearce, who died without issue in 1907, being the 
last member of the Pearce family to play an active part in 
the yard'a m3nagement. 31 
In the short run neither Clydebank nor Fairfield was 
greatly changed by the intervention of the armaments 
manufacturers. While Clydebank as the shipbuilding 
department of Johp Brown & Co. and Fairfield as part owner of 
the ordnance works were necessarily more closely identified 
with the fortunes of the armaments industry than they had 
been previously, both were already heavily committed to 
warshipbuilding. F. urther, while John Brown & Co. gradually 
introduced new management at Clydebank 32 and representatives 
of Cammell Laird & Co. joined the Fairfield board, 33 there 
was no obvious discontinuity in policy. Both yards 
continued to combine naval work with merchant shipbuilding 
and there was no significant change in the scale or pattern 
of either yard's capital investment. 
Under John Brown's management, net additions to fixed 
assets at Clydebank amounted to L356,383 in the eight years 
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to 31st March 1907, compared with provisions for depreciation 
amounting to L228,669, but Clydebank was a thriving co-ncern 
and there is no reason to suppose that other owners would 
have been unable to finance similar outlays if they had 
wished to do sq. On the contrary Clydebank's previous 
owners had spent an average of E82,225 per annum on net 
additions to fixed assets in the three years preceding the 
takeover, compared with the average of L44,548 per annum 
spent by John Brown. & Co. Similarly, while net additions to 
fixed assets at Fairfield rose from an average of L26,823 per 
annum in the six years to 30th June 1905 to, L51,587 per annum 
in the two years following Cammell '-aird & Co. 's 
intervention, arrangements for an issue of debentures had 
been made in June 1904 since: 
It will be necessary in the immediate future 
to expend large sums on the-i-mprovement of 
the Dock, the electrification of the works 
and the provision of new machinery. 
34 
- In contrast to Clydebank and Fairfield, Dalmuir, the 
other Clyde warshipbuilding yard controlled by the great 
armaments manufacturers, owed its very existence to their 
intervention. Completed in 19C7 at a total cost of 
L923,036,35 Dalmuir's facilities were expressly designed to 
give William Beardmore & Co. the capability to build the 
largest warships. A ninety-acre site with a river frontage 
nearly a mile long was served by its own power station and 
producer gas plant. The engine and boiler works, covering 
an area of five and a half acres, were equipped with the 
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latest machine tools; contemporaries particularly noted the 
absence of belting and shafting as each machine tool was 
driven by its own motor. The largest of seven shipbuilding 
berths, designed to acconmodate vessels or up to 830 feet in 
length and 100 feet in beam, was equipped with travelling 
cranes mounted on a gantry. The fitting-out basin, 
occupying an area of seven and a half acres in the middle of 
the yard and ser. viced by a crane capable of lifting 150 tons 
was reckoned to be the largest in the world. 
36 
Beardmore's decision to follow Armstrong's earlier 
example by building a completely new naval yard rather than 
taking over an existing warshipbuilding yard, as Vickers, 
John Brown and Cammell all did, was as much a matter of 
necessity as of choice. For obvious reasons it was 
desirable that Beardmore's shipyard should be situated on the 
Clyde rather than elsewhere and John Brown & Co. 's coup in 
acquiring Clydebank effectively limited the options. 
Fairfield, the only other Clyde warshipbuilder of comparable 
size and experience, was beyond Beardmore's means and the 
Fairfield directors declined to entertain a proposal for 'an 
amalgamation of shipbuilding interests'. 
37 Beardmore's, as 
the occupants of the Parkhead Forge once owned by Robert 
Napier, was able to resurrect famous associations by 
purchasing the goodwill of the shipbuilding business of 
Robert Napier & Sons in 1900, but outdated buildings and 
plant at Govan and Lancefield Street, valued at only E26,500 
in July 1898,38 were hopelessly inadequate for an ambitious 
armaments manufacturer's purpose. Although a short lease or 
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-these facklities enabled Beardmore's to start warshipbuilding 
on a modest scale, it was never intended to be more than an 
interim solution, the site for the new yard at Dalmuir having 
been bought in 1900.39 
The building of Dalmuir necessitated a major 
reorganisation of Beardmore's affairs. Unlike the other 
leading armaments manufacturers, the firm was still a private 
concern in 1899 and William Beardmore's personal resources 
were already fully stretched to cover a major programme of 
capital investment at Parkhead begun in 1898.40 In 19130 he 
was able to borrow E110,000 from the Bank of Scotland to help 
finance the purchase of Robert Napier & Sons business 
41 but 
the construction of a great new naval yard was beyond his 
private means. Work an the new yard finally started in 
earnest in 1902. In the meantime Beardmore had 
reconstituted his business as a limited company in December 
1901 and the project went ahead only with the powerful 
backing of Vickers, which had purchased half of the equity 
presumably with a view to gaining some control over an 
ambitious rival. 42 
7rom the outset Dalmuir was more heavily dependent on 
warshipbuilding than either of its major rivals on the 
Clyde. While naval work constituted by far the largest and 
most profitable element in the businesses of both Clydebank 
and Fairfield in the opening years or the new century, 
neither yard was totally dependent on warshipbuilding for its 
livelihood. Most of the profit Fairfield and Clydebank 
earned an merchant work between 1899 and 1906 was 
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attributable to a handful of contracts. Apart from the 
9,033 top Orient liner ORONTES an which the firm earned a 
profit of L34,982, virtually all of Fairfield's merchant 
shipbuilding profits in the seven years to 30th June 1906 
were attributable to six contracts which between them 
resulted in net profits of L134,841 - four ships built for 
Sir Donald Currie (Ell5,551)43 and the liners EMPRESS 07 
BRITAIN and EMPRESS of IRE! -AND 
built for Canadian Pacific 
(1-19,289). Similarly, at Clydebank, the profitability of 
merchant work in the seven years to 31st Harch 1906 was 
entirely attributable to the profits earned on five contracts 
- four contracts dating back to 1898 which yielded net 
profits of Z83,262.44 and the contract for the Cunard liner 
CARONIA which resulted in a net profit of L100,222. 
Nevertheless both yards had this leavening of profitable 
merchant work and could boast of a substantial volume of 
nerchant busine3s on which to recover overheads - Clydebank 
conpleted merchant orders worth L3,195,672 in the seven years 
to 31st March 1906 and Fairfield completed merchant orders 
worth L3,26Z, 501'in the seven years to 30th June 1906. 
Despite the problems created for other shipbuilders by 
the involvement of William Pirrie, chairman of the Belfast 
shipbuilders Harland & Wolff, both in the rash of shipping 
mergers and amalgamations which accompanied the formation of 
the International Mercantile Marine Co. in 1902 45 and in the 
subsequent rise of the Royal Mail Group, which ultimately 
controlled fifteen percent of the entire British merchant 
fleet, 46 Fairfield and Clydebank both strengthened their 
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merchant shipbuilding businesses in the opening years of the 
century. Fairfield, which found itself in conflict with 
Harland & Wolff over the division of work following the 
merger of its valued customer Sir Donald Currie's Castle Line 
with the Union Line in 1900,47 gained an important new 
customer in Canadian Pacific, which was beginning to build up 
its liner fleet. 48 More important, Clydebank, under John 
Brown & Co, 's managementt succeeded in re-establishing itself 
as the premier merchant shipbuilding yard on the Clyde by 
regaining the custom or Cunard, the principal transatlantic 
operator to stand aloof from the International Mercantile 
Marine combination. 
Clydabank's previous owners had taken the First step 
towards re-establishing tne yard's connection with Cunard by 
undertaking the building of the liner SAXONIA in 1898, and 
the yard had gone an to take the order for the 9,851 ton 
PANNONIA in 1901, but it was John Brown & Co. which seized 
the opportunity presented by the decision of the Government 
II 
to subsidise the building by Cunard of a pair of fast 
passenger liners expressly designed to recapture the 'blue 
riband' of the North Atlantic for Britain. 
49 In contrast to 
Fairfield which, as already noted, 
50 was understandably 
reluctant to quote Cunard a price for a 25-knot liner in 1902 
after its disastrous experience with the liners CAMPANIA and 
'-UCANIA in 1893-94, John Brown & Co, was not deterred by the 
risks involved in such an undertaking and were eventually 
rewarded with the contract for the 31,550 ton turbine-powered 
liner LUSITANIA ordered in April 1904. Following as it did 
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earlier orders for a pair of slower intermediate liners - the 
19,687 ton CARONIA, the largest ship yet built an the Clyde 
when she_was launched in 1904, and her sister the CARMANIA, 
which differed in being turbine powered 
51 
- the order for 
the LUSITANIA brought Clydebank's tally of orders fron Cunard 
to over 80,000 tons in the space or four years. Work for 
Cunard was not particularly profitable. The CARONIA was - 
exceptional in yielding Clydebank a large net profit. 
Although the contrac. t for the UISITANIA was profitable, a net 
profit of L50,972 was a poor return on a Z1.6 millions 
contract, which had involved capital expenditure of at least 
Z55,145.52 More typically, the contracts for the SAXONIA , 
the PANNONIA and the CAq11ANIA all resulted in small net 
losses, the discrepancy between the net profit of Z100,022 an 
the CARONIA and the net loss of Z4,317 on the CARMANIA being 
only partly attributable to the latter's turbines which cost 
V0,279 more than the reciprocating machinery fitted in the 
CARONIA. 53 Nevertheless, big liner contracts which did not 
result in heavy losses were a welcome addition to any 
warshipbuilder's order book if only because no other merchant 
work was more compatible with the building of major warships 
and the biggest liners were the only merchant contracts 
comparable in value With a major naval contract. 
54 
In contrast to Fairfield and Clydebankq Beardmore's 
merchant business was neither extensive nor profitable. 
Even allowing for the limitations of the facilities with 
which it had to work, the firm's record in the years leading 
up to the opening of Dalmuir was poor. The goodwill 
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attached to Robert Napier & Sons business proved to be 
virtually worthle. ss. Between 1894, when the firm had been 
reconstituted as a limited company following the insolvency 
of the previous partnership, and 1900, when Beardmore's took 
over, Napier's yard at Govan had produced a respectable 
output of thirty merchant ships aggregating 76,773 tons, 
including seven ships for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 55. * 
but Beardmore's inherited only an order for one 1,018 ton 56 
ship and, more disappointing, only one or Napier's former 
customers - the Eastern and Australian Stqamship Co. 
subsequently placed an order with the new owners. 
Beardmore's had some initial success in attracting other 
business. In 1901 and 1902 the yard won orders from both the 
Nelson Line and the Unign-Castle Line 57 but the success did 
not last. The total value of all the merchant contracts 
undertaken by the firm between 1900 and the end of 1905 
amounted to' only Z560,436, only four of the ten contracts 
were reported to have yielded net profits and one of these 
had not been charged with a share of overheads. 58 By 1905, 
when Dalmuir opened, the firm did not have a single nerchant 
order an its books. NeverthelesG, at the time Dalmuir was 
conceived, an ambitious armaments manufacturer might be 
excused for believing that a new yard could hope to prosper 
on warshipbuilding alone. 
The extensive use of private yards to build the Navy's 
ships in the decade following the Navy Defence Act of 1889 
had not been an unqualified success. By the end of 1900, 
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the bankruptcy of Earle & Co. and Maudslay, Son & Field, the 
disruption caused by a prolonged lock-out of engiheering 
workers in 1897-98, a chronic shortage of armour plate, and 
the difficulties experienced-by many firms in achieving the 
design speed on 27-knot destroyers had all contributed tu a 
situation where deliveries by contractors were falling 
seriously behind schedule. 59 Despite these shortcomings the 
outlook for the private warshipbuilder had never been 
better. Admiralty demand remained high and the Royal 
Dockyards were experiencing the greatest difficulty in 
meeting all the demands being made upon them. In the 
dockyards, progress on new construction was being adversely 
affected by the competing claims of other work associated 
with servicing a growing fleet. In 1900-01, the pressure 
was eased by having one of the battleships originally 
allocated to the dockyards put out to contract 60 but they 
were noving inexorably towards the position where a mounting 
backlog of repairs and refits would eventually force the 
Admiralty to take extraordinary measures to deal with the 
situation. Meanwhile, an Admiralty committee, appointed to 
inquire into the arrears at 31st December 1900, was expressly 
askea not only to examine the reason far the arrears but also 
to report on: 
Whether the private sources of the United 
Kingdom are utilised to the fullest possible 
extent for the purposes of production for 
naval shipbuilding and armament and if not, 
generally how this end can be obtained. 61 
100 
Like many or the Admiralty's contractors, the Clyde 
warshipbuilders Kad experienced the greatest difficulty in 
building destroyers. Hannah, Donald & 'Wilson, a small 
Paisley firm which had successfully built torpe-do boats for 
the Admiralty in 1879 and 1888, ruined itself in the 
attempt. Awarded a contract to build two destroyers in 
1894, the firm had round the work to be beyond its 
capabilities. Nefther HMS FERVENT nor HMS ZEPHYR cane close 
to achieving their design speed. During construction their 
locomotive boilers had to be replaced with water-tube boilers 
at an additional cost of L10,56U each and, by the time the 
boats were finally completed in lgoo_()1,62 their builder had 
been driven out of business. 63 Clydebank and Fairfield, 
which had undertaken the building of destroyers at the same 
time, were more successful but they too found the work 
uncongenial and Clydebank in particular ran into serious 
technical difficulties in building thirty-knot boats. None 
of the five destroyers ordered in 1895-96 and 1696-97 had 
been delivered by 1900, one of them - HMS KESTREL - only 
achieved the design speed after ten attempts and two others 
HMS BRAZEN and HMS ELECTRA - completely failed to do so. 
64 
Another destroyer - HMS ARAB - one of three 'specials' 
ordered from separate builders in 1896 was a technical 
fiasco. Designed to steam at thirty-three knots, her best 
speed was thirty-and-a-half knots and on most of her trials 
she achieved speeds only or between twenty-eight and 
twenty-nine knots. 65 Fortunately the Admiralty was prepared 
to make allowance for the technical difficulty of building 
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small fast boats with the technology available and, apart 
fron abatements in Vie price when boats failed to achieve the 
design speed after numerous trials, the contractors suffered 
no real penalties beyond the trouble and expense to which 
they were put in running the additional trials and modifying 
machinery. 66 More inportant, failure with destroyers did 
not debar contractors from tendering successfully for ather 
Admiralty work and the Clyde's record with cruisers was not 
marred by comparable. blemishes. 67 
In the opening years of the new century cruiser 
contracts were plentiful. The 1900-01 and 1901-02 programmes 
included an exceptionally large number of arinoured cruisers 
and the Clyde warshipbuilding industry, which had built eight 
of the eleven armoured cruisers put out to contract up to 
1900, repeated its success in the bidding for a further nine 
ordered from private firms in 1900 and 1901. Three of the 
four ships ordered under the 1900-01 programme and four of 
the five ships ordered under the 1901-02 programme went to 
Clydeside firms. These seven armoured cruisers together 
with two King Edward VII class battleships added no less than 
104,295 tons of warships to Clyde order books in the space of 
two years, the intake of 59,010 tons from the 1901-02 
programme being the largest tonnage of Admiralty orders yet 
placed on the Clyde in a single year. 
Under these conditions even the smallest of the Clyde 
warshipbuilding yards flourished. Scott's of Greenock which 
secured the contract for the 10,850 ton Devonshire class 
armoured cruiser HMS ARGYýL ordered under the 1901-02 
102 
programme had been seeking such a contract since before the 
turn of the century. Although the firm was reported to have 
submitted the lowest of the unsuccessful tenders for Monmouth 
class cruisers in both August 1899 and October 1900,68 
success eluded it until 1901 when the exceptionally large 
number of ships on offer tipped the scales in its ravour. 
69 
For Scott's the contract for a complete ship was a logical 
extension of the work or the Greenock Foundry Co. which had 
already supplied the, engines ror three dockyard-built 
battleships - HMS BARFLEUR and HMS CENTURION, laid down 
in 
1890, and HMS CANOPUS, laid down in 18 97 and was currently 
engaged in making those for a fourth - HMS PRINCE V WM. ES. 
There is no evidence that the Greenock Foundry Co. had found 
naval work particularly profitable, 1895 being the only year 
between 1892 and 19013 when the firm's trading profits were 
sufficient to cover provisions ror depreciation and interest 
paid to third parties. 70 but the record of the shipyard, 
which had confined itself to merchant shipbuilding since 
1888, was even less satisfactory. Apart fron 1895, when it 
earned a profit after depreciation of L28,958, and 1898, 
Scott & Co. had suffered a net loss in every year rrom 1393 
to 1900. ' In the nine years to 31st December 1901, the firm 
had suffered an overall loss of L39,395 after providing for 
depreciation. 71 
Scott's fundamental problem was that by the turn or the 
century its business consisted almost entirely of orders from 
John Swire & Sons' China Navigation Co. and from Alfred Holt 
for whon Swire"s acted as agent. Excluding yachts and 
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lighters, the number of ships completed far Alfred Holt, 
Holt's Ocean Steamship Co. and the China Navigation Co. 
increased from fifteen in 1890-1893 to sixteen in 1894-1897 
and twenty in 1898-190,72 while the number of ships 
completed for other customers fell from twenty-one in 
189U-1893 to nine in 1894-1697 and three in 1898-1901; 
Further, while contracts for the China Navigation Co., in 
which the Scott family were major shareholders, were 
invariably profitabl'e the outcome of contracts for Alfred 
Holt was not as dependable, all of tMose completed between 
1896 and 1901 having resulted in losses. The underlying 
deterioration in the firm's trading situation during the 
1890'S i3 apparent from Table 5.1 
TABýE 5.1 
PROUTABIATY OF CONTRACTS COMMETED BY SCOTT & CO. 
1890-1895 1896-1901 
No. z 'No. z 
Al-ýRED HOI-T/OCEAN S. S. 12 27 255 10 (40,006) 
CHINA NAVIGATION 17 36,767 12 33,741 
OTHER CUSTOMERS 23 15,985 10 3,222 
TO TIAý ý ýO 
-. 0 07 i-2 (3,043) 
(Source: UGD 319/7/l/1) 
Followinq . the receipt of the order For HMS ARGYI-I-, 
Scott's Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd., the product of 
a merger of Scott & Co. and the Greenock Foundry Co. in 
December 1901,73 ha .d to embark on a major programme of 
capital expenditure involving the outlay of L169,454 in the 
four years to 31st December 1905. Building a major warship 
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was beyond the shipyard's existing facilities. In 
particular, the public dock previously used by Scott & Co. 
for fitting-out was inadequate for fitting-out a major 
warship in accordance with Admiralty requirements and Scott's 
was obliged to build its own wet dock with 'sufficient depth 
of water to permit of the heaviest class of warships 
remaining afloat at all states of the tidel. 
74 While the 
cost of equipping itself for warshipbuilding was high, the 
prospects were bette. r than they had been in 1888 and Scott's, 
which had secured the contract for HMS-ARGY1_1_ at a most 
favourable price, had reason to hope that that its enterprise 
would be rewarded with lucrative repeat orders. 
In the short run Scott's had good reason to be satisfied 
with the outcome of its'resunption of warshipbuilding. The 
Z622,262 contract for the armoured cruiser HMS ARGYýL gave 
particular cause for satisfaction as it yielded a net profit 
of E152,039 allowing Scott's to write Z50,000 off the cost of 
the new wet dock. 
75 Up to 31st December 1905 the family 
shareholders had received little in the way of dividends, 
total distributions comprising a payment of 10% in respect of 
1903 and one of 5% in respect of 1905, but, in the first four 
years of the company's existence, 1: 147,927 had been written 
off as depreciation of fixed assets and bank borrowings had 
been reduced to the manageable figure of E74,083. The 
addition of the order for HMS ARGYLý made all the difference 
to the firm's profitability. In the four years to 31st 
December 1905, the period during which the cruiser was under 
construction, both the shipyard and the engine works traded 
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profitably. During these years the firm also completed 
fourteen more ships for the China Navigation Co. and fourteen 
other merchant ships, including the 9,160 ton NARRAGANSETT, 
the largest oil carrying vessel of its dayv but, as shown in 
Table 5.2, the two Admiralty contracts accounted for 54.3% of 
tne total contribution to overheads and profit fron all the 
contracts completed. 
TAB! 
-E 5.2 
CONTRACTS COMPLETED BY SCOTT'S 1902-1905 
CUSTOf-fER No. SAýES CONTRIBUTION 
PROCEEDS T_O OVERHEADS 
AND PROýIT 
LL 
ADMIRA! -TY 2 
820,164 228,774 
CHINA NAVIGATION 14 527,845 134,453 
OTHERS 14 672,034 57,870 
30 2,020,043 421,097 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix FV) 
While nothing is known OF the details OF the trading 
performance of the London & Glasgow, whose facilities were if 
anything inferior to those of Scott's, the profitability of 
the yard's naval work can be inferred From the published 
accounts for the eight years to 30th June 1906. In the 
four years to 30th June 1902, a period during which the yard 
completed twelve ships aggregating 34,354 tons 76 but only 
one major naval contract - that ror the 5,600 ton second 
class cruiser HMS HYACINTH - its trading profits before 
depreciation averaged only Z18,600 per annum. In the four 
years following after 30th June 1902, during which it 
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completed six ships aggregating 42,924 tons 
77 including 
three major Admiralty contracts - those for the 9,800 ton 
Monmouth class armoured cruisers HMS MONMOUTH and HMS 
CUI-IBERLA14D and for the 10,850 ton Devonshire class armoured 
cruiser HMS ROXBURGH ordered in 1899,1900 and 1901 
respectively - trading profits before depreciation averaged 
L71,454 per annum. Since the London & Glasgow's HMS 
ROXBURGH cost the Admiralty L46,035 less_than Scott's HMS 
ARGyLý. 78 it is passible that the firm did not earn as large 
a profit as Scott's an the Devonshire class ship, but it is 
unlikely that any part of the London & Glasgow's ZI. 6 
millions of Admiralty business was unprofitable. Certainly 
it was achieved with a minimum of capital expendi. ture. Net 
additions to fixed assets in the eight years to 30th June 
1906 amounted to only Z49,724. Meanwhile the directors were 
at pains to build up the company's finances. In the eight 
years to 30th June 1906 the directors distributed Z157,800 to 
ordinary shareholders but they also realised X65,395 by 
calling up the unpaid balances an the ordinary shares. In 
consequence they were able to repay murtgages of L4C, 000 and 
accumulate substantial liquid assets, the balance sheet at 
30th June 1906 showing cash balances of E141,403 and 
investments in British Government securities, debentures and 
preference shares with a market value of E83,986.79 
Beardmore's did not share fully in this period of 
prosperity. Handicapped by Robert 'Napier & Sons inadequate 
facilities, it prudently tendered an the basis of 
subcontracting the manufacture of machinery to other 
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firms. 80 Subcontracting necessarily affected the 
profitability of the 9,800 ton Monmouth class armoured 
cruiser HMS BERWICK and the 10,850 ton Devonshire class 
armoured cruiser H14S CARNARVON. Nevertheless, net profits 
of L47,146 and L63,939 respectively were encouraging in light 
of the limited facilities at the firm's disposal and, by the 
spring of 1905, when Dalmuir opened to build the hull of the 
15,925 ton Lord Nelson class battleship HMS AGAMEMNONp 
Beardmore's was poised to join Clydebank and Fairfield as one 
of the three leading warshipbuilders an the Clyde 
For Clydebank and Fairfield the opening years of the 
century had been a period of unprecedentei prosperity. 
Fairfield, with E2,313,022 worth of Admiralty work on hand in 
the summer of 1699, had gone an to secure the contracts for 
the 9,800 ton Monmouth class cruiser HMS DONEGAL in 1900-01, 
the 15,610 ton King Edward VII class battleship HMS 
COI-11-IONWEA!. TH in 1901-02, the 2,860 ton Scout class light 
cruisers HMS FORWARD and HfIS FORESIGHT in 1902-03 and the 
13,55U ton Warrior class armoured cruiser HMS COCHRANE in 
1903-04. Clydebank, with Z2,190,035 worth of Admiralty work 
on hand at the time of John Brown & Co. 's takeover, had been 
excluded from tendering for cruisers in 1900-01 an account of 
the late delivery of other work and the problems with 
destroyers, 81 but the yard's return to favour had been marked 
by the order for the 10,850 ton Devonshire class armoured 
cruiser HMS ANTRI14 in 1901-012 and it had gone an to take 
orders for the 15,885 ton King Edward VII class battleship 
HMS HINDUSTAN in 1902-03 and the engines for the 
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dockyard-built battleship HMS AFRICA in 1903-04. In 
addition both Fairfield and Clydebank had a share of the 
naval repairs and refits put out to private firms on a 
'cost-plus' basis in 1902 and 1903, 'the former havi ng 
undertaken the refit or three torpedo boats at a cost to the 
Admiralty of E129 v006 
82 and the latter the refit of three 
cruisers at a cost to the Admiralty or Z290,353.83 
As in the 1890's major Adniralty contracts invariably 
proved to be very profitable to the two big yards. 
7airfield's rive contracts eventually yielded net profits of 
L505,18B on a total invoiced price of E2,334,783, 
contributions to overheads and profit ranging between an 
average of 30.5113 of invoice price on the two light cruisers 
and 26.68a of invoice price on the battleship HMS 
CGMMONWEAýTH. Similarly Clydebank's ttiree contracts 
eventually yielded net prorits of L348,390 on a total 
invoiced price of Z1,485,836, contributions to overheads and 
profit on the contracts for the cruiser HMS ANTRIM and the 
battleship HMS HINDUSTAN working out at 41.9715 or invoice 
price and 32.34% or invoice price respectively. 
Since neither yard normally took credit for the profits 
on contracts until they were completed, the outcome of these 
contracts was not fully reflected in their accoun-ta- until 
1906-07 when Fairfield completed WIS COCHRANE and Clydebank 
finished HMS HINDUSTAN and the engines for HMS AFRICA, 'but, 
as a corollary, the profitability or both yards in the seven 
years to 1906 benefited from the completion or all the 
Admiralty contracts on hand in 1899. lairfieldo which 
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completed Admiralty contracts worth E4,200,183 in the seven 
years to 30th June 1906 was able to report trading profits 
before depreciation amounting to Z909,147, an average of 
E129,878 per year. Clydebank, which completed'the L874,983 
contract for the Japanese battleship ASAHI as well as 
Admiralty contracts worth E3,064,565 in the seve6 years to 
31st March 1906, earned trading profits before depreciation 
amounting to L661,54Z, the yard, s lower average profits of 
L94,506 per year being partly explained by the Z50,877 of 
profit an uncompleted contracts taken by the previous owners 
in 1899 84 and partly by the lower volume of naval work. 
As has already been noted, merchant shipbuilding 
contributed to the profitability or both yards but the 
critical importance or warshipbuilding is apparent from the 
analysis of the net profits earned on all contracts completed 
in the seven years to 1906 in Table 5.3. 
TABLE 5.3 
NET PROFITS 0% CONTRACTS COMPLETED 1899-1906. 
PAIRFIEýD CILYDEBANK 
NAVAL WORK 701,216 576,498 
MERCHANT WORK 173,367 174,946 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendices rII and FIII) 
The record oF rairfield, the only one oF the two yards 
to retain a separate corporate identity, was indicative oF 
the strength oF the warshipbuilders' position. In contrast 
to the 1890's, when the size oF distributions to ordinary 
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shareholders had been dictated primarily by the desire or the 
Pearce family to recoup the capital paid in to meet the 
deficiency in the conpany's accounts at 30th June 1894, 
payments or_8% in respect of 1899-1900 and 1900-01,1210 in 
respect or 1901-02,20% in respect of 1902-03,1903-04 and 
1904-65 and 30% in respect or 1905-06 were fully justified by 
the Firm's trading performance. Over these seven years 
provisions for depreciation of fixed assets had anounted to 
L273,500 and the company had managed to finance net additions 
to Fixed assets amounting to Z210,857 and an initial 
investment of E167,500 in the Coventry Ordnance Works without 
as yet having issued the new debenture auttiorised in 1904. 
It had also turned a bank overdraft of Z215,220 at 30th June 
1899 into cash on hand or Z57,129 at 30th June 1906. 
This-period of extraordinary prosperity was drawing to a 
close by the tine Dalmu*ir opened but thi-s was riot apparent at 
the time. The total volume of new warship orders Olaced 
with private Firms had declined steadily from a peak of 
91,125 tons in 1901-02 to 34,815 tons in 1904-05,85 largely 
because the elimination of the backloq of repairs and refits 
allowed the Royal Dockyards to undertake more new 
cons-truction but circumstances still appeared to favour the 
private warshipbuilder. In 1902-03, at the height of the 
dockyard crisis, the Admiralty decided to allow private 
contractors to undertake work which heretofore had remained 
the jealously guarded prerogative of their own establishments: 
It has been arranged ... that the vessels 
in course of construction at the contractors 
III 
premises will be completed in all respects 
ready for immediate passing into the Fleet 
Reserve an delivery instead of as heretofore 
leavihg the carrying out of the trials, 
installation of the armament and completion 
of certain details till after delivery at one 
of His Majesty's Dockyards. 86 
Meanwhile the committee set up to inquire into the 
arrears in shipbuilding programmes at 31-6t December 1900 tied 
produced a report which was extremely favourable to the 
interests of the private warshipbuilder. While it 
acknowledged that the Admiralty was in no position to 'follow 
the practice of private firms by guaranteeing a continuance 
of orders to any particular firm' it pointedly remarked that: 
Those shipowners of the mercantile marine 
are best served who are able to give constant 
employment to a particular firm or firms. 87 
In 1904 the Admiralty decided against discontinuing 
shipbuilding in the Royal Dockyards altogether an the grounds 
that it was desirable to have both a check on prices and an 
insurance against strikes 88 but, the statement accompanying 
the 1905-06 Naval Estimates, which reported that it was no 
longer. necessary to provide for repairs in private yards, 
emphasised that: 
Henceforth it should be borne in mind that 
the first business of the Royal Dockyards 
is to keep the Fleet in repair and accordingly 
the amount of new construction allocated to 
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those dockyards should be subordinated to 
this consideration. " 
Most important of all, the Admiralty under the leadership of 
Admiral Fisher who became First Sea '-ord in 1904 was about to 
give a further stimulus to the demand for warships by 
introducing a revolutionary new generation of capital ship. 
The 17,900 ton battleship HNS DREADNOUGHT, laid down at 
Portsmouth in October 1905 and completed less than a year 
later, set a new standard for capital ships. The design of 
the new ship, about which Fisher had taken the advice of both 
Admiralty officials and civilian experts, 90 was a logical 
progression from earlier battleships, which had grown 
steadily from the 14,150 ton seventeen-and-a-half-knot Royal 
Sovereign class of 1889 to the 16,350 ton nineteen-knot King 
Edward VII class of 1903 but it incorporated two 
revolutionary features. First, to-faci-1--ktate gun control 
and shot sighting, the Admiralty abandoned the mixture of 
four twelve-inch, four nine-inch and ten 3ix-inch guns of the 
King Edward VII class in favour of ten twelve-inch guns and, 
in some respects the most revolutionary aspect of the whole 
design, the disposition of these guns was such that eight 
could be brought to bear on either broadside or six ahead or 
astern. 91 Second, to take maximum advantage of the ship's 
ability to engage the enemy at long range without any lass of 
tactical mobility, the new ship was designed to be faster 
than any previuus battleship and to secure the design speed 
of twenty-one knots without an unacceptable increase in 
engine weight it was necessary to use steam turbines. 92 
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The Admiralty's decision to take the lead in building a 
battleship which was bigger, faster and more powerfully armed 
than any other battleship in existence and more 
controversially, to build faster but less heavily armoured 
battlecruisers of a similar size to act in concert with it, 
was widely criticized as a break with Britain's traditional 
policy of leaving innovation to others. Fisher and his 
supporters believed the developments to be inevitable and 
they were determined to ensure that the Royal Navy had a lead 
over its rivals. 93 Accordingly , the 1905-06 Navy Estimates 
provided for the building of HMS DREADNOUGHT and three 
battlecruisers and, since none of the Royal Dockyards could 
accommodate the building of such ships without extensive 
modification'94 all three battlecruisers had to be built in 
private yards. The result was that the total tonnage of 
warships put out to contract under the 1905-06 programme rose 
to 64,762 tons. 
In a significant departure from normal Admiralty 
practice the contracts for the 'three battlecruisers were 
placed with carefully selected firms rather than being put 
out to tender. 95 Clydebank and Fairfield were two of the 
three firms selected for the work, Clydebank having the order 
for the 17,290 ton HMS INr'. EXIBLE and Fairfield the order For 
the 17,410 ton HMS IND01MITAW. E. As experienced 
warshipbuilders which had previously built the largest 
battleships and armoured cruisers, the two firms were natural 
choices to undertake this type of work and it was fitting 
that they should have been chosen to build these particular 
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ships. Clydebank's earlier orders for the Cunard liners 
CARMANIA and !. USITANIA set it apart as the only major 
warshipbuilding yard with previous experience of building a 
big turbine-powered ship. 96 Sir Alexander Gracie, 
7airfield's engineering director, had been one of the experts 
consulted by Fisher in developing the idea of the 
ldreadnought'. 97 While Gracie was consulted as a private 
individual rather than as a director of rairfield, there can 
be little doubt that Fairfield's deciaian to undertake a 
major programme of capital investment in 1904 was made in the 
knowledge that the 1dreadnought' was in the offing and it was 
no coincidence that, by the time the order arrived, the firm 
had been at pains to acquire some experience of manufacturing 
turbines, first by building the yacht NARCISSUS for Colonel 
Moseley, one of the firm's directors, and then by undertaking 
the building of the channel ferry DIEPPE for the ýondon 
Brighton. & South Coast Railway Co. and the-Irish ferry VIPER 
for G. & J. Burns. 
With the receipt of the orders for the two 
battlecruisers in the autumn of 1905 Clydebank and Pairfield 
were better placed than other warshipbuilders on the Clyde. 
The ýondors & Glasgow was exceptional in having no Admiralty 
orde. rs to follow the completion of HMS ROXBURGH but, by the 
end of 1905, Scott's had only the machinery for the 
dockyard-built cruiser HMS DErENCE on hand and, prior to the 
conmencement of the battlecruisers, Dalmuir was unique in 
having a warship an the stocks, all or the Admiralty work on 
hand at Clydebank and Fairfield being in an advanced state of 
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completion. Compared with the situation in 1902 and 1903 
when, as The Glasgow Herald remarked, the exceptional number 
or warships an the stocks and ritting-out explained 'to a 
very large extent' the way in which employment continued to 
be fairly plentiful in spite or a ralling away of merchant 
demand, 98 Admiralty work was in relatively short supply. 
However as far as the three big yards in particular were 
concerned the outlook was far from discouraging. The 
private warshipbuilding industry had enjoyed a period of 
unprecedented prosperity; there was no indication that the 
Clyde was uncompetitive on cost; Clydebank and Fairfield had 
each received an order for one of the new generation of 
capital ships; Dalmuir was well on the way to acquiring the 
capability to do the same; all three yards had established 
links with a powerful armaments industry which appeared to 
augur well for their chances of securing foreign warship 
orders. All three yards could therefore look to the future 
with confidence, comfortable in the knowledge that they 
ranked with Armstrong Whitworth's Elswick yard, Vickers' 
Barrow yard and Cammell T-aird's Birkenhead yard among the six 
or seven biggest, best equipped and, at least as far as 
Clydebank and Fairfield were concerned, most successful 
private warshipbuilding yards in Britain. " 
NOTES. 
John Brown's had been engaged in the manufacture of 
armour plate since the 1850's. By 1867, the firm, 
which had becone a limited company capitalised at 
L1,000,000 in 1864, was reported to have supplied the 
wrought iron armoured piates for three-quarters of the 
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lironclads' in the Royal Navy. See Grant, Steel and 
Ships: The History or John Brown's, pp. 21-22. 
2) The Coventry Ordnance Works Co. had its origins in the 
Birmingham firm of Mulliner & Wigley which manufactured 
scientific measuring equipment and tools for producing 
the most complicated parts of ordnance. Following a 
move to Coventry, the firm began manufacturing ordnance 
for the Army an its own account and an amalgamation with 
Charles Cammell & Co. had been arranged to ensure the 
supply of the high quality steel needed for this 
purpose. F-or a fuller description of the firm and its 
history see The Times, June 9th 1909. 
3) William Beardmore, who had become sale partner in the 
Parkhead 7orge once owned by Robert Napier in 1887, 
started experimenting with the manufacture of all-steel 
armour plate in 1889. By 1898-99, Beardmore's armour 
plate business was thriving and a massive expansion of 
the facilities 
' 
at Parkhead included provision For the 
manufacture of guns. See Hume & Mos3, Beardmore, 
pp. 37 & 47-48. 
4) Vickers Sons & Co,, the Sheffield steelmakerst had 
installed equipment for the manufacture of guns and 
all-steel armour plate in 1888. By the early 1900's, 
following the acquisition of Maxim Nordenfelt's 
artillery and ammunition works and the Barrow shipyard 
of the Naval Construction and Armaments Co., the firm of 
Vickers, Maxim & Co. ýtd. ranked alongside 
Armstrong-'dhitworth's and Krupps as one of the three 
greatest armaments manufacturers in the world. See 
C. 1-Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers. Armaments and 
Enterprise, 1854-1914 (ýondon 1977), p. 31 and The Times 
2nd June 1909. 
5) All-steel armour 
' 
plate superseded compound armour plate 
after tests at Shoeburyness in 1888 had shown that the 
best compound armour plate manufactured in Britain was 
shattered by gunfire which did not even penetrate 
all-steel armour plate of the same thickness. See Hume 
& Moss, Beardmore, pp. 35-36. 
6) In 1889 'w hen the specification of a single 
battleship of 
the Royal Sovereign class called for 4,560 tons of 
all-steel armour plate, only John Brown & Co. and 
Charles Cammell & Co. had started production and total 
output amounted to 8,000 tons per annum. By the time 
the programme autharised by the Navy Defence Act or ing 
was completed, five firms were in production and output 
had grown to 50,000 tons per annum. See The Times, 
12th May 1909. 
7) Built to the design of Robert Duncan of Port Glasgow in 
1869, the yard had traded as the Barrow Shipbuilding Co. 
until 1888 when it was taken over by the Naval 
Construction & Armaments Co. which made a particular 
specialisation of warshipbuilding including work on 
Nordenfelt submarines. See Pollard & Robertsong The 
British Shipbuildinq Industry, pp. 111-12. 
8) Sir William Armstrong, who had made his name by inventing 
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a rifled breech-loading gun during the Crimean War, 
commenced the manufacture of ordnance at Elswick in 
1863. In 1867, he beg3n building warships in Charles 
Mitchell's Walker shipyard and in 1884, following a 
merger of the two firms, a new warshipbuilding yard was 
laid out at Elswick alongside the existing ordnance 
works. See Dougan, The History of North East 
Shipbuilding, Chapters 2&3. 
9) In 1688 Sir Joseph 1,1hitworth & Co. and Armstrong's were 
the only private firms in Britain capable of producing 
the largest guns. See Trebilcock, The Vickers 
Brothers, p. 54. 
10) The Times, 24th June 1899. 
11) See Chapter 3 above. 
12) UCS 1/l/12, Minutes of Board Meetings, 31st July 1696 
and 4th September 1896. 
13) ibid., t1inutes of Board Meeting, 31st July 1896, 
14) ibid., Minutes of Board Meeting, 4th September 1896. 
15) ibid., Minutes of Board Meetings, 6th October 1896 
and 2nd November 1896. 
16) See Appendix CV. 
17) UCS I/l/12, Minutes of Board Meeting, 7th 
September 1897. The total cost of the armour plate is 
given in the Contract Cost-Book (UCS 118611). 
18) The Times, 24th June 1899, quotes Mr. J. D. Ellis as having 
told the John Brown W Co. shareholders' meeting that 
Clydebank was "About to be converted into a limited 
company" but this is clearly wrong. Either he had 
chosen his words without sufficient care or he was 
mi6reported. 
19) Clydebank's fixed assets and tools and utensils were 
revalued by John Brown & Co. after the takeover. 
BOOK VA'-UE VALUATION 
31.3.1899 1.4.1899 
zL 
GROUND 92,234 112,790 
BUIý , DINGS 
175,423 208,460 
WORKS IMPROVEMENTS 13,899 
HOUSES 24,677 38,774 
YARD RAILWAY 13,629 15,500 
DOCK 34,000 55,000 
MACHINERY 209,053 297,220 
TOOLS & UTENSI*-S 76,578 103,670 
OTHER ASSETS 91,841 91,841 
731,334 923,255 
(SOURCE: UCS 1/3/6) 
of Laird Brothers Ltd., founded in The Birkenhead firm 
1824 by. "William Laird, had extensive experience of 
building warships for both the Admiralty and foreign 
powers. At the time of the merger with Charles Cammell 
& Co. Ltd. in October 1903, it was in process of 
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constructing a new shipyard and two graving docks at 
Tranmere Say immediately south or its existing yard. 
-or a fuller description of the yard and its history, 
see The Times, 9th June 1909. 
21) Preparations f-or the nanufacture or the largest naval 
guns and gun mountings involved the extensiv-e rebuilding 
and re-equipment or the firm's Coventry works and the 
development or a new site at Scotstoun an the Clyde ror 
the erection and fitting or the gun mountings. A 
quarter of a million pounds was spent in building and 
equipping the shops on the Scotstoun site alone. See 
The Times, 9th June 1909. 
22) H. '-yons, 'The Admiralty and Private Industry', in 
Technical Chanqe and British Naval Policy, 1860-1939 
(London 1977), ed. B. Ranft pp. 49-50. 
13) Report of the Conference appointed to examine the Shops 
and Machinery at Woolwicn arsenal, other than in the 
Danger Buildings and Torpedo Factory, in order to 
consider whether any article not now made in the 
Ordnance Factories can appropriately be made there with 
this machinery: with proce6dings of th-e Conference, 
Minutes of Evidence and appendices, Parliamentary Papers 
1907 [Cd35141 X! -TX 449, p. 
8. 
24) ibid., p. -9. 
25) As early as 1897, when there was an abortive proposal 
that Clydebank and Vickers should combine forces to 
tender for a battleship order in China, the Clydebank 
board was particularly anxious to know how Clydebank 
would be safeguarded against abnornal prýofits being put 
on armour and armament by Vickers 'with a view to 
cutting down our figures for hull and machinery'. 
Ironically Clydebank had earlier decided against 
establishing its own gun factory. See UCS I/l/12, 
Minutes of Board Meetings, 12th July 1897 and 10th Harch 
1896. 
26) UCS 2/l/3, Minutes of Board Meetinq, 160 November 
1905. Fairfield paid L187v5Oo for 125,000 -el ordinary 
shares, sixteen shillings paid, and Z25,000 for Z25,000 
51. Preference Stock. 
27) Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the 
arrears of shipbuilding, Parliamentary Papers, 1902 
[Cd10551 ýX 1, (hereafter referred to simply as The 
Report of the ý-oster Committee) p. 10. 
28) The costs of the hulls or the batLlecruisers HMS 
INF'-EX181-E (Clydebank Yard -No. 374) and HMS INDOMITABLE 
(rairfield Yard No. 445) suggest that these contracts 
included armour plate but this was exceptional. Under 
normal circunstances, the Admiralty went out or its way 
to place the contracts for armour plate separately fron 
those ror hulls to the extent that the armaments 
manufacturers rarely supplied the armour plate for 
British warships built in their own shipyards. See 
Lyons, The Admir 
, 
alty and Private Industry, p. 41. 
29) UCS 2/l/3, Minutes of Board Meeting, 27th January 1903. 
30) ibid., Minutes of Board Meeting, 16th November 1905. 
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31) Links with the Pearce Family were not Finally severed 
until the death, in 1918, or the dowager Lady Pearce, 
the lat'e Sir William Pearce's widow. As a major 
shareholder, the dowager Lady Pearce was asked to 
guarantee the company's overdraft in 1909 and she was 
consulted on a proposal to borrow L250,000 in 1912 (See 
UCS 2/l/4, Minutes or Board Meetings, 22nd May 19-09 and 
12th September 1912) but-she was never actively involved 
in the running of the company. On Sir William G. 
Pearce's death, the chairmanship of the company passed 
to Francis Elgar. 
32) I-lost notably Thomas (later Sir Thomas) Bell, who was 
appointed a director in 1907 and succeeded J. G. Dunlop as 
Managing Director of Clydebank on the latter's 
retirement in 1908. See Grant, Steel and Ships, p. 59. 
33) J. t-l.! - aird and R. R. Bevia joined the 
ý'airfield board in 
December 1905. See UCS 2/3/1. 
34) UCS 2/1/3, Minutes of Extraordinary General Meetin'g, 17th 
June 1904. 
35) This figure represents the valuation of Dalmuir at lst 
January 1902 plus net additions to fixed assets between 
then and 31st December 1907 excluding transfers from 
Govan and Lancerield Street. 
36) A full description of the facilities at Dalmuir is given 
in a special article in The Times, 7th July 1909. See 
also Hume & Moss, Beardmore, pp. 72-73. 
37) UCS 2/l/3, Minutes of Board Meeting, 29th November 1901, 
38) GIJ 4935, Robert Napier & Sons Rapers, No. 25. Valuation 
or Govan Shipbuilding Yard and Lancefield Engine Works 
by Thomas W. Smillie & r*raser dated 20th July 1898. 
39) Hume. & Moss, Beardmore, p. 50. 
40) ibid. pp. 47-48. 
_ýational Bank th-e Head 41) of Scotland Minute Books (held at 
Office of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Edinburgh), 
Vol, 36, p 5499 29. th November 1900. Quoted by Hume & 
Moss, Ecardmore, p. 51. 
42) Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers, p. 91. 
43) KIN-FAUNS CAST, -E, KII-DONAN CAST!. 
E, ARIMADAýE CASTI-E and 
DURHAM CAST! 
-E. 
44) VADERLAND, ZEELAND, HAVERr*ORD and MERION 
45) E. Creen & M, Moss, A Business of National Importance: The 
Royal Mail Shippinq Group, 1902-1937 (London 1982), 
p. 17. 
46) By 1928, Lord Kylsant, the chairman of the Royal Mail 
Group, effectively controlled 140 companies including 
the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., Elder Dempster & Co. t 
the Union-Castle Mail Steamship Co. and the White Star 
line. See ibid., p. 80 & pp. 223-6. 
47) UCS 2/20/1, letter from rrancis Elgar to Alexander 
Gracie, dated l5th January 1903. 
48) Walker, The Song or the Clyde, p. 106. 
49) ibid., pp. 110-11. The building of these ships was nade 
possible by the Admiralty agreeing to lend Cunard 
Z2t6OOqOOO at 2 3/4% to help Finance the building of 
the ships and to pay an annual operating subsidy of 
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-150,000. In exchange the Admiralty had the rigtit to 
have these ships built in accordance with its 
requirements for war service and to amend the design of 
any other new Cunard liner capable of more than 
seventeen knots. See Pollard & Robertson, The British 
Shipbuilding Industry, p. 225. 
50) See Chapter 4 above. 
51) The decision to fit stean turbines in the 19-knot 
CARMANIA was taken following the recommendation of a 
52) 
53) 
54) 
55) 
56) 
committee of experts 
powered by turbines. 
Clyde, p. 111. 
that the 25-knot liners should be 
See Walker, The Song oF the 
UCS I/l/13, Mioiutes or Board Meeting, 18th May 1904. 
The invoice price of the CARHANIA was L43,253 less than 
that of the CARONIA. See Appendix FIII. 
It is interesting to compare the labour costs of the 
battleship HHS HINDUSTAN with those of the liner CARONIA 
built by Clydebank at approximately the same time. The 
labour expended on the L647,711 contract for the hull 
and machinery of the battleship totalled Z179,301 
compared with only Z163,836 expend. ed on the L630,467- 
contract for the hull and machinery of the liner, most 
of the difference arising from the lower labour cost of 
constructing and fitting out the liner's hull - Z123j842 
compared with 
of the labour 
UCS 1/85/2. 
ýA PI-ATAI, !. UNHO 
Nos. 449,450, 
The TAt. CA built 
Z137,260 for the battleship. Breakdowns 
costs of the two ships are to be found in 
I EBRO, %'IýE, -TAGUS, TRENT and TYNE (YARD 
451,454,466,467 and 470). 
for the Pacific Stpam Navigation Co. 
57) The 5,662 ton HIGH'_AND BRIGADE and the 3,750 ton HIGHýAND 
ýADDIE for the Nelson 1-ine and the 5,893 ton Aý_NVICK 
CAST'_E and the 5,883 ton BERWICK CASTLE for the 
Union-Castle ýine. 
58) See Appendix FIV. 
59) Report of the Foster Committee, pp. 4-7. 
60) Statenent of the First ýord of the Admiralty explanatory 
of the Navy Estimates for 1302-1903, Parliamentary 
Papers, 1902 [Cd9501 LIX 307, p. 13. 
61) Report of the roster Committee, p. 2. 
62) March, British Destroyers, p. 35. 
63) Walker, The Song of the Clyde, p. 75. 
64) March, British Destroyers, p. 47, 
65) ibid., p. 54. 
66) Clydebank suffered abatements of price of E750 an HMS 
8RAZENt Z500 on HMS ELECTRA and Z3,000 an HMS ARAB in 
respect of shortfalls in their design spee. d but the 
Admiralty did not exact additional penalties for late 
delivery. See UCS 1/75/4. 
67) Fairfield, in particular, could boast of a good record on 
the delivery of cruisers. HMS VENUS, HtIS DIANA and HMS 
DIADEM had been delivered 37 days early, 44 days early 
and 27 days early respectively. Despite a fire HMS 
ARGONAUT had been delivered only 14 days late and, 
although HMS HERMES had been delivered one month late 
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because of a strike, her sister ship HMS HIGHFILYER had 
been-delivered one month early. Only HMS ABOUKIR was 
seriously late but this was attributed to the want of 
armour 'which was a separate Covernnent order with which 
they had nothing whatever to do'. See report of speech 
by Sir William G. Pearce at the launching of HMS BEDFORD 
in cairplay, 
_5th 
September 1901. 
68) eairplay, Ist November 1900. 
69) Figures abstracted from papers acconpanying later Navy 
estimates suggest that HMS ARGY! _ý was 
the most expensive 
of the five Devonshire class arraoured cruisers put out 
to contract in 1901-1902. Excluding dockyard 
incidental charges, her first cost was Z860,740 By 
comparison, the first cost of Clydebank's HMS ANTRVI was 
given as Z856,778, the next most expensive ship- 
Beardmore's HMS CARNARVON - cost only Z840,932 and HMS 
ROXBURGH, bui-It by the London & Glasgow and HMS 
HAMPSHIRE buil 
,t 
by Armstrong Whitworth's appear to have 
cost the Admiralty only Z814,705 and Z818,105 
respectively. 
70) The net prorits/-Iosses of the Greenock Foundry Co. for 
the years 1890 to 1900 inclusive are taken from UGD 
319/7/2/5-6. Similarly the net profits/-losses of 
Scott & Co. for the years 1889 to 1901 inclusive are 
taken from UGD 319/7/l/l. In both cases interest on 
partners' capital accounts has been added back in 
computing the figures. 
NET PROFITS&LOSSES 07 THE GREENOCK FOUNDRY CO. 
A'M SCOTT & CO. 1889-1901. 
YEAR TO GREENOCK SCOTT & CO. 
31st DECEMBER rOUNDRY CO. 
L 
1869 ? 4,570 
1890 5,906 19,891 
1891 10,077 19,273 
1692 36 7,643 
1893 -250 -5,322 
1894 -3,862 -4,498 
1895 17,688 28,958 
1896 -1,441 -4,653 
1897 -2,954 -1,650 
1898 -4,345 1,081 
1899 -3,491 -18,513 
-1" 0 4,490 -44,714 
1901 ? 11,916 
71) See note 70 above. 
72) Ana lysis of contracts abstracted from UGO 319/7/l/l. 
73) Although the new company nominally dates its existPnce 
fron Ist January 1902, there is some doubt whether the 
decision to form it was made then or later. The 
accounts for the two years to 31st December, 1903 appear 
to have been prepared retrospectively and the estate of 
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John Scott, who died in tlay 1903, lists his interests as 
being in Scott & Co. and the Greeno6k roundry Co. rather 
than in Scott's Shipbuilding and Engineering CO. ' Ltd. 
See Fairplay, 7th January 1904. 
74) rairplay, 13th November 1902, quoting report in the 
Greenock Telegraph of the previous week. 
75) In the conpany's books the Z50,000 was debited direct to 
the contract for HMS ARGYýý. In Appendix EV the author 
has treated it as a provision for depreciation and the 
cost of the ship in Appendix FV ties been ammenaed 
accordingly. 
76) Yard Nos. 2ý2,294-297,300-302,308, and 310-312. 
77) Yard Nos. 304,313-314,317,320 and 322. 
78) See Note 69 above. 
79) The narket value is given as a note on the published 
accounts for the year to 30th June 1906. 
80) In 1900, Beardmore's tendered for Monmouth class cruisers 
with engines suppied by either Hawthorn ýeslie or 
Humphrey Tennant and while the former tender was the 
cheaper the Admiralty preferred the latter. See 
Fairplay, lst November 1900. Humphrey Tennant also 
supplied the engines for HMS CARNARVON. although Hawthorn 
I-eslie later provided those for HNS AGAMEMNON. 
81) This was a rare instance of firms being penalised for 
late delivery. The firms involved were reported to be 
'conplaining bitterly' about being excluded and the 
Admiralty was said to have pronised that they would be 
allowed to participate in the bidding for battleships 
and cruisers due to be put out to tender in a few 
months' time. See 17airplay, Ist-Novenber 1900. 
82) HMS JASON, HMS CIRCE and HMS I-EDA 
83) HIIS TERRIBLE, HIIS AURORA and HMS PELORUS. In contrast 
to Fairfield, Clydebank treated these contracts as 
miscellaneous sales and they were not ascribed a ship 
number. 
84) UCS 1/3/6, working papers on accounts for year to 30th 
June 1899. 
85) Excluding warships purchased while under construction for 
foreign powers. 
86) Statement of the First lord of the Admiralty explanatory 
of the Navy estimates for 1903-1904, Parliamentary 
Papers 1903 [Cdl4781 XXXIX 305, p. 14. 
87) Report of the 7oster Committee, p. 14. 
88) Marder, The Anatomy of British Seepower, p. 42. 
89) Statement of the cirst Lord of the Admiralty explanatory 
of the Navy Estimates for 1905-1906p Parliamentary 
Papers 1905 (Cd24021 XýVII 293, p. 7. 
90) A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to_Scapa Flow- The Royal 
Navy in the ý'isher Era, 1904-1919 
1961-1970)), Vol. 1, pp. 67-68. 
91) 
92) 
93) 
(Five Volumes: ýondon 
Marder, The Anatomy oF British Seapower, p. 533. 
Conway's All the World's Fightinq Ships, 1906-1921, p. 
Harder, From the Dreadnouqht to Scapa F-low, V01.1, 
pp. 56-70. 
21 . 
94) After the introduction of the 1dreadnought' only 
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Portsmouth and Devonport Dockyards were equipped to 
build the largest warships. Pembroke Dockyard was 
relegated to building nothing larger than cruisers and 
Chatham Dockyard was primarily used to build submarines. 
95) Although the contract was not signed until 
30th January 1906, Clydebank was approached regarding 
the building of HNS INFýEXIB! E in August 1905-. See UCS 
I/l/3, Minutes of Board Neeting, 16th August 19U5. 
96) Swan Hunter's, the builders of the ýIJSITANIA's sister 
ship MAURETANIA, did not become involved in 
warshipbuilding until later. The desfroyer HMS HOPE 
laid down in 1909 appears to have been their first 
warship contract. See 
, 
Conway's All the World's 
Fighting Ships, 1906-1921. 
97) The civilian members of th e committee also included 
Professor J. H. Biles who served Clydebank and later 
Denny's as a naval architect. 
98) The Glasgow Herald, Shipbuilding & Engineering 
Supplement, 21st December 1904. 
99) Apart Fron these Five firms, only Palmer's of Jarrow and 
the Thames Iron Works had recent experience of building 
the largest warships and the latter, which was forced 
into liquidation in 1911, was already in financial 
difficulties. It had suffered a loss in building the 
battleship HNS AýBION, completed in 1902, and it was 
reported that it had been awarded the contract for the 
armoured cruiser HMS BLACK PRINCE in 1902-03, only for 
political reasons. See Fairplay, 4th December 1902 and 
Ist January 1903. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
1907-1914: PRE-WAR PROBLEMS. 
The years immediately following the introduction of the 
1dreadnought' in 1905 were lean years for the private 
warshipbuilder. While the resignation of the Unionist 
Government in December 1905 did not result in any fundamental 
change in naval policy and the incon-ing I-iberal 
admini4tration made no attempt to reverse the controversial 
decision to proceed with the building or 1dreadnoughts', the 
I-iberals were pledged to reduce expenditure on armaments. 
They inherited a situation which permitted some reduction in 
the planned rate of new construction without jeopardisinq 
Britain's naval supremacy. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 
1902, which assured the Royal Navy or a powerrui ally in the 
Far East in the event or war with with any two other powers, 
had recently been renewed ; the United States was already 
regarded more as a kindred power than a'potential enemy and, 
in 1904, the Entente Cordiale with France together with the 
crushing defeat inflicted on Russia by Japan had effectively 
neutralised the hostile combination against which all of 
Britain's naval preparations had previously been directed. 
Germany, once seen as a potential ally, was increasingly 
identified as Britain's most likely enemy in the event of war 
but in 1906, with the bulk of the British battlefleet in 
process of being concentrated in hone waters and the first or 
the new 1dreadnoughts' in the ofringo there was no immediate 
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danger. Britain enjoyed an overwhelming naval superiority 
and the Admiralty Is original intention of laying down four 
new 1dreadnoughts' a year was difficult to justify. In 
consequence the number or 'capital ships included in the 
1906-07 and 1907-08 programmes was reduced fron four to 
three I and, although the outcome of the 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference dispelled any illusion that the other powers would 
be willing to agree to any plan for the limitation of 
armaments which would perpetuate Britain's existing naval 
supremacy. 2 the Admiralty was able to persuade a reluctant 
Cabinet to agree only to the inclusion of a battleship as 
well as a battlecruiser in the 1908-09 programme on the 
grounds that the omission of a battleship would bring the 
heavy armaments industry to a standstill at an inopportune 
moment: 
Although it is quite true that our 
preponderance in battleships at the present 
moment might justify the omission of the 
solitary battleship proposed, yet with the 
full knowledge and absolute certainty (now 
afforded by the German progr3nne just issued) 
of having to commence a large battleship 
programme in 1909-10, it would be most 
unbusiness like and indeed disastrous, to 
close down the arnour plate industry of this 
country by the entire cessation of battleship 
building. It would be similarly disastrous 
to abruptly stop the manufacture of heavy gun 
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mounti6gs which the omission of the battleship 
would also involve. 3 
The private warshipbuilding industry was accorded less 
consideration. The Admiralty professed to be favourably 
di sposed towards an industry which had served the Royal Navy 
well since 1889, and Lord Tweedmouth, the newly appointed 
Liberal cirst Lord of the Admiralty, told a delegation of 
dockyard workers from Chatham in 1906 that: 
He could not accept in its fullest sense 
the proposition that the nation's work 
should be carried an in the national 
shipbuilding establishments. 4 
Nevertheless the Admiralty's earlier decision not to abandon 
shipbuilding in the Royal Dockyards meant that in practice it 
was sti-11 the private shipbuilders who bore the brunt of any 
contraction in demand. While Portsmouth and Devonport, the 
only dockyards equipped to build Idieadnoughts', were 
allocated six of the eight capital ships laic] down in the 
three year3 1906-07 to 1908-09, private contractors were 
starved of major warship orders. Apart from destroyers, 
torpedo boats and submarines, their total share comprised one 
battleship in each of 1906-07 and 1907-08 and five 4,800 ton 
I 
protected cruisers in 1908-09.5 
The contraction in Admiralty demand had an adverse 
effect on the fortunes of the Clyde warshipbuilders. 
Denny's of Dumbarton, which, as an unincorporated family 
concern, had been debarred from tendering for Admiralty 
contracts between 1895 and 1905 when one of its partners 
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served as a Member of Parliament. 6 was able to turn its 
pioneering work on turbine-powered steaMers 7 to advantage by 
securing orders for four turpedo boats and a destrayer, 
8 but 
the bigger warshipbuilding yards were less successful. The 
battleships an offer in 1906-07 and 1907-08 went to 
Armstrong's and Vickers respectively, despite a determined 
effort by Clydebank to secure the second order by taking 'a 
considerable amount' off charges in its tender. 9 Clydebank 
and Fairfield, the only Clydeside yards judged fit to build 
large turbine-powered warships in 1905, both managed to 
secure an order for the machinery of a dockyard-built ship 
10 
and Scott's was encouraged to equip itself for the 
manufacture of turbines by the award of the contract for the 
machinery of the dockyard built battleship HMS ST. VINCENT in 
1907, but neither Scott's nor Dalmuir , admitted to the list 
of f-irms invited to tender for complete ldreadnoughts' after 
re-presentations by Beardmore's in 1906,11 succeeded in 
securing a single warship oýder between 1905 and the end of 
1908. rurther, unlike Alfred Yarrow & Co.. the destroyer 
specialist, which transferred its business from* Poplar to a 
new yard at Scotstoun on the Clyde in 1907,12 none of them 
had naval work for foreign governnents to keep them 
going. 13 
_ 
Consequently, the Clyde yards were pLrogressively 
denuded of naval work. By December 1907, following the 
launching of the 17,290 ton battlecruiser MIS 1'47LEXIB!. E at 
Clydebank and the 17,410 ton battlecruiser HMS INDOMITABLE at 
Fairfield, the only naval work on the stocks an the Clyde 
were the destroyers building at Denny's and Yarrowls. As 
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The Glasqow Herald remarked, this was 'a condition of affairs 
quite unprecedented within recent years'. 
14 
All or the erstwhile warshipbuilders were running short 
of work or any kind. The London & Glasgow had no orders to 
follow the launching of a 5,180 ton merchantman in 1907.15 
In December of tne same year it was reported that Scott's and 
Dalmuir each had only one merchant vessel- on hand, at 
rairfiald only two small steamers were an the stocks and all 
or Clydebank's berths stood empty. 16 While the plight of 
the warshipbuilders was no worse than that or the majority or 
Clyde yards, which were all beginning -to reel the effects of 
the onset or the abnormally severe slump in merchant demand 
which was to reduce the district's total output or ships fron 
an all-time high of 619,919 tons in 1907 to 355,8136 tons in 
1908, they had particular cause fur concern. All of them 
had experienced difficulty in securing worthwhile nerchant 
orders even when demand was relatively buoyant between 1904 
and 1907. 
Two yards had indeed experienced difficulty in securing 
work of any kind. Since opening Dalmuir to build tne 
battleship HMS AGAMEMNON in the spring of 1905, Beardmore's 
total intake of new work had consisted of five ships for the 
Pacific Steam Navigation Co. worth E533,789,17 all of them 
taken at prices which failed to cover prime cost, while the 
ý. ondon & Glasgow had built only six merchant ships 
aggregating 26,. 779 tons since the beginning or 1904.113 
Clydebank's record was little better. Since April 1904, 
when the yard had received the order for the LUSITANIA, it 
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had managed to secure only thirteen merchant orders worth 
Z1,043,808.19 Six of these thirteen orders had resulted in 
losses, three of them failing to cover even prime cost, and 
all thirteen contracts together had yielded a contribution to 
overheads and profit of only L63,311. Even those 
warshipbuilding yards which had managed to secure a volume of 
merchant orders commensurate with their capacity had run into 
difficulties. Scatt's, which had taken orders for 
thirty-two ships worth L1,167,763 in the three years to 
December 1907,20 suffered net losses on ten and the total 
contribution to overheads and profit from all thirty-two 
contracts amounted to only L132,947, compared with the 
contribution of L184,963 frota the building of the armed 
cruiser HMS ARGYLL alone. Fairfield, which had taken 
fifteen merchant contracts worth ZE2,187,738 since February 
1904,21 had most cause for satisfaction, not least because 
the intake included four orders for large passenger liners 
each worth more than L300,000 - the 14,190 ton EMPRESS OF 
SRITAIN and EMPRESS OF CANADA for Canadian Pacific and the 
10,897 ton HVAOPOýIS and CAIRO for the Egyptian Mail 
Steamship Co. - but even- Fairfield's record was seriously 
flawed. Four of the orders, including both the HELIOPOLIS 
and the CAIRO resulted in losses, and, more seriously, both 
the Egyptian Mail Steamship Co., which had bought its two 
liners on credit and Italian owners, who had bought the 
steamer VOLTURNO on similar terms, failed to meet their 
contractual obligations. Fairfield was obliged to repossess 
all three ships, the VOLTURNO in August 1907 
22 and the 
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others in October 1908,23 leaving the company with the 
problem of disposing of second-hand ships in a depressed 
market. Eventually, a Canadian buyer took all three ships 
off rairrield's hands in November 1909.24 In the meantime, 
the company had to borrow to cover the dishonoured bills. 
The transaction resulted in further losses of Z22,960 25 and 
only LIOO, OOO of the resale price of E415,000 was paid in 
cash, the balance beind settled by promissory notes for 
Z90,000 and L225,000 of debenture stock in the Canadian 
Northecn Railway which, under the terms of the deal, could 
not be sold for less than L95 per Z100 of stock 26 -a price 
which was still not obtainable in the open market four years 
later . 
27 
In the depressed conditions of 1908 the outlook for 
merchant shipbuilding became even bleaker. The London-& 
Glasgow, which had been at a complete standstill for most of 
the year to 30th June 1908 due to the fact that: 
Orders could not be obtained at prices which 
the Directors would have been justified in 
accepting, 28 
reopened to build the 12,129 ton nailship OSTER-EY for the 
Orient Line. Clydebank and Fairfield both had similar 
orders for the same owners but other merchant work was in 
desperately short supply. Apart from the liner ORSOVA which 
was worth L365,837, Clydebank took only two other merchant 
order, the E107,000 rail ferry MUNICH and a contract worth 
Z32,397 on which it suffered a net loss of L9,219.29 
Fairfield with orders for three ferries for the Zeeland 
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Steamship Co. worth E306,766 
30 in addition to the L324,800 
order for the liner OTWAY fared rather better but it 
was barely enough to keep the yard going. Scott's, which 
only took orders for six small merchant ships worth -1290,626 
between December 1907 and the spring of 1909,31 was in a 
similar position. Dalmuir had no work at all to follow the 
completion of the last of the five ships for Pacific Steam 
Navigation. 
ý'ortunately the 1908-09 naval programme afforded the big 
yards their best ch'ance of securing a major warship order 
since 1905-06. Apart from sixteen destroyers and twelve 
submarines, the programme provided for the building of five 
4,600 ton protected cruisers in private yards, the Admiralty 
having revised its earlier opinion that there was no place 
for small cruisers in the post 1dreadnought' fle, t. 
32 The 
I 
major Clyde yards made the most of their opportunity. While 
the contracts for two of the five ships went to Vickers and 
Arnstrong's. the other three orders went to Clyde yards - HMS 
GLOUCESTER to Dalmuir, HMS GLASGOW to Fairfield, and HMS 
BRISTOL, the lead ship of the class, to Clydebank. 
Fairfield and Clydebank also had the contracts for the 
machinery of two more dockyard-built warsMipsq the former for 
the unarmoured cruiser 11MS BE: -LONA and 
the latter-for the 
battlecruiser HMS INDEFATIGABLE. Meanwtiile, rairfield, 
Clydebank, Denny's and the London & Glasgow between then took 
orders for eight of the sixteen destroyers on offer, 
7airfield and Clydebank having been awarded the contracts for 
three vessels each as a reward for having submitted the 
132 
lowest tenders. 33 
Not all or these orders were remunerative. Despite 
Fairfield and Clydebank receiving average prices of only 
L100,407 and LIC2,210 respectively on each of their Beagle 
class destroyers conpared with E115,771 paid to Denny's for 
HMS PINCHER, they reported average net profits or L21,471 per 
vessel and L20,090 per vessel respectively. The larger and 
more prestigious contracts for cruisers were much less 
profitable. HMS GI. AtGOW gave Fairfield a net profit of only 
L9,434 on a price of 002,806 and Clydebank suffered a net 
loss of LI, 024 on the E312,950 contract for HMS BRISTOL. 
The outcomes of the two cruiser contracts were adversely 
affected by the practice followed by both firms or allocating 
all their overheads to work in progress irrespective of how 
little work they had on hand and it is notable that 
Beardmorels, which apparently took the view that the low 
level of throughput at Dalmuir obliged it to distinguish 
between the charges which contracts could be expected to bear 
and the balance which had to be written off as irrecoverable, 
reported a net profit of ZE30,143 an the L301,537 contract to 
build HIIS Gloucester Nevertheless, as Table 6,1 shows, 
disparities in the treatment of overheads do not account for 
the low contributions to overhead and profit earned on all of 
these contracts. 
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TAB'-E 6.1 
OUTCOME OF CRUISER CONTRACTS TAKEN IN 1908/09 
Invoice Contribution 
Yard Ship Price to Over 
, 
heads 
and Profit 
V rz 
C! 
-Y 
DE 8 AN K BRISTOL 312,950 57 769 16.46 
DALMUIR GLOUCESTER 301,537 55,791 18.50 
FAIV'IELD- GLASGOW 302,806 44,287 14.63 
(SOURCE: Abstracted fron Appendices FII, FIJI and FIV). 
The contributions earned by Clydebank and Fairfield on their 
two contracts were both less than half the average 
contributions of 37.06% and 29.82% respectively earned by the 
two yards on all the warships undertaken by them between the 
turn of the century and the advent of the ldreadnought'. 
However, in the conditions which prevailed in the winter of 
. 1908-C9 depressed prices did not 
lessen the attractions of 
Admiralty orders. Work of any kind was in short supply and 
warship contracts which did not result in serious losses were 
most welcome , particularly as preýsure was already 
building 
up for a more substantial programme or naval construction to 
begin in 1909-10. 
ror a gavernnent pledged to peace abroad and social 
reform at home it was a bitter blow to have to sanction any 
increase in naval expenditure, especially at a time when it 
was already conmitted to finding the money tu-pay fur a state 
funded old age pension scheme. 34 By the spring of 1909 the 
Cabinet had no choice. Up to 1908 it had been possible to 
resist pressure for increased naval expenditure by pointing 
to the absence of any immediate threat to Britain's naval 
supremacy. By the end of 1908, Germany had started laying 
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down 1dreadnoughts' at the rate of four a year: she possessed 
the industrial capacity to sustain thi3 level of output, and, 
crucially, she was credited with being able to match or even 
better Britain's speed of construction. 35 If no action was 
taken it was feared that Germany would possess more 
1dreadnoughts' than Britain by 1912. The issue was no 
longer whether -Britain's 
own building programme should be 
increased but how nany 1dreadnoughts' needed to be laid down 
in 1909-10. The Admiralty asked for six, the Opposition, 
supported by the pro-navy press and the armaments 
manufacturers, demanded eight and thp Cabinet, which baulked 
at the cost of laying down more than four, gave an 
undertaking that preparations would be put in hand to permit 
the laying down of a further four before April 1910 if this 
should prove necessary. 
36 
The publication of the 1909-10 Naval Estimates marked 
the beginning of another period of naval expansion. With 
Britain's prestige committed to the maintenance of her naval 
supremacy and Germany bent an acquiring a navy appropriate to 
her status as th. e leading power on the continent of Europe, 
the scene was set for a protracted naval arms race which 
continued until the outbreak of war in 1914. By 1912 the 
Government had explicitly redefined Britain's naval supremacy 
in terms of a sixty per cent margin of superiority in 
ldreadnoughts' over Germany alone 37 and the eight 
1dreadnoughts' of the 1909-10 progranme were followed by 
twenty more, the programmes for each of the next four years 
providing for the building of a further five. At the same 
I 
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time provision had to be made for a host of smaller warships 
whose number tended to increase in proportion to the size of 
the main battlefleet, with the result that, in addition to 
twenty-Four battleships and six battlecruisers, 
38 no less 
than twelve protected cruisers, twenty-one unarmoured 
c. ruisers, one hundred and three destroyers, fifty submarines, 
two depot-ships and two depot-ship tenders were laid down by 
the Admiralty in British yards between April 1909 and the 
outbreak or war in -August 1914.39 The services of private 
warshipbuilders were in growing demand and, as shown in Table 
6.2, the total tonnage of British warships under construction 
in Clyde yards rose steadily year by year from 1,276 tons in 
December 1908 to 10,286 tons in December 1913, 
TABILE 6.2 
ADMIRALTY WORX IN PROGRESS IN C'-YDE YARDS 
YEAR END ON STOCKS FITTING-OUT TOTW_ 
(TONS) (TONS) (TONS) 
1908 1,008 250 1,276 
1909 P, 303 13,378 43,681 
1910 71,442 29 285 100,727 
1911 38,067 75,047 113,114 
1912 74,924 56,615 131,539 
1913 104,016 63,268 167,266 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix Cllb)40 
The renewed demand for warships, together with a later 
revival in the demand ror merchant ships, raised the output 
or the Clyde shipbuilding industry to record levels in the 
years preceding the First World War. By December 1911 The 
Glasgow Herald was speaking or 'A period of unexampled 
prosperity, 41 and in 1913 the volume of ships launched on 
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the river reached an all-time high of 756,976 tons, more than 
double the output of 355,586 tons achieved at depths of the 
preceding slump in 1908. Unfortunately, as The Glasgow 
Herald also remarkedl the boom was accompanied by increases 
in the costs of materials and labour and in 1913 
shipbuilders' profits were reported to be 'Far lower than 
they were when less money was passing through their hands'. 
42 
As in previous periods of high naval demand, 
warshipbuilding W3S-confined to a relatively snall nunber of 
firms. The distribution of orders i-s given in Table. 6.3. ' 
Apart from A&J Inglis, which built a single destroyer and 
Yarrow's and Denny's, which likewise confined themselves to 
building destroyerst all of the Clyde's share of Admiralty 
orders was attributable to the efforts of the same five yards 
which had been activeýy engaged in warshipbuilding prior to 
the introduction of the 1dreadnought' in 1905. 
TABLE 6.3 
DISTRIBUTION 07 ADMIRA!. TY ORDERS 1909-1914 
YARD 
DALHUIR 
QYDEBANK 
FAIRFIELD 
SCOTT'S 
ANDON & GIASGOW 
YARROW'S 
DENNY'S 
INGAS 
WARSHIPS ENGINES 
Na TONS No H. P. 
11 96,852 12 343,500 
16 90,035 17 555,500 
13 58,169 15 40a, 000 
7 48,552 a 100,350 
6 16,835 6 123,10U 
12 10,478 12 259,000 
11 9,923 9 175,225 
1 760 1 13,500 
(Source: Abstracted rron Appendix CII) 
Of the five firms, Scott's and the '-ondon & Glasgow both 
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laboured under the disadvantage that, at the outset, neither 
was properly equipped to take full advantage of the renewed 
demand for large turbine-powered warships. By 1909, both 
Scott's, which had been awarded the contract for the 
machinery of the dockyard-built battleship HMS ST. VINCENT in 
December l9a7, and the London & Glasgow, which had secured 
the order For a Beagle c'lass destroyer at the end of 1908043 
had-taken the vital first steps towards proving their 
capability to manufacture turbine-powered ships. The upturn 
in naval demand encouraged both to proceed with more costly 
schemes of reconstruction designed to enable them to build 
the largest warships. The amounts spent by the two firms in 
re-equipping themselves were relatively modest by comparison 
with the sun which had been expended by Beardmore's in 
building Dalmuir but the sums of L139,998, expended by 
Scott's an net additions to fixed as-Tets between December 
1908 and Dec-ember 19149 and L117,631, expended by the London 
& Glasgow on net additions to Fixed assets between June 1909 
and June 1911 were significant outlays for the firms involved. 
Of the two firms the I-ondon & Glasgow was the more 
fortunate in being able to Finance most of this capital 
expenditure from its own resources. While the company had 
paid a dividend of 30s. per share in respect of the year to 
30th June 1907, when the trading results did not justify it, ' 
the directors had been careful to husband the company's cash 
resources by passing the dividend on the ordinary shares in 
each of the two years Following and in June 1909 they had a 
cash balance of L106,632 and short-term investments worth 
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L60 , 29 2 
44 on which to draw when the need arose By 
contrast, Scott's had been undercapitalised since the 
formation of the company and, although the directors had 
pursued an extremely conservative depreciation policy which 
resulted in the book value of fixed assets falling from a 
peak of L475,065 at 31st December 1904 to L376,525 at 31st 
December 1908, and distributions to ordinary shareholders had 
amounted to on_ly Z48,125 in total since the company's 
formation, it still owed its bankers Z106,726 at 313t 
December 1908. 
Any misgivings which Scott's might have have had about 
borrowing more money for further capital expenditure did not 
prevent them from doing so when the firm succeeded in winning 
the Clyde's first order for a ldreadnought' battleship - the 
2n. OOO ton Colossus class battleship HMS COLOSSUS laid down 
in July 1909. While there was some surprise that Scott's 
rather than one or the bigger yards was favoured with such an 
important contract 45 and, at the time, the firm could offer 
little proof or its fitness for the work beyond having 
undertaken theq as yet unfinished, contract for the machinery 
of MIS ST. VINCENT, the appeal of a large naval contract to 
the management was understandable. Three years had elapsed 
since completing the cruiser HMS Argyll in 1905, during which 
time the firm had no major warship orders on hand. While 
the company had managed to earn trading profits before 
depreciation amounting to L76,958, the directors must have 
been well aware that virtually all of the profit was 
attributable to the net profit or Z62,369 earned by the 
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engine tiorks in manufacturing the machinery for the 
dockyard-built armoured cruiser HMS DEFENCE and that the 
shipyard had suffered a loss before providing for 
depreciation in all-three years. 46 
Scott's expansion progranme resulted in the building of 
a new shop equipped with overhead cranes to service the new 
baring, blading and planing machines needed to manufacture 
turbines. 47 Over the next Four years: 
Practically the whole or the buildings 
embraced in the shipyard and the engine 
shop and boiler shop department were 
reconstructed and equipped with modern 
and in many cases new classes of machinery 
and tools. 48 
Such a conprehensive reconstruction imposed heavy strains on 
the company's liquidity. By December 1912 bank borrowings 
amounted to L31C, 397 but, at the outset, ttie prospects seemed 
favourable. Apart From the firm's happy experience with HIIS 
Argyll when a similar initiative had been quickly rewarded, 
the chances of repeat orders were good and the development of 
the naval business was made more attractive by the depressed 
state of merchant demand which made profitable merchant work 
increasingly difficult to obtain. 
The London & Glasgow's programme of capital investment 
was necessarily more speculative. The directors embarked on 
it with only the order for the Beagle class destroyer HMS 
RATTLESNAKE on hand. Here too, there was nothing in the 
firm's recent trading performance to encourage optimism 
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should the firm fail to preserve its position as a credible 
contender -for major Admiralty contracts. The company had 
not earned satisfactory profits in any year since completing 
the cruiser HMS Roxburgh in 1905-06. Total trading profits 
before depreciation in the three years to 30th June 1909 
amounted to only Z18,609 and the yard had no merchant work to 
follow the 12,029 ton mail liner OSTERLEY launched in 1909. 
The board's hand may have been forced by the need to find 
. 
alternative fitting. -out facilities to replace a deep berth on 
the river which was no longer available, 49 but the need for 
facilities capable of building the largest warships was 
clearly uppermost in the directors' minds when they came to 
determine the layout of an expanded yard incorporating the 
ground formerly occupied by Robert Napier & Sons'yard. A 
slipway set at an angle to the river and a new wet basin were 
both designed to accommodate ships of up to 7CO feet in 
length and 100 feet in beam. As The Times commented: 
While mercantile ships, as in the past, 
will probably form a major portion of the 
work 
ýeing provided for, the immediate 
object of the extension and dock formation 
is the provision of adequate facilities 
for building and outfitting naval ships 
including the largest class of battleships. 50 
To complement the improvements in the shipyard more ground 
was purchased adjoining the existing engine works on the 
other side of the river so that new shops could be erected to 
permit, as the directors themselves-said: 'the construction 
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of turbines of the great power now required by the 
Admiralty'. 51 
The London & Glasgowts enterprise was not particularly 
well rewarded. Hopes that the reconstruction of the 
shipyard would result in an order for a 1dreadnought' had not 
been realised by the winter of 1911-12. Although the firm 
had apparently been tendering for the machinery of 
dockyard-built battleships since 1910,52 and its aspirations 
were implicit in the appointment as general manager in 1911 
of Mr. J. R. Bond, who had previously been employed in 
supervising the building of 1dreadnoughts' at Portsmouth 
Dockyard, 53 the yard's share of the 1909-10 amd 1910-11 naval 
programmes consisted or only two small cruisers -the 5,250 
ton HMS YARMOUTH and the 5,400 ton HMS SYDNEY. These 
orders, together with a 5,750 ton merchantman, 54 'were 
apparently not sufficient to keep the firm profitably 
employed. By June 1911, trading results, which had 
recovered from a trading loss before depreciation of L8,319 
in 1907-08 to a trading profit before depreciation of L13,545 
in 1908-09 , were again deteriorating, A trading profit 
before depreciation of L6,472 in 1909-10 was followed by a 
trading profit before depreciation of only L1,779 in i910-11 
when the ordinary dividend had to be passed for the third 
time in four years. By the end of 1911 with no signs of any 
improvement in the trading situation and an order intake from 
the 1911-12 naval programme comprising only three destroyers 
55 and the 3,380 ton destroyer depot-ship HMS WOOLWICH, the 
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directors apparently decided that the prospects were not 
sufficiently encouraging for the firm to continue 
unchanged. In any event they approached Harland & Wolff, 
which was then looking for additional capacity to augment the 
resources of its busy Belfast yard, and in February 1912 they 
advised the shareholders to accept Harland & Wolff's offer of 
nine pounds, three shillings for each nine-pound share. 56 
Following the takeover the firm's engine works were 
turned over to Harland & Woolf's associates Burmeister & Wain 
for conversion to the manufacture of deisel engines. After 
informing the Admiralty that it no longer wished to be 
considered for machinery of-its own manufacture, 57 the yard 
was entrusted with no-further naval work before the outbreak 
of war in 1914, but under Harland & Wolff's management the 
yard was well supplied with merchant work. Output was 
30,468 tons in 1913 alone. 58 
Unlike the London & Glasgow, Scott's persevered with 
warshipbuilding but it had little to show for a great deal of 
effort up to the outbreak of war. The contract for HMS 
COLOSSUS was followed by orders for the 3,600 ton submarine 
depot-ship HMS MAIDSTONE and the 23,000 ton King George V 
class battleship HMS AJAX in 1910-11 but the outcome of all 
these contracts was adversely affected by the disruption 
involved in the reconstruction of the yard. 
59 Of the three 
contracts only HMS MAIDSTONE, on which the firm failed to 
recover prime costs of L22,983, actually resulted in a loss, 
but, as Table 6.5 shows, neither of the two battleship 
contracts came close to matching the profitability of the 
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firm's earlier contract for HMS ARGYLý. 
TAWS 6.5 
PRO"ITABIIITY D" SCOTT'S MAJOR ADMIRALTY CONTRACTS 
SHIP INVOICE CONTRIBUTION 
PRICE TO OVERkEADS & PROFIT 
HULL ENGINES TOTAL 
L ELz 
Hi4S WMI. 622,262 124,832 60,131 184,963 
HIIS COýOSSUS 717,597 57,399 30,437 97,836 
HMS AJAX 847,578 100,597 20,964 121,561 
(Source: Abstracted fron Appendix rV) 
Since all of the nine contracts for merchant ships 60 taken 
by Scott's between 1909 and 1912 resulted in losses - 
E806,599 worth of work yielded a contribution to overheads 
and profit of only L13,575 - the firm was unquestionably 
better off with the naval contracts than it would have been 
without them but trading profits before depreciation amounted 
to only L37,022 in total in the four years to 31st December 
1912. Scott's survived this crisis and went on to earn 
trading profits before depreciation of Z164,410 over the next 
two years but up to the outbreak of war in 1914 there were 
two main reasons for questioning whether the improvement 
could be sustained. 
First, the profitability of the firm in 1913 and 1914 
was attributable largely to the profits earned in building 
three liners for Cunard's Canadian service The contracts 
for the 13,4C5 ton liners A! -AUNIA and 
ANDOINIA and for the 
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14,500 ton liner TRANSYLVANIA, the first transatlantic liner 
fitted with geared turbines, yielded Scott's contributions to 
overheads and profit totalling Z130,37,8 , but the firm had no 
comparable merchant work to follow them in 1914. Apart from 
the Cunard contractsv Scott's total intake of merchant work 
since 1912 amounted to only ten ships worth 1-957,971,61 all 
but three of them for the firm's regular customers Alfred 
Hol-t and the China Navigation Co. 
Second, after receiving the order for the batCleship HMS 
AJAX the firm's total intake of conventional Admiralty work 
comprised a single contract for the manufacture of the 
machinery for the dockyard-built light cruiser HMS 
CONQUEST. -In 1909, Scott's had shown commendable enterprise 
in arranging to build Fiat-designed submarines under licence 
in Britain 62 and, although it remained to be seen whether 
the Admiralty, which had placed orders for three of this type 
of vessel by 1914,63 would return for more, the firm-had gone 
on to accept an order for HMS SWORD71SH, a revolutionary 
Admiralty-designed, steam- powered submarine displacing 932 
tons afloat. If all went well, these two ventures promised 
to make Scott's name as a submarine builder and to open up a 
potentially lucrative market, as the Admiralty was anxious'to 
reduce its dependence or, Vickers for this class of work. 64 
In the meantime the firm had suffered a loss of L11,623 in 
building its first 7iat submarine, the contract price of 
L53,044 having failed to cover prime cost by L7,340. 
In consequence Scott's like the London & Glasgow could 
not claim to have had more than limited success in exploiting 
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the opportunities presented by the revival in naval demand 
from 1909 onwards. In December 1914 the company still owed 
its bankers Z215,177 and, apart from emergency orders placed 
by the Admiralty after the start or the war, its order book 
comprised only two nerchant s, lips, 65 the three remaining 
submarines and the machinery of the dockyard-built cruiser. 
The performance of the bigger Clyde warshipbuilding 
yards was in some respects even more disappointing than that 
of their smaller neighbours. Of the rour major 
warshipbuilding yards which remained in the business at the 
outbreak of war in 1914, Scott's was exceptional in failing 
to add substantially to its tally of Admiralty orders after 
1911. Dalmuir, Clydebank and Fairfield all secured further 
major Admiralty orders in 1912 and 1913. In the six years 
preceding the outbreak of war in 1914, Clydebank, had orders 
for one battleship, two battlecruisers, two light cruisers 
and fifteen destroyers as well as the machinery for the 
battlecruiser HIMS QUEEN MARY built by Palmers of Jarrow 
Dalmuir, had orders for three battleships, six light 
cruisers, three destroyers and the machinery for a 
dockyard-built light cruiser; Fairfield, had orders for one 
battleship, one battlecruiser, two light cruisers, thirteen 
destroyers and the machinery for two dockyard-built light 
cruisers. 66 Between them, the three firms had received 
Admiralty orders worth Z16,618,4190, an average of L923,244 
per yard per year. Fairfield, the least successful took 
orders worth E4,376,113, nearly double the value of all 
Admiralty contracts taken by Scott's (L2,265,092). It was a 
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measure of the capacity of the three major yards that they 
were able to undertake the huge volume of Admiralty work 
without having to spend large sums an additional capital 
investment. Total net additions to fixed assets in all 
three yards in the six years prior to the outbreak of war 
amounted to only L387,473, nearly half of which (LI87,609) 
was incurred at Clydebank in the two years to 31st March 1912 
when the yard had to be extensively modified to accommodate 
the building of the mammoth 45,647 ton Cunard liner 
AQUITANIA. 67 Nevertheless, none of'the three enjoyed a 
measure of prosperity commensurate with the high volume of 
Admiralty work passing through their hands. 
Dalmuir's record was abyssmal. After suffering a 
trading loss before depreciation of L4,276 in the year to 
31st December 1905v the yard incurred further trading losses 
before depreciation totalling L207,006 over the following 
three years, partly because of the heavy losses incurred on 
the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. contracts but primarily 
because the yard's facilities were chronically 
underutilised. Even in 1908, when both the shipyard and 
engine works were at a virtual standstill, overheads amounted 
to L54,705, including L8,339 for gas, electricity, light and 
power. 68 and over the two years to 31st December 1908 
overheads tota-Hing L136,419 had to be written off as 
irrecoverable. 69 Following the upturn in the demand for 
warships in the winter of 1908-09, the situation began to 
improve and, after suffering a further trading loss before 
depreciation of L48,457 in 1909, the yard managed to earn 
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small trading profits before depreciation in each of the next 
two years but the improvement was not sustained. Despite 
increasing activity, Dalmuir suffered trading losses before 
depreciation of Z170,927 in 1912 and Z163,347 in 1913. Even 
in 1914, with two battleships and three light cruisers under 
construction, it still reporteq a trading loss before 
depreciation of E22,768. 
A number of factors contributed to Dalmuir's dismal 
record. Some were peculiar to Beardmore's. 'First, the 
firm had not inade significant progress in building up its 
merchant business. In 1911, it secured orders for three 
7,7GO ton ships for the Adelaide Steamship Co. and for the 
more prestigious 18,500 ton liner A! -SATIAN 
for the Allan Line 
but the yard's only other merchant orders in the six years to 
31st December 1913 were for a sludge boat and a lighthouse 
tender. 70 The total value of Dalmuir's merchant business in 
these years amounted to only L999,994. Second, Dalmuir 
started with the disadvantage of having no previous 
experience of manufacturing turbine-powered machinery and of 
having been unable to offer regular employment to skilled 
workers prior-to 1909. Third, there is sane evidence that 
prime costs at Dalmuir compared unravourably with those at 
both Clydebank and FairField. Certainly the prime costs of 
both the liner A'-SATIAN and the cruiser HMS DUBLIN were 
significantly higher than those of sister ships built in the 
other two yards at the same time, the prime cost or the 
ALSATIAN being L543,569 conpared with L480,714 for the 
CALGARIAN built by Fairfield and the prime cost of HMS DUBLIN 
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being L282,036 compared with Z260*438 for HMS SOUTHAMPTON 
built by Clydebank. 
Two facets of Dalmuir's performance - losses an merchant 
contracts and the declining profitubility of Admiralty work - 
were common to the experience of all three major 
warshipbuilding yards. Neither Fairfield nor Clydebank 
suffered losses on merchant contracts comparable with those 
suffered by Dalmuir in building the three ships for the 
Adelai-de Steamship Co. and the liner ALSATIAN, which together 
resulted in net losses of E302,564, but few of the merchant 
contracts undertaken by either yard between 1909 and 1911 
ended profitably. 
Demand for merchant tonnage revived in 1909 and 1910 
when naval work was still in relatively short supply. 
Clydebank and Fairfield both took advantage of the 
opportunity to replenish their order books with major 
merchant orders by the end of 1911. Between the beginning 
of 1909 and the end of 19119 Clydebank took orders for twelve 
merchant ships worth E3,031,740.71 None of these ships was 
designed for great speed, but the 45,647 ton Cunard liner 
AQUITANIA was the biggest merchant ship yet built in Britain 
and both the 13,000 ton liner DRAMA, built for the Orient 
Line and the 13,415 ton liner NIAGARA, built for the Union 
Steamship Co. were notable ships in their own right. 
Similarly, Fairfield's intake of thirteen merchant orders 
worth L29408vOO7 72 included the 13,300 ton Union Castle 
liner BALMORAL CASTLE, the 16,850 ton Canadian Pacific liners 
EMPRESS OF RUSSIA and EMPRESS Or' ASIA and the 18,500 ton 
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Allan liner CAýGARIANt all of which ranked among the biggest 
liners of their day. 
Unhappilyq ten of the twelve merchant contracts 
undertaken by Clydebank and nine of the thirteen merchant 
contracts undertaken by Pairfield resulted in net losses, 
three of the Fairfield contracts and no less than seven of 
the Clydebank contracts having been taken at prices which 
proved to be insufficient to cover prime cost. The largb 
volilme of merchant work made only a modest contribution to 
overheads and profit. The total contribution to overheads 
and profit from Pairfield's twelve contracts was L214,453 
(8.9% of sales value) but only L109,446 (3.6.11 of sales value) 
from the thirteen contracts undertaken by Clydebank. 
Warshipbuilding was more profitable but here too Dalmuir 
was typical in experiencing a progressive decline in the 
profitability of Admiralty contracts undertaken between 190a 
and 1912. The cruisers HMS GI-OUCESTER, MIS FAI-MOUTH and HMS 
DUBI. IN, completed at Dalmuir in 1911,1912 and 1913 
respectively, yielded progressively lower contributions to 
overheads and profit of Z55,791, L37,186 and L13,1207, the 
contract for HMS DUBLIN resulting in a net loss of L20,087. 
Similarly, the contribution to overheads and profit from 
destroyer contracts fell from L9,521 on HMS GOSHAWK completed 
in 1912 to an average of Z5,835 each on H14S V-EWEýYN and HMS 
'-ENNOX completed in 1914. Most ominous of all, in December 
1914, the management at Dalmuir was anticipating a loss of 
J44,750 on the contract for the 25,000 ton Iran Duke class 
battleship HMS BENBaw ordered in 1912,73 whereas the 22,200 
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ton Orion class battleship HMS CONQUEROR, ordered in 1910 and 
completed in 1913, had yielded a net profit of E44,149. 
Unlike Dalmuir, Clydebank and Fairfield were largely 
spared the embarrassment of sufferiny losses on Admiralty 
contracts completed before the war: the cruiser HNS BRISTOI- 
at Clydebank and the snall survey ship-HMS ENOEAVOUR at 
Fairfield were the only Admiralty contracts an which either 
yard failed to report a net profit, but an underlying decline 
in the profitability of naval work was apparent in the 
outcome or the most important of the naval contracts 
undertaken by the two yards between 1909 and 1911, those for 
the battlecruisers HMAS AUSTRALIA and HMS NEW ZEALAND. In 
both cases the contracts yielded their builders profits but 
the net profit of L32,040 earned by Clydebank in building 
HMAS AUSTRALIA and the net profit of Z50,454 earned by 
rai-rTield in building HMS NEW ZEALAND were both more than 
L90,000 lower than the net profits earned by the same yards 
in building the battlecruisers HMS INFLEXIBLE and HMS 
INDOMITA6LE some four years earlier. At both Clydebank and 
Fairfield, the decline in profitability as measured by the 
average percentage contributions to overheads and profit was 
as marked in the case of Admiralty contracts as it was an 
merchant work. The detail is in Table 6.6. 
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TABLE 6.4 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO OVERHEADS & PROFIT. 
CONTRACTS CýYDEBANK ýAlRrIEýD 
COI., IPI-E TED NAVA'- MERCHANT NAV A 1- MERCHANT 
( '0 S A! - 
ESZ. SA 1- ES) (Z SA! -ES) 
(I. SAI-ES) 
1905-10 25.43 13.35 24.40 15.18 
1910-15 17.68 4.57 17 . 87 8.20 
(Source: Abstracted fron Appendices FII and rIll) 
In retrospect, contemporary conmentators were perhaps 
too ready to accept that the contracting profit margins which 
characterised the period were attributable wholly to factors 
beyond the shipbuilders' control. While both the depressed 
prices which prevaileý when work was in generally short 
supply and the sharp rise in costs or materials and labour 
which accompanied the ensuing boom necessarily had an adverse 
effect on the warshipbuilders' profitability, at least one of 
their number - rairfield - placed some of the blame on the 
shortcomings of its own management. Mr. Sampson, tne firm's 
shipbuilding director, tendered his resign-at-ion in May 1914 
after a board meeting at which reference was made: 
To the repeated losses in the shipbuilding 
department on contracts completed between 1911 
and 1914, also to the fact that notwithstanding 
repeated references by the management no changes 
had been made in any section of the Shipbuilding 
Department with a view of improving matters. 74 
Whatever the cause, the problems had not been conpletely 
resolved by the outbreak or war in 1914. As the volume of 
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naval work an hand built up, both Clydebank and 7airfield 
could afford to be more selective in tneir choice of merchant 
work and the orders for two steamers for the Russian Steam 
Navigation Company 75 and for the Union Castle liner 
I-%ANSTEPHEN CASP-E, taken by Clydebank and rairfield 
respectively in 1912, all yielded their builders 
contributions to overheads and profit in excess of 15% or 
selling price, but the improvement in profit margins was 
achieved at the expense or drastically curtailing the volume 
of merchant business. Neither yard secured any other 
merchant orders in 1912 and Clydebank's order for the Orient 
liner ORMONDE was the only merchant work booked by either 
yard in 1913. More important, there was no evidence or a 
corresponding improvement in the profitability of Admiralty 
contracts. On the contrary, as shown in Table 6.7, the 
outcome of successive batches of destroyers built at 
Clydebank suggests that profit margins had not recovered to 
previous levels by the outbreak of war. 
TAV. E 6.7 
DESTROYER CONTRACTS UNDERTAKEN BY C! -YDEBANK 
YEAR ! -AID 
TYPE No. IN AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION 
DOWN BATCH SE'-'. ING TO OVERHEADS 
PRICE AND PRO71T 
1906-09 IGIClass 3 101,876 37,323 36.6 
1909-10 'H'Class 3 93,524 27,826 29.8 
1910-11 'I'Class 3 85,927 18,107 21.1 
1911-12 'K'Class 3 97,678 21,651 22.2 
1913-14 'M'Class 3 122,872 26,951 21.9 
(Source: Abstracted From Appendix FIII) 
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Meanwhile, the combination of the unprofitable merchant 
contracts taken before 1912 and the lower profit margins on 
Admiralty work necessarily had an adverse effect on the 
warshipbuilders' profitability. Neither Clydebank nor 
7airfield was as profitable in the four years to 1914 as it 
had been in the previous four years. rairfield, which had 
earned trading profits before depreciation averaging Z115,872 
per annum in the fo. ur years to 30th June 1910, reported 
average trading profits before depreciation of only Z68,4C6 
per annum over the following four years, the year to 30th 
June 1912 resulting in a trading loss before depreciation of 
Z4,013. There is no reason to suppose that Clydebank's 
experience was different. John Brown & Co. 's shareholders 
were told that the yard had earned little profit in the year 
to 31st March 1911 76 and the surviving records show that 
profits taken on contracts which had totalled Z306,172 in the 
four years to 31st March 1910, when trading profits before 
depreciation and losses on demolitions etc. are known to have 
aggregated L350,422, amounted to only L45,860 over the 
following four years. 
To add to their disappointing trading results, neither 
Clydebank nor Fairfield had much success in securing worship 
orders fron foreign governnents. Following an agreement to 
pool resources with Cammell ! -aird & 
Co., 77 Fairfield was 
finally rewarded with its first overseas warship orders in 
1913-14 but the contracts, an hand at the outbreak oF war in 
1914, for two Greek destroyers and a Turkish despatch 
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vessel, 78 represented the sun total of the yard's intake of 
foreign naval work. Under John Brown & Co. 's management 
Clydebank's record was little better. As with rairfield, 
the yard received orders for two destroyers for Greece 79 as 
a member of the Coventry Ordnance Works Syndicate, but its 
only other successes were orders for the engines of two 
Russian battleships completed in 1914-15 and the machinery of 
a battleship for Chile subcontracted to Clydebank by 
Armstrong-Whitworth's. 80 
To some extent, Clydebank's lack of success could be 
attributed to a change of policy on the part of major 
overseas customers. The massive naval expansion programme of 
which the battleship ASAHI formed part was the last occasion 
on which thýe Japanese Government made extensive use of 
British shipyards. By the turn of the cent-ury smaller 
warships were already being built in Japanese yards, the 
first Japanese-built capital ship followed in 1905 and the 
battlecruiser KONGO delivered by Vickers in 1913 was the last 
major Japanese warship built abroad. 81 Similarly, in 1908, 
when the Spanish Government started to make good the heavy 
losses suffered by the Spanish Navy in the Spanish-American 
Idar of 1898, it did so through the agency of its own 
armaments company, the Sociedad Espanola da Construcion. 
John Brown & Co. as tne heir to Clydebank's connection had a 
minority share in the new venture but the role of the British 
participants was to supply equipment and technical 
expertise. 82 There was little profit for Clydebank in 
supervising the re-equipment and re-organisation of Spanish 
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dockyards at Cartagena and Ferrol. 
More worrying, the dearth of overseas orders for both 
Clydebank and Fairfield was a reflection of the failure of 
ttie Coventry Ordnance Works to overcome opposition from 
Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth's. Between them these two 
firms contrived to prevent the Coventry Ordnance Works from 
obtaining major Admiralty contracts until 1910 
83 thereby 
denying the enterprise both the domestic orders which it 
needed and the official recognition without which it had 
little hope of securing major overseas naval orders. - 
The 
participants in the Coventry Ordnance Works Syndicate 
therefore found themselves in the unfortunate position of 
deriving little advantage from their investment and of having 
to support a loss-making enterprise which absorbed upwards of 
LZ millions of their capital before it became self-supporting. 
The problems of the Coventry Ordnance Works bore 
particularly heavily on rairfield. Clydebank, as the 
shipbuilding department of John Brown & Co., was not directly 
involved but ýairrield, as one of the principýls, was raced 
with the problem of finding the cash to Finance its share or 
the mounting cost. By 1910, after the failure of an 
attempted issue of debentures by the Coventry Ordnance Works 
Company ! -td., 7airfield was left in the position of 
having to 
subscribe for its share or the unwanted stock. 
64 The 
r the strain which the -airfield board became alarmed at 
enterprise was imposing on their liquidity but could do 
little about it. An attempt to dispose of part or 
Fairfield's holding to Cammell Laird A Co. in 191,85 came to 
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nothing and the problem of a profitless investment, which 
accounted for approximatg-ly one-third of all the funds 
employed in the business, remained unresolved in 1914. 
Despite the setbacks, neither Fairfield nor C-lydebank 
was in serious difficulties on the eve of the rirst World 
War. Unlike Dalmuir which was becoming a pers-istent drain 
on Beardmore's resources, C6 Clydebank's record was a matter 
of disappointment rather than serious concern to its 
parent. The yard had not been stinted for funds. Apart 
from net additions to fixed assets amounting to E571,895, 
John Brown & Co. had spent more than L90,000 an demolitions 
and disposals of old plant to nake way for inprovenents and 
E193,646 in additions to stocks of tools and raw materials in 
the fifteen years to 31st March 1914.87 The business was 
essentially self-suppurtiny as cumulative trading profits 
before depreciation and losses on demolitions etc. amounted 
to Z1,054,538 by 31st iMarch 1910. At worst, Clydebank was 
an investment fron which John Brown & Co. was deriving 
prestige more than profit. 
Similarly, while Fairfield's decision to pay no 
dividends on its ordinary shares in respect of 1911-12, 
1912-13 and 1913-14 and the omission of any pro vision for 
depreciation of Fixed Assets in 1911-12 and 1913-14 together 
with only noninal provisions of L17,500 in 1910-11 and Z7,500 
in 1912-13, were synptonatic of the firm's unsatisfactory 
trading perforýmance, the conpany was not at risk as long it 
could meet its obligations to preference shareholders and 
debenture holders. rollowing the death or Sir Wil"liam G. 
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Pearce in 1907, the directors werztunder less pressure to pay 
large dividends on the ordinary shares and distributions had 
been limited to payments of 2 1/2 percent per annum from 
1907-08 to 1910-11. The need for a further issue of 
debentures, mooted in 1912,88 had been avoided by the bank of 
Scotland's willingness to grant the company a loan on the 
security of its investments. By June 1914 rairfield owed 
its bankers Z413,000 but the company's investments amounted 
to E735, U35 and there was no immediate problem so long as the 
Coventry Ordnance Works situation did not deteriorate to the 
point where a significant part of rairfield's totall 
investment of E516,609 in the enterprise became irrecoverable. 
Nevertheless, Clydebank and rairfield had as much reason 
as any of the Clyde warshipbuilders to be concerned at the 
situation in which they found themselves in the summer of 
1914. Membership of the Coventry_Ordnance Works Syndicate 
had not resulted in a significant number of overseas naval 
orders, a large volume of first class merc. hant work had 
produced very little profit and Admiralty work, whi-ch had 
been the backbone of their businesses for twenty years, was 
no longer yielding the phenomenal returns which had 
characterised the decade preceding the introduction of the 
1dreadnought'. Clydebank and Fairfield were better off than 
Dalnuir, which had yet to prove that it was capable of 
operating at a profit, or Scott's, which had yet to prove 
that a specialisation in submarines was an alternative to 
conventional warshipbuilding. They still had plenty of 
naval work an hand, but it was worrying that even the most 
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successful of the Clyde warshipbuilders had not profited 
greatly from the boom conditions of 1911-1913 as merchant 
demand was already falling away. 89 If, as seemed probable 
in the summer of 1914, the Clyde shipbuilding industry was 
racing another period of depression, then the warShipbuilders 
might still hope to be kept better employed than most or 
their neighbours but they could no longer take prosperity for 
granted. Twenty years of sustained growth had resulted in 
the creation of as much warshipbuilding capacity as would 
ever be needed in peacetime and it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to find profitable employment for it all. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
1914-1921; THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The shadow of overcapacity which hung over the Clyde shipbuilding 
industry in the summer of 1914 was dispelled by the outbreak of the 
First World War. Although normal trade was disrupted and the 
United Kingdom's output of merchant ships which had reached a peak 
of 1,932,153 gross tons in 1913 slumped to 650,919 gross tons in 
1915.1 the Admiralty needed ships to prosecute the war. It soon 
became apparent that the Admiralty had made insufficient pro vision 
for the. large number of small ships required to maintain a distant 
blockade of Germany and keep the sea lanes round Britain clear of 
mines. Later the U-boat added an unwelcome new dimension to sea 
warfare and the Admiralty had to provide for the building of further 
escort vessels to counter the menace and also for the replacement of 
heavy losses of merchant shipping. As a result the Admiralty had 
to augment its normal sources or supply by designing new types of 
warship which could be built under the supervision of Lloyd's 
surveyors in yards with no previous experience of naval work. 2 The 
entire shipbuilding industry was mobili. sed progressively from 1915 
onwards to meet the insatiable demand. By 1917 its resources were 
stretched to the limit. The mounting losses of merchantmen forced 
the government to modify its priorities to allow merchant 
shipbuilding a larger share of the available resources and merchant 
output recovered from 608,235 gross tons in 1916 to 1,348,120 gross 
tons in 1918 3 but the manpower required for warshipbuilding was 
still rising in the fourth year of the war and yards which had been 
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earmarked for merchant shipbuilding in 1917 were still engaged in 
warshipbuilding at the end of the war. 4 
Situated as they were on the west side of the country, away 
from the danger of attack by enemy surface raiders and outside the 
range of German air attack, the Clyde shipyards were ideally suited 
for wartime construction and the Admiralty made extensive use of 
their facilities. According to statistics published by The Glasqow 
Herald in 1918, the district's contribution to the war effort 
included an output of 481 naval vessels aggregating 759,407 tons in 
the five years 1914_18 5 and a further 26 warships and 50 naval 
auxiliaries were launched in 1919.6 Much of this wartime output 
was attributable to the six firms which had been involved in 
warshipbuilding before the war. Although as many as thirty 
separate firms were listed as having made some contribution to the 
output, only eight firms produced more than 17,500 tons of naval 
vessels. One of these- Barclay Curle - credited with 39 naval 
ships aggregating 47,246 tons, produced only sloops and 
minesweepers. Another, Harland & Woolf, creditbd with 12 naval 
vessels totalling 27,405 tons had resumed warshipbuilding in the 
London & Glasgow's Govan yard to produce six destroyers and three 
monitors in 1915-16, only to return to merchant shipbuilding as soon 
as the opportunity presented itself. 
The remaining six, Clydebank, Fairfield, Dalmuir, Scott's. 
Denny's and Yarrow's were the pre-war warshipbuilders. Indeed, 
apart from the warships built by Harland & Woolf and eighteen 
destroyers ordered from Alexander Stephen & Son, these six yards 
were responsible for virtually all of the conventional warships 7 
built on the Clyde during the war. In the five years 1914-18 they 
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were credited with 70.5% of the tonnage of all naval vessels 
launched on the Clyde and 86.6% of the horsepower attributed to 
them, a record which was only partly attributable to the inclusion 
of warships ordered before the war. 
8 As shown in Table 7.1, the 
six firms had been the recipients of Admiralty orders for a total of 
247 warships aggregating 458,933 tons during the war itself. 
TABLE 7.1 
WARTIME ADMIRALTY ORDERS FOR CONVENTIONAL WARSHIPS. 
I HULLS ENGINES 
NO. TONNAGE H. P. 
FAIRFIELD 49 128,615 1,295,800 
CLYDEBANK 46 130,015 1,275,950 
DALMUIR 35 64,109 654,080 
SCOTT'S 31 48,662 645,780 
DENNY'S 39 45,340 827,060 
YARROWIS 47 32,192 703,600 
ALL OTHERS 37 62,445 657,400 
284 521,378 6,154,770 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix CIII) 
Fairfield had orders for two battlecruisers, five light cruisers, 
twenty-nine destroyers and thirteen submarines. Clydebank's share 
comprised two battlecruisers, one aircraft carrier, two light 
cruisers, thirty-seven destroyers, three submarines and a depot 
ship. Dalmuir had an aircraft carrier, two light cruisers, 
nineteen destroyers, and thirteen submarines . Scott's were 
entrusted with three light cruisers, nineteen destroyers, eight 
submarines and a monitor. Denny's were asked to build a small 
aircraft carrier, three flotilla leadersq twenty-seven destroyers 
and eight submarines. Yarrow's accounted for twenty-nine 
destroyers, one submarine, sixteen river gunboats and a small 
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depot-ship. 9 
None of the six yards was a free agent during the war. 
Fairfield, Clydebank and Dalmuir all became Admiralty controlled 
dockyards an the outbreak of war and the other three yards were 
subject to Admiralty direction from the passing of the Munitions of 
War Act in 1915 if not sooner. 10 In consequence they were allowed 
-to undertake very little merchant shipbuilding. A few merchant 
ships, which were at an advanced stage of completion when the 
Admiralty took over, were finished during the war, most notably the 
14,850 ton Orient Liner ORMONDE at Clydebank, but other merchant 
ships under construction were taken over on the stocks and converted 
to naval use. The Lloyd Sabaudo liner CONTE ROSSO, on the stocks 
at Dalmuir at the outbreak of war, finished up as the aircraft 
carrier HMS ARGUS; at Fairfield the 15,300 ton AVENGER was completed 
as an armed merchant cruiser. Further, apart from a few 'standard' 
cargo ships laid down in 1918,11 no new merchant ships were laid 
down in the three big naval yards during the war. By 1918 a number 
of yards, including Alexander Stephen & Son an the Clyde, which were 
still engaged in warshipbuilding, were designated to be turned over 
to merchant shipbuilding as part of planned division. of capacity 
between the Admiralty and the Ministry or Shipping but the six Clyde 
yards were numbered among the eleven firms which were to continue to 
be wholly at the Admiralty's disposal. 12 This did not necessarily 
mean warshipbuilding, as Dalmuir in particular had been denied a 
larger share of warship orders to leave room for the production of 
armaments, tanks and aircraft, 13 but it precluded their undertaking 
any work of which the Admiralty did not approve. 
Being Admiralty controlled establishments was not without its 
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advantages. Throughout the war years, the warshipbuilders had the 
highest priority in the allocation of scarce supplies of manpower 
and materials. At the start of the war workmen were transferred to 
them from merchant yards 14 and, as late as 1918, Sir James Lithgow, 
the Deputy Controller of Merchant Shipbuilding, wa"s still 
complaining that, despite the fact that additional manpower had only 
been made available to the shipbuilding industry in consideration of 
the urgency of merchant work, the Admiralty had secured the services 
of two-thirds of the additional 18,300 men employed in the 
construction of hulls in the six months to 31st July 1918: 
It is not for me to criticisa the policy of 
the Government in regard to construction for 
the Navy, but I am entitled to draw attention 
to the fact that although the Naval authorities 
had for three years the entire run of the- 
shipbuilding resources of the country they have 
still considered it necessary to augment the 
manpower so engaged throughout the whole of the 
fourth year of the war. 15 
While many of the merchant yards were poorly supplied with work 
until 1916, the naval yards were assured of a steady flow of work 
which kept them fully occupied throughout the war. The average 
numbers employed during the war at Scott's (2,345 in the shipyard 
and 1,974 in the engine works) and in Denny's shipyard (2,266) were 
lower than the numbers employed by these firms at the height of the 
pre-war boom in 1913 when Scott's employed 5,687 workmen in total 
and Denny's shipyard 2,622,16 but the reverse was true of the three 
major yards. At Clydebank the numbers employed averaged 9,693 over 
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the four years 1915-1918 compared with a pre-war peak of 9,715 in 
Januar-y 1913 and and an-average of 8,910 for the two years 1912 and 
1913; 17 at Fairfield the wartime workforce averaged 9,640 compared 
with 7,632 in December 1913; 18 At Dalmuir the payroll increased from 
5,854 in 1914 to 10,855 in 1917 19 although in this case most of the 
increase was probably attributable primarily to the expansion of 
other activities. During the war Beardmore's had spent L67,181 in 
laying down fuse-making plant at Dalmuir. This work was 
subsequently transferred to Anniesland but, up to 1917, the 
Admiralty used part-of Dalmuirl-s facilities to manufacture aircraft 
and airships and the Ministry of Munitions spent L261,196 equipping 
Dalmuir for the manufacture of howitzers, and field guns. 20 As 
shown in Table 7.2, nearly 40v. of Dalmuir's total overhead recovery 
was imputed to these activities by 1917 although the proportion 
dropped to 30% in 19189 following the transfer of the manufacture of 
aircraft and airships to Inchinnan. 
TABLE 7.2 
OVERHEAD RECOVERY AT DALMUIR 1915-1918 
YEAR TOTAL AIRCRAFT MUNITIONS TOTAL NON- 
OVERHEAD ETC. SHIPBUILDING 
LLLL% 
1915 248,251 43,048 11,576 54,624 22.0 
1916 382,682 50,944 59,437 110,381 28.8 
1917 494,383 46,654 144,178 190,832 38.6 
1918 650,749 Nil 195,621 195,621 30.1 
(Source: Detail abstracted from UGD 100/l/8/15-18) 
Most important of all the high level of war work was extremely 
profitable. From the beginning of the war, the Admiralty had 
abandoned its peacetime system of competitive tender and, apart from 
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a brief period in 1916, when, at the insistence of the Public 
Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, some contracts were 
placed at a fixed price, 21 all wartime naval contracts were on a 
'time and line' basis. In the long run, the use of what was 
effectively a cost-plus system may not have been in the best 
interests of the firms concerned, as it necessarily encouraged 
wasteful and inefficient practices which were not conducive to 
economical production after the war, but, in the short run it 
eliminated any possibility of unprofitable contracts. None of the 
four big yards lost money an a single order taken after the outbreak 
of war and most contracts yielded a contribution of between twenty 
and thirty per cent of the invoice price. 
The combination of high output and profitable contracts made 
the war years a period -of great prosperity. -Provisions for Excess 
Profits Tax, introduced in 1915 to prevent firms from profiting 
unduly from the national emergency, 22 absorbed a large proportion of 
the profits but, even so, the warshipbuilders earned high profits in 
the five years to 1919. In the five years to 30th June 1919, 
Fairfield's trading profits before depreciation amounted to 
L1,910,555. In the five year to 31st December 1919, Scott's 
reported trading profits before depreciation totalling E975,288. 
There is no record of the profit earned by Clydebank in these years 
but the records which are available show that profits taken on 
contracts in the five years to 31st March 1919 amounted to 
L1,105,495 and, at that stage, John Brown & Co., which had always 
been more conservative than Fairfield or Scott's in anticipating 
profits on uncompleted contracts, had not yet taken credit for any 
part of the profit earned in-building the battlecruiser HMS HOOD 
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(L214,108), the light cruiser HMS ENTERPRISE (L44,046), three 
destroyers (L19,642) and two sets of warship engines (L9,044). 23 
Even Dalmuir, 'which had never managed to earn a satisfactory profit 
in peacetime, was profitable under wartime conditions. Despite the 
fact that some of the munitions work had been transferred to 
Parkhead at cost, Dalmuir was credited with having earned trading 
profits before depreciation amounting to L1,569,177 in the five 
years to 31st December 1919. 
The high profi. ts were not accompanied by further large 
expenditure on the expansion of shipbuilding capacity. Fairfield 
was exceptional in spending L384,334 on net additions to fixed 
assets in the five years to 30th June 1919. At Dalmuir, much of 
the expenditure of L398,443 nominally attributed to the shipyard and 
engine works in the five years to 31st December 1918 appears to have 
been associated with the production of aircraft, airships and 
tinks. 24 At Clydebank and Scott's. where net additions to fixed 
assets other than houses amounted to L79,379 and L87,967 
respectively in the five years to 1918-19, expenditure was lower 
than in the five years preceding the outbreak of war. The modest 
level of capital expenditure required was partly a reflection of the 
extent to which the major yards had equipped themselves for 
warshipbuilding before 1914. It also partly reflected the 
character of wartime demand. Unlike the pre-war period when the- 
demand for big armoured ships required heavy expenditure on large 
berths, on heavy lifting equipment and on capacious wet docks,. 
wartime programmes were dominated by the demand for large numbers of 
relatively small warships. While some of the yards, most notably 
Fairfield and Dalmuir, had to be equipped to build submarines, a 
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specialisation which had previously been confined to Scott's on the 
Clyde, and, in the last year of the war, Clydebank, Fairfield and 
Dalmuir all received sanction for extensions and improvements 
including measures to expedite production in inclement weather, 25 
the Admiralty's needs were largely served by making intensive use of 
existing facilities. When regard is had to the heavy wear and tear 
to which plant and machinery was subjected during the war, it is 
possible to maintain that the rates of depreciation allowed by the 
authorities were less than generous and that the war years may have 
Y 
witnessed an erosion of the warshipbuilders real fixed capital 
stock. As a corallory they were spared the cost of adding 
substantially to their'capacity with corresponding advantage to 
their liquidity. 
The impact of high profits and relatively modest capital 
exp-enditure on the financial situation of the warshipbuilders is 
apparent form the balance sheets of the two major yards - Fairfield 
and Scott's - which were independent corporate entities. Even 
after-providing L1,106,000 for taxation and paying dividends of 7.5% 
in 1915 and 1916 and 100. in each of the following three years, 
Fairfield's retained profitsq including transfers to reserve, 
amounted to L170,296 in the five years to 30th June 1919. Allowing 
for provisions for depreciation and amounts written off pro-war 
inve-Ttments, total retentions amounted to L531,073. The full 
benefits of these retentions were not reflected in the company's 
balance sheet at 30th June 1919. The Admiralty was slow in 
settling its accounts and bank loans net of cash an hand had only 
fallen from L408,467 in June 1914 to L269,792 in June 1919, but the 
underlying financial situation had been improved out of all 
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recognition. The high wartime demand for armaments had solved the 
liquidity problems of the Coventry Ordnance Works and by 1916 
Fairfield had been repaid all of its loans which had amounted to 
L157,450 in June 1914.26 Meanwhile the company had financed an 
outlay of L384,334 in additions to*fixed assets and there had been a 
qualatitive improvemen-ts in its investments as the holding of 
Canadian Northern Railway's debentures, which had stood in the books 
at L222,750 in June 1914, had been sold off and investments at 30th 
June 1919 consisted principally of a holding of L190,000 of 5% of 
War Loan purchased in 1917. The transformation which the war had 
brought an the warshipbuilders' finances was even more apparent from 
the balance sheet of Scott's. Bank borrowings had all been repaid 
by 1917.8y 31st December 1919, there-was cash on hand of 
L104t321p the company had an investment of L50,625 in War Loan and, 
including wartime provisions which would never be needed, reserves 
and retained profits amounted to L528,373. 
That the strength of the warshipbuilders' balance sheets at the- 
end or the war was to be of critical importance in enabling them to 
survive the depressed conditions which prevailed in the shipbuilding 
industry for much of the inter-war period did not become apparent 
until some years after hostilities had ended. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war the warshipbuilders were more concerned to 
deploy their resources to take advantage of the post-war boom in 
merchant shipbuilding. By comparison with other yards which had 
been turned over to merchant production during the war, the 
warshipbuilders were at a disadvantage in still being almost totally 
committed to naval work when the war ended but most of them were 
able to face the prospect of having to resume merchant shipbuilding 
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with relative equanimity. 
During the war, it had been impossible to provide for the 
replacement of all the merchant tonnage which had been lost. Such 
capacity as could be spared for merchant shipbuilding had been 
reserved for the production of cargo ships. The heavy wartime 
losses of passenger liners still remained to be made good at the end 
of the war and owners had taken the precaution of reserving capacity 
on the understanding that work would begin as soon as circumstances 
permitted. All three major warshipbuilding yards on the-Clyde 
emerged from the war with big passenger liners an order. - Clydebank 
had orders on hand for the 19,800 ton Union Castle liner WINDSOR 
CASTLE and for the 16,000 ton Canadian Pacific liners MONTCALM and 
MONTCLARE. Shortly afterwards, Cunard, which had booked a large 
berth for ten years and a smaller berth for five years '27 exercised 
its option by placing orders for the 20,000 ton FRANCONIA and the 
smaller ALAUNIA. Fairfield, with firm orders for six big passenger 
liners,. 28 two each for Canadian Pacific, the Anchor Line and the 
Anchor Donaldson Line, was even better placed. With more than 
100,000 tons of merchant orders on hand, the firm's merchant order 
book was larger than it had been at any time for more than thirty 
years. Dalmuir was in an equally happy position. Apart from the 
order to replace the liner CONTE ROSSO, taken over by the Admiralty 
for conversion to an aircraft carrier in 1915, the firm had a 
further order to build the 18,765 ton liner CONTE VERDE for the 
Lloyd Sabaudo Line. In addition Cunard had placed an order for the 
16,243 ton liner TYRRHENIA, the Anchor Line had booked space for 
16,297 ton CAMERONIA and there were also orders on hand for two 
14,000 ton refrigerated cargo liners for the Commonwealth Dominion 
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Line . 
29 
Down river at Scott's and Denny's, the size and quality of the 
order books were less impressive but here too there was no shortage 
of work and both firms could look forward with confidence to the 
resumption of long-established merchant connections which had been 
interrupted by the war. Only Yarrow's, with no tradition of 
merchant shipbuilding and faced with the problem of finding suitable 
merchant work for a yard specifically designed to build destroyers, 
was seriously disadvantaged by the absence of naval work. Although 
Yarrow's suffered no more than other Clyde warshipbuilding yards 
from the cancellation of naval orders after the Armistice. 
30 it was 
the only one where the announcement of the cancellations was 
reported to have met with protests from the workforce. 31 For the 
rest it was a matter of disengaging themselves-from war work as 
quickly as possible. 
As soon as the Armistice was signed the Admiralty m6-ved quickly 
to suspend work on all warships under construction 'to permit of 
increasing the production of merchant shipping'. 32 The first 
cancellations followed in December 1918 but it was some months 
before decisions were reached on how to proceed with all of the 
contracts on hand at the end of the war, and some of the 
warshipbuilders chafed at the delay. In January 1919, the 
Fairfield board decided to -communicate with the Admiralty: 
Protesting against the war ships now on hand 
being dealt with as stand-by jobs thus delaying 
the laying down of merchant ships 
and asking in particular for a decision on the battlecruiser 
IRODNEY@. 33 Ordered in 1916 as one of four ships intended to make 
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good the losses suffered at Jutland, the 'RODNEY' had 'been standing 
idle in Fairfield's biggest berth since 1917, when work had been 
halted to free resources for small warships and merchantmen which 
were more urgently required. Eventually, in February 1919, the 
Admiralty decided to scrap the IRODNEYs 34 and it became one of 
forty-three Clydaside orders for conventional warships cancelled by 
the Admiralty after the war. 35 Work on other orders, including the 
IRODNEY's' sister ship HMS HOOD at -Clydebank, carried an without 
much sense of urgency and the warshipbuilders were not entirely 
clear of Admiralty work until 1920. In the long run the 
consequential delay in resuming merchant work probably worked to the 
warshipbuilders advantage but in 1919 they were more concerned to be 
free of Admiralty control so that they might devote themselves 
wholeheartedly to the task of post-war reconstruction. 
Faced with the prospect that naval work would be in relatively 
short supply for some years to come the warshipbuilders prepared 
themselves as best they could to expand their merchant output. 
Beardmorels, which had most reason to doubt its ability to attract a 
sufficient volume of first-class merchant work under normal 
conditions, sought to augment Dalmuir's product range by securing a 
share of the promising market for tankers and diesel engines. 
After first acquiring a licence to use the Isherwood system of 
longitudinal framing employed in the building or tankers 36 and 
entering into an agreement with the Italian Tosti Company for the 
joint development of a heavy diesel engine, 37 the Beardmore board 
formally authorised the expenditure of L260,000 on the construction 
of four new berths9 specifically designed for the building of 
tankers and cargo vessels. 38 Fairfield, which had embarked an the 
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development of a similar new West Yard in January 1919, moved in the 
same directiont its membership of the Northumberland Group providing 
access to Doxford's proven diesel engine technology. 39 On the 
other hand, expenditure on additions to fixed assets was on a 
relatively modest scale when account is taken of the inflationary 
conditions of the time. Excluding expenditure on non-shipbuilding 
activities at Dalmuir, the net outlay on additions to fixed assets 
in the four big naval yards amounted to only LI. 165,638 in the five 
years to 1924.40 Much of the money which was spent was devoted 
either to changes made necessary by the switch to peacetime 
production, such as the widening of berths designed for 
narrow-beamed destxoyers to accommodate broader-beamed merchantmen, 
or to replacing worn-out plant, improving material handling and 
generally rearranging the layout of yards with a view to more 
efficient production. As Sir Thomas Bell reminded the John Brown 
board, in recommending a programme of capital investment at 
Clydebank estimated to cost E174,000 in October 1919: 
It is only too apparent that when in the 
course of another eighteen months prices 
for ships and engines are once more only 
obtainable after severe competition only 
those firms equipped with every type of 
labour saving appliance and the most 
advantageous arrangements for transport 
of materials can hope to hold its own. 41 
The situation in 1921 was to be much worse than Bell or anyone else 
could have envisaged in 1919. All of the warshipbuilders' post-war 
attempts to make a success of merchant shipbuilding were doomed to 
177 
fail but until 1920 there was no reason to take a pessimistic view 
of the prospects. To have- failed to have made any provision for 
capital investment would have left them open to the charge that they 
had missed out on a favourable opportunity to exploit the situation. 
As in the rest of the shipbuilding industry, the 
warshipbuilders suffered their share of the interminable labour 
disputes and the chronic shortages of manpower and materials which 
hampered post-war production. In September 1921 Bell remarked on 
the difficulties wh. ich Clydebank had encountered in building the 
Canadian Pacific liner MONTCALM. 
We have experienced every conceivable form of 
trouble during the construction of this vessel. 
To begin with shortage of men, then shortage of 
steel, then a strike of shipyard platers for 
a couple of months followed by a rail strike 
which. again completely upset our steel and coal 
deliveries and finally the joiners' strike which 
lasted within a week of nine months. 42 
Faced with these problems many managements made costly 
mistakes, particularly in acting on the assumption that steel would 
continue to be in short supply. Fairfield paid a heavy price for 
having entered into onerous long-term contracts for the supply of 
steel at the height of the post-war boom; 43 Beardmorels, Denny's and 
Yarrow's all had reason to regret their decision to buy out the 
existing owners of steelworks at premium prices when in due course 
demand turned down and steelmaking ceased to be a profitable 
business. 44 None of this was apparent in 1919-20. Even John 
Brown was buying steel from America to overcome the shortage. 45 
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The demand for ships was buoyant, cost was no obstacle as long as 
owners were happy to place orders at cost-plus prices, and securing 
access to supplies of a scarce commodity was essential if firms were 
to honour their existing commitments. 
By May 1919 John Brown's connection with Lord Pirrie had 
resulted in Clydebank receiving contracts for the hull of the 9,500 
ton LOCH KATRINE for the Royil Mail Line and for four 7,000 ton 
vessels for the Elder Dempster Line. 46 In consequence it was 
reported that there. were ships under construction in all of the 
yard's eight berths, *a condition of matters which has never existed 
before in the history of the yard'. 47 By 1920, Fairfield's order 
book had been topped up with orders from its new associates in the 
Northumberland Group including four tankers for the Globe Shipping 
Co.; 48 Dalmuir had secured orders for five tankers and two small 
diesel powered cargo ships; 49 Scott's, which had emerged from the 
war with relatively few merchant orders on hand, had booked two 
10,000 ton passenger and cargo liners for Lloyds Royal Belge, three 
more large ships for Donaldson Brothers, two 7,000 ton merchantmen 
for South Amepican owners and no less than five orders each for 
Alfred Holt and the China Navigation Co.; 50 Denny's, which had also 
secured the contracts for two 10,000 ton liners for Lloyds Royal 
Belge 51 was well supplied with work and even Yarrow's was having 
some success in securing merchant orders with contracts for two 
small cargo boats, four coastal vessels and a number of shallow 
draught river boats. 52 
- Success came easily in the boom conditions of 1919-20 when 
berths were at a premium and owners were prepared to pay any price 
to renew their fleets and make good wartime losses as quickly as 
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possible so that they might share in the post-war boom in trade. 
The outlook for merchant shipbuilding began to look much less 
promising once the wartime losses had been replaced, a condition 
which was broadly satisfied within two years of the end of the 
war. By the end of 1920, when it was reported that there was 
insufficient work for all the ships in existence. 
53 there was little 
demand for new ships and such orders as were still available looked 
increasingly unattractive in relation to costs of production which 
had been on the increase since the outbreak of war in 1914. After 
six years, during which inflation had raised costs of production to 
more than four times the level of 1914,54 the downturn in demand, 
coupled with the deflationary policies adopted by the government in 
the spring of 1920, made the shipbuilding Lndustry's existing cost 
structure untenable. A reduction of costs became a matter of 
necessity, but all costs were not equally-responsive. While the 
price of steel ship-plates, which had reached a peak of L26 per ton 
in May 1920, fell to LIO. 101- per ton by November 1921 and the price 
of steel sectionsg which had reached a peak of E25.10/- per ton in 
May 1920, likewise fell to LIO per ton by November 1921,56 
reductions in the industry's wage rates were the subject of 
protracted negotiations between managements and unions and the first 
round of cuts in wages was not implemented until the autumn of 
1921.57 With the open market price of a new 7,500 ton deadweight 
cargo steamer slumping from an all-time high of L258,750 in March 
1920 to L82,500 a year later. 58 tenders for new work became 
hopelessly uneconomic and there was no alternative but to lay off 
men as existing order books ran out. By the autumn of 1921 
Yarrow's. which required a continuing flow of new work to keep 
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going, had been forced to close its yard altogether until such times 
as 'conditions enable business to be carried an with some chance of 
success, 59ýand even those yards which had large orders on hand were 
running into serious difficulties. 
Under normal circumstances the big yards which specialised in 
building liners would have been less vulnerable to any downturn in 
demand if only because it took time before they felt the effect of 
the shortage of new work; in 1920-21 conditions were far from 
normal. Once the inflationary expectations which had fuelled the 
post-war boom began to evaporate, owners not only-declined to place 
new orders but also became reluctant to proceed with cost-plus 
contracts for ships for which there was no prospect of finding 
profitable employment in the foreseeable future. In consequence 
the major Clyde warshipbuilders in common with other liner builders 
faced a spate of cancellations and stoppages of work. in the winter 
of 1920-21. Several important contracts had been suspended or 
cancelled by the end of 1920. In September, Fairfield was 
negotiating with the Houlder Line on its suspension of an order for 
two ships; 60 in December both Scott's and Denny's suffered from 
Lloyd Royal Belge's decision to cancel all its outstanding 
orders. 61 More seriously, by the spring of 1921, stoppages of work 
had reached epidemic proportions as some owners. were running out of 
money and the most dependable of customers realised that it was to 
their advantage to defer the completion of cost-plus contracts until 
such times as the intense deflationary pressures were reflected in 
lower costs of production. By May 1921, Lloyd Sabaudo had halted 
work on the liner CONTE VERDE at Dalmuir. 62 the Anchor Line had 
ordered the suspension of work on its two liners at Fairfield, 63 
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Anchor Donaldson having already indicated that it was unable to 
proceed with one of its two ships, 
64 and at Clydebank, where Cunard 
had first threatened to stop work on its orders 'in view of the high 
costs or shipbuilding and the disappointingly slow deliveryi, in the 
spring of 1920,65 work an both the Cunard liners had been stopped. 
46 
The stoppage of work an so many major contracts caused their 
builders acute embarrassment but there was very little they could do 
as they were powerless to force customers to honour their 
contractual obligations without running the risk of outright 
cancellation and a probable loss of goodwill. Temporary stoppages 
were preferable to outright cancellations. It was always possible 
that work might be resumed at a later date and in any event there 
was nothing to be gained by releasing berths for which there was no 
other work. In consequence the leading warshipbuilders found 
themselves in the unusual situation that, although they had plenty 
of work on hand, very little or it was proceeding'normally. 
Scott's and_Denny's managed to keep going on the strength of the 
loyalty of their regular customers but the situation facing 
Clydebank in May 1921 was typical of the state of affairs which 
prevailed in the three big yards in the spring or 1921. Lord 
Pirrie had stopped work altogether on the hull or the LDCH KATRINE 
and slowed down the completion of the last two ships for Elder 
Dempster-; 67 it was feared that work would shortly be suspended on 
the tanker INVERGORDON, ordered in May 1920; 68 meanwhile, work was 
at a standstill an the two Cunarders and the management could only 
hope that Canadian Pacific would agree to continuing with their two 
liners which were at a relatively advanced stage of completion. 69 
Under these circumstances, managements had little room for 
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manaeuvre and, barely two years after the end of the warg the 
warshipbuilders found themselves laying-off men and struggling with 
the painful task of cutting overheads to a level compatible with the 
greatly reduced volume of output. Doing so was extremely 
difficult. At Clydebankv where charges had been cut by one-third 
by May 1921 with a further seven or eight per cent to follow when 
reductions in wages became effective, 70 management found that by 
October 1921, labour an contracts was down to L18,000 per week, less 
than half of what it had been a year earlier and only 751. of the 
amount required to support even this reduced level of charges. 71 
Against this background, the success of Clydebank, Fairfield 
and Dalmuir in winning the contracts for three of the four new 
battlecruisers ordered by the Admiralty in October 192,72 was a 
most welcome development. While there was, as yet, no reason to 
suppose that the demand for merchant ships would not revive once the 
necessary-action had been taken to reduce costs of production, the 
receipt of major naval contracts appeared to herald a decisive turn 
for the better. Apart from providing immediate relief, it appeared 
that the major warshipbuilders would have less need for merchant 
work in future since the orders for the battlecruisers promised to 
be only the beginning of many post-war naval contracts. In 1920 
the Government had formally abandoned its commitment to maintaining 
a 'Two Power Standard"73 but its avowed purpose was that the Royal 
Navy should remain the equal of any other navy in the world and, 
with both the United States and Japan in process of building modern 
battle fleets. 74 the replacement of Britain's ageing fleet of 
battleships and battlecruisers was becoming unavoidable. While a 
large number of modern light cruisers, destroyers and submarines had 
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been built during the war, the light battlecruisers HMS REPULSE and 
HMS RENOWN and the 41,200 ton battlecruiser HMS HOOD were the only 
capital ships to have been added to the fleet as a result of wartime 
building programmes and the Admiralty had yet to make good the 
battlecruisers lost at the Battle of Jutland let- alofie begin to 
madernise its existing fleet of capital ships. 
Unfortunately, from the point of view of the warshipbuilders, 
the need to provide for the building of a, large number of new 
capital ships was obviated by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921. 
It secured parity with the United States and a margin of superiority 
over Japan in terms of both capital ships and cruisers without the 
need for the expenditure of large sums an new construction. 
Indeed, the treaty expressly provided for the cancellation of the 
four battlecruisers already on order and limiied Britain to building 
no more than two battleships of up to 35,000 tons standard 
displacement over the next decade. 75 At the stroke of the pen all 
prospect of naval programmes containing a large number of new 
capital ships had disappeared. What remained of the pre-war 
armaments industry, which had prospered by supplying armour plate, 
heavy ordnance and large gun mountings, suffered a crippling blow 
and special subsidies had to be paid to a nucleus of firms to keep 
any of the capacity in existence. 76 Meanwhile the warshipbuilders 
had to adjust to a long-term contraction in the demand for warships 
for which they had not planned or even envisaged. 
A policy of arms limitation suited Britains straitened economic 
circumstances. The war had left a crippling national debt, the 
success of deflationary policies demanded that there should be 
drastic cuts in government spending and a renewed arms race was 
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something which Britain could ill afford. In 1921 the Government 
had given in to the Admiralty's request for the resumption of naval 
construction with great reluctance. Since the end of the war the 
emphasis had been on reducing naval expenditure. To this end the 
Admiralty had first been instructed to plan on the basis that they 
would not be required to fight a war with another major power for at 
least ten years 77 and then persuaded to accept a one power standard 
with a corresponding reduction in the size of the fleet, 
78 but the 
naval estimates had continued to run at levels which the politicians 
considered to be unac ceptable in peacetime. The Geddes Committee 
on National Expenditure, set up to make recommendations to cut 
government spending in the light of the 'present and prospective 
position of the Revenue' agreed with them. In its first report, 
published in December 1921 while the Washington Conference was still 
in progress, it pointed out that: 
The estimates provide that in the year 1923, 
the fift'h year after the Armistice was signed, 
with a broken and exhausted Europe and with 
no German menace, we are to have far greater 
fighting power, with a larger personnel, and 
a greater preparation for war than ever before 
in our history. ... (While) the Admiralty have 
clearly given the deepest thought to the 
production of a thoroughly equipped force to 
meet immediately any possible naval contingencies. 
Their plans seem to us to take too little account 
of the period of peace which they have been 
instructed to anticipate and of the present 
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serious financial condition of this country. 79 
In fact the Cabinet had only agreed to provide L2 millions for the 
replacement of 'obsolete ships' after members of a Cabinet 
committee, set up in December 1921, to examine the Admiralty's case, 
had concluded that to delay laying down new capital would not only 
adversely affect Britain's prestige but*would also mean that Britain 
would be at a disadvantage in any negotations with the United States 
on arms limitation. " 
For Clydeside , which suffered the loss of contracts which would 
have provided employment for some 18,000 men in the months ahead, 
the timing of the Washington Treaty could hardly have been worse and 
news of the cancellation of the contracts was reported to have 
caused 'something approaching consternation'. 81 While no one 
rejoiced at a decision: 
Which will probably mean a spell of continued 
idleness for many thousands of men who would 
otherwise have found employment, 82 
the principle of arms limitation met with general approval. The 
views of the local business community were reflected in an editorial 
in The Glasgow Herald which saw: 
The real interest of the country and of the 
working population in particular being better 
served by the general stimulus in trade ensuing 
on reduced naval estimates then by transitory 
and unproductive employment created by a naval 
building programme. 83 
Politically the use of warshipbuilding to provide relief commanded 
little support. In contrast to the pre-war period, when large 
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naval programmes had enjoyed bi-partisan support and a Conservative 
opposition had used unemployment as an additional justification for 
building more warships, 84 the opposition Labour Party now regarded 
any expenditure on armaments as wasteful. A 'Scottish Labour 
Manifesto' published on November 22nd 1921, three days after the 
news of the cancellation, pointed out that the decision spelled 
'economic distress and starvation to thousands of working men' but 
it also dismissed the building of battleships as. 'waste and folly I 
and implied that the Government was only remiss in having failed to 
provide 'alternative and socially necessary employment'. 85 
Both the armaments manufactures and the warshipbuilders were 
placedin a difficult situation. While arms limitation was 
inimical to their interests and even a popular daily such as The 
Daily Record remarked on the particular problem facing the 
shipbuilding industry when 'the proportion of warshipbuilding upon 
which 6e shipyards relied in former times will no longer be 
available, 86 there was no prospect of reversing the decision. 
Raising the issue merely drew attention to their predicament. 
William Beardmore, now Lord Invernairn, 87 in his speech to the 
Annual General Meeting of William Beardmore & Co. Ltd. on 13th 
December 1921 was careful to balance a criticism of government 
policy in general with reassurances that the company's prospects did 
not depend on armaments alonet 
I think the Government would be well advised 
to consider economies and greater economies 
which could be effected on other items of 
xpenditure, which do not by their very nature 
ive anything like the employment which would 
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be afforded by a naval programme ... I do not 
desire to see a continuance of the exhausting 
policy of competition in armaments between 
nations, but I do think we cannot afford to 
allow our naval supremacy to be lowered to 
any degree. ... In the present depressed state 
of trade, the suspension of these orders is 
naturally a matter of serious importance to 
this company but I should point out that the 
spirit of economy underlying the suspension of 
these orders - if extended to other items of 
national expenditure. - will release funds for 
expenditure on ordinary commercial products for 
the manufacture of which the resources of this 
company are even more suited, as our principal 
business is that of steel manufacturersq 
forgemastersq shipbuilders and engineers. I 
think it desirable to draw attention to this 
fact as the impression appears to be current 
that the manufacturing facilities of this company 
are mainly for the production of armaments. 88 
Under the circumstances there was little else an armaments 
manufacturer could say, but acceptance of the inevitable could not 
disguise the fact that the armaments industry had suffered a major 
blow. For war shipbuilders in general the outlook was not quite as 
bleak as the Washington Treaty did not forbid the construction of 
cruisers of less than 10,000 tons or the replacement of smaller 
warships but, without capital ships, the larger warshipbuilding 
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yards in particular faced an uncertain future and it remained to be 
seen whether they could survive and prosper on the limited amount of 
naval work which would be available. At best, their past history 
suggested that it would be an uphill struggle and the conditions 
which they were to face in merchant shipbuilding were to be worse 
than the most pessimistic could have anticipated. In 1921, there 
was still room for hope; it was not until the experience of the 
1920's had shown that merchant shipbuilding could not compensate for 
the lack of naval orders that there was a belated acceptance of the 
fact that arms limitation was incompatible with the preservation of 
all of the warshipbuilders' capacity. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
1921-1929 : ARMS LIMITATION. 
While the slump in demand which began in 1920 appeared to have 
reached bottom at the end of 1922, when t here were under 
constructiorf in the whole of the United Kingdom only 331 ships 
aggregating 1,617,045 tons, 
1 thle anticipated recovery was slow to 
materialise. In 1923, production wa_s severely disrupted 
by a 
prolonged dispute with the boilermakers. 
2 Although there were 
some signs of recovery in 1924, prices were reported to be 'poor' 
and much of the output an the Clyde consisted of arrears of work 
carried forward from 1922 and 1923.3 Trade continued to be 
depressed in 1925 and recovery was further del. ayed by the coal 
strike in 1926. Thereafter the situation improved and 1927, 'a 
year of absolute shipyard peace"4 and 1928 were years of 
relative prosperity for the shipbuilding industryq but even in 
1928 the Clyde's output of 604,611 tons was below the levels 
achieved in the boom years of 1911-1913 and 1919-1926 and a rise 
in the proportion of the industry's workforce unemployed from 
20.6% in January 1928 to 32.6% in November 1928 heralded the 
beginning of another downturn in demand. 5 Against this 
background the warshipbuilders had little chance of finding 
sufficient merchant work to compensate for the contraction in 
demand for naval ships but, at least in the beginning, it was 
possible to believe that the problem was only temporary and that, 
given time, all would be well. Periods of depression were to be 
expected in a highly cyclical business; sooner or later the 
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demand for warships would revive and it was unthinkable that 
large and well-equipped yards should be closed down on account of 
some temporary difficulties when years of prosperity had given 
them the means to survive a prolonged period of unprofitable 
trading. 
Ironically the commitment to naval work, which had delayed 
the warshipbuilders resumption of merchant work at the end of the 
war, now worked to their advantage. Despite the fact that 
deflationary policies were only partly successful and costs 
failed to return to pre-war levels, 
6 the unions were forced to 
accept drastic reductions in wage rates which were sufficient to 
persuade owners to resume work on contracts which had been 
suspended in 1921. At Dalmuir, work on the liner CONTE VERDE 
restarted in February 1922 with the assistance of loans of 
L600,000 guaranteed under the Trade Facilities Act; 
7 in June' 
1922, work recommenced-on the hull of the FRANCONIA at Clydebank, 
the resumption being attributed to: 
The recent reduction in shipyard wages 
and the consequent decrease in the costs 
of construction. 8 
Although, at that time, work was still suspended an the ALAUNIA 
at Clydebank, and on both the TRANSYLVANIA and LETITIA at 
Fairfield, all of these liners too were eventually completed. 
The big post-war order books were not exhausted until 1925 and 
most of. the warshipbuilders were able to maintain a semblance of 
prosperity for some time after the reality had disappeared. 
Dalmuir was exceptional in recording a trading loss before 
depreciation as early as 1920. In part this reflected 
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provisions for losses an fixed price contracts and on the need to 
write down ships being used for development purposes in 
consequence of the collapse in the market value of second-hand 
ships, but it also reflected the extraordinary measure of freedom 
which Beardmore's enjoyed in the preparation of their 1920 
accounts. Pending the resolution of the many complex issues 
arising from wartime contracts with the Ministry of Munitions, 
the company had not submitted accounts to its shareholders for 
five years and, as Iong as average annual profits for the five 
years to 31st December 1920 were higher than those achieved in 
1915, provisions made in 1920 were not going to cause the 
management any serious embarrassment. Dalmuir's loss of 
052,822 before depreciation in 1920 was therefore probably as 
*. uch a matter of convenience as of strict necessity. There was 
* spectacular recovery in the profits reported by Dalmuir in each 
of the two years following and it was not until 1923 that the 
yard's fortunes took a permanent turn for the worse. More 
typically, Scott's accounts showed no signs of any downturn until 
1923 and Fairfield's profits held up until 1923-24. 
The years immediately following the war had been extremely 
profitable for Fairfield. Excluding provisions for damages 
arising from the cancellation of steel contracts, trading profits 
before depreciation had averaged L250,492 per-"num in the three 
years to June 1922 despite losses on the cancellation of Globe 
tankers in 1921.9 The trading profit before depreciation fall 
to L132,661 in 1922-23 but the year's results were boosted by a 
credit of L103,161 arising from the final settlement of 
outstanding Admiralty claims and the Chairman was able to reflect 
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on the satisfactory' nature of the Company's position given the 
$unprecedented industrial depression' of the last two and a half 
years and 'the difficulties which they in common with other 
shipbuilding concerns had had to face'. 
10 Nevertheless the 
Company had to provide for the loss of its investment in the 
Northumberland Shipbuilding Co. and the dividend which had been 
cut to 51. in 1921 was passed for the first time since 1914. A 
year later the trading profit before depreciation was down to 
L19,088 and after providing for interest and tax there was a 
deficit of L21,461. 
The key to Fairfield's prosperity in the immediate post-war 
years was the large merchant orders carried over from the end of 
the war. Although the Houlder Line had cancelled its order for 
two ships before work an them had proceeded very far 
11 and the 
Orient Line had not taken up its option on a berth booked during 
the wart12 the six big liners which had been on order at the end 
or the war were all completed. The liners EMPRESS OF CANADA and 
MONTROSE for Canadian Pacific were completed in 1921-22 and, 
although work was suspended for a time on three of the four ships 
being built for the Anchor Line and the Anchor-Donaldson Line and 
the latter considered cancelling one of its orders altogethert 
13 
all four were eventually finished, the last of them, the 16,293 
ton TRANSYLVANIA in 1925-26. Moreover, despite at least two of 
these contracts being re-negotiated an a fixed price basis 14 and 
a claim for damages an the Canadian Pacific contracts which was 
settled for L52,049 in 1924-25, all six liners yielded high 
profits. The details are given in Table 8.1. 
196 
TABLE 8.1 
PROFITABILITY OF FAIRFIELD'S POST-WAR LINER CONTRACTS. 
WORKS VESSEL INVOICE CONTRIBUTION- 
ORDER PRICE TO OVERHEADS 
AND PROFIT 
LL% 
528 EMPRESS OF CANADA 2,052,535 430,838 21.0 
529 MONTROSE 1,668,455 340,522 20.4 
595 TUSCANIA 1,449,839 307,661 21.2 
596 ATHENIA 1,043,848 236,198 22.6 
6aO TRANSYLVANIA 1,358,696 373,992 27.5 
601 LETITIA 812,305 203,202 25.0 
(Source': Abstracted from Appendix FII) 
When these contracts were completed there was no new business to 
ta-ke their place. Apart from relatively small orders from other 
members of the Northumberland Group, the only new merchant order 
booked by Fai-rfield in the five years from the end of the war to 
the spring of 1924 was the 17 . 491 ton AORANGI for the United 
Steamship Company or New Zealand. This ship was technically 
interesting in being an exceptionally large motorship powered by 
four sets of Sulzer two-cycle single-acting six cylinder engines 
specifically modified to ensure maximum reliability on long 
voyages, 15 but it yielded a net profit of only L855 and resulted 
in no repeat business. 
Scott's fared better by virtue of its long standing 
connections with Alfred Holt and China Navigation, both of whom 
placed further orders in this period, but Beardmorels, which had 
no such advantage only succeeded in attracting orders for one 
sludge boat and two sets of engines in 1922-23 with the result 
that by September 1923 the naval yard was completely empty of 
work and there were only two small ships an the stocks in the new 
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East Yard. 16 Thereafter Beardmore's situation was improved by 
th eceipt of the order for the 24,416 ton liner CONTE BIANCAMANO 
for the Lloyd Sabaudo Line and in the course of 1924 the firm was 
also able to secure orders for three 2,700 ton tankers and a 
3,272 ton cargo ship. 17 The improvement did not last and, in 
1925, the total order intake again consisted of a single sludge 
boat. 
The difficulties which the warshipbuilders faced in this 
period are all too apparent from Clydibank's experience. Table 
8.2 shows that it too earned high profits on the big liners on 
order from the end of the war. 
TABLE B. Z. 
PROFITABILITY OF CLYDEBANK'S POST-WAR LINER CONTRACTS. 
WORKS VESSEL INVOICE CONTRIBUTION 
ORDER PRICE TO OVERHEADS 
AND PROFIT 
ORDER LL%- 
456 WINDSOR CASTLE 1,767,380 329,085 18.6 
464 MONTCALM 1,714,064 338,845 19.8 
465 MONTCLARE 1,632,494 338,671 20.8 
492 FRANCONIA 1,559,910 296,273 19.0 
. 
495 ALAUNJA 907,752 165,746 18.3 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix FIII) 
Finding new work to take their place proved to be extremely 
difficult During 1922 there were some new orders -a yacht in 
April, two cable steamers in July 'to provide work for the 
nucleus of our best and oldest established men' 18 and, towards 
the end of the year, the long awaited order for the Orient Line's 
19,800 ton liner ORONSAY - but by the spring of 1923 the 
situation was again desperate. In the hope of securing more 
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work Bell approached Lord Pirrie who had given them to understand 
that he would require four of Clydebank's eight berths for five 
or six years after the war. 19 With Harland & Wolff's own yards 
under-employed and ships lying idle - two of the Elder Dempster 
ships completed in March 1923 having gone straight to Dartmouth 
'to be laid up for an indefinite time, 20 - Pirrie was able to 
offer no assistance beyond promising to keep Clydebank in mind 
"if-anything turns up". 21 With his death in 1924 the personal 
connection was severed and any hope of relief from that quarter 
disappeared. 22 
Under these circumstances Clydebank which, until then, had 
avoided taking hopelessly uneconomic contracts was forced to 
consider any opportunity. Even so the options were limited. 
In December 1923, Bell pointed out that whereas pre-war it had 
been possible to compete for ordinary cargo ships: 
The difference between our-price and that of 
cheap cargo building firms being constituted 
by their obtaining in addition to their actual 
expenditure probably one-third to one-half 
charges, 23 
these same firms were now quoting for vessels at the bare cost of 
their labour and material and: 
Firms like John Brown and Company are at 
a hopeless disadvantage for in the same 
shop we cannot do the rough type of work 
that they do and yet maintain the standard 
of w9rkmanship required for the turbines and 
gearings for high class passenger vessels 
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and warships and also for diesel machinery. 24 
Clydebank therefore gave up any idea of tendering for ordinary 
cargo boats with steam reciprocating machinery and concentrated 
on turbine-driven and diesel-powered ships. Little such work 
was on offer and, since Clydebank was not successful in securing 
any of the limited number of naval contracts which were put out 
to tender between 1921 and 1925, the only new business secured by 
the yard from the end of 1922 to the spring of 1925 consisted of 
a yacht, a tanker for H. E. Moss, two 6,100 ton ships for Canadian 
Pacific, two cross-channel ferries for Great Western Railways, 
and three sets of engines. Worse still, apart from the yacht on 
which Clydebank earned a reasonable profit, none of the business 
taken in this period was profitable and the price of seven of the 
other eight contracts failed to cover prime cost. The 
progressive deterioration in the situation is obvious from the 
analysis in Table 8.3 of the outcome of all the contracts begun 
by Clydebank from the end of the war to the spring of 1925. 
TABLE 6.3. 
PROFITABILITY OF ORDERS TAKEN BY CLYDEBANK 1919-1925 
PERIOD NO. INVOICE CONTRIBUTION 
VALUE TO OVERHEADS 
AND PROFIT 
UP TO MAY 1920 16 11,576,628 2,231,043 19.3 
JUNE 1920 TO I- 
NOVEMBER 1922 4 1,107,015 80,393 7.3 
NOVEMBER 1922 
To MARCH 1925 10 1,341,704 (121,504) LOSS 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix FIII)26 
In Clydebank's trading accounts the deteriorating profit 
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margins was reflected in the trading profit before depreciation 
and cost of demolitions etc. which declined steadily from 
L368,134 in 1919-20 to L76,616 in 1924-25. But for the delays 
in the completion of the Cunarders and the building of the 
ORONSAY, it is difficult to see how Clydebank could-have 
recovered any significant part of its overheads in the two years 
to 31st March 1925. As it was, by the winter of 1924-25, 
Clydebank was nearing the end of its tether. As early as the 
summer of 1920 it had been reported that the engine and boiler 
works we. re only being kept going by 'a large number of outside 
orders', including a quarter of a million pounds' worth of work 
for Kawasaki Dockyard, as: 
The present shipbuilding output of Clydebank 
would not suffice to keep 50% of our engine 
and boi ler capacity going. 27 
By November 1924 the yard's principal iron works squad had been 
disbanded as there was no work for heavy frame setters and 
platers: 
The best of our men are now working in 
Beardmore's on their new Lloyd Sabaudo 
Atlantic liner but whenever that work is 
finished it will be necessary for us to 
do something to prevent them from drifting 
out of the district. 28 
In the winter of-1924-25 a decision to lay down a second tanker 
'on spec. 1 saw the yard through the immediate crisis. 29 Hopes 
of securing an order for two mail steamers were repeatedly 
deferred. It was not until the spring of 1925, when an order 
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arrived for two 10,000 ton cruisers for the Australian 
Government, that Clydebank's prospects took a turn for the better. 
The order for the two cruisers was followed by another for 
two passenger and refrigerated cargo ships for the Blue Star 
Line's London and South American service. 30 These ships, on 
which work started at once, had the more immediate effect an 
employment in the yard, but, both here and at Fairfield, where an 
Admiralty order had been received under similar circumstances in 
the spring of 1924, the resumption of warshipbuilding could not 
have been more timely. Quite apart from. the welcome boost to 
morale, contracts for big naval ships guaranteed regular work for 
at least some of the skilled men in the shipyard and engine works 
for two or three years ahead. More importantt the work was 
profitable. The Australian cruisers yielded Clydebank a 
contribution to overheads and profit of 16.7% of invoice value 
(L369,211) and Fairfield which obtained a contribution of 16.71. 
from HMS BERWICK earned 27.5% (014,367) on a second 10,000 ton 
cruiser HMS NORFOLK laid down in 1927. Unhappily, such 
contracts continued to be in short supply. The only other major 
warship built an the Clyde in the 1920's was the 10,000 ton 
London class cruiser HMS SHROPSHIRE which was awarded to 
Beardmore's in 1926, although Dalmuir also had the contract for 
the machinery of the dockyard-built cruiser HMS CORNWALL in 1924 
and Fairfield supplied the machinery for the cruiser HMS LONDON 
laid down in Devanport Dockyard in 1926. - 
Sir Alexander Kennedy, the Chairman of Fairfield's warned 
the public of the danger that vital defence capacity would be 
lost for want of orders: 
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It had to be borne in mind that the 
shipbuilding industry and in particular 
many shipbuilding firms had been built up 
on warshipbuilding as well as merchant 
shipbuilding ... one of our greatest national 
assets in the past had been our capacity 
for adequately meeting all the requirements 
of our national defence ... today private 
firms were finding themselves burdened with 
equipment and resources capable of meeting 
naval requirements far beyond any programme 
of naval shipbuilding that was now or might 
be for some years to come - if not for ever 
likely to be laid down. The scrapping-of 
all that naval capacity would be of most 
serious moment to the country and yet the 
deadweight burden of it was a very serious 
matter indeed to their industry. He did 
not believe it was unreasonable to ask that 
the country should view their interest from 
the point of view of wise insurance. 31 
This was a forlorn hope. There was nothing in the international 
situation to warrant bigger naval programmes and as long as 
Governments of both parties remained committed to a policy of 
arms limitation there was little hope of persuading the public of 
the need to insure against some remote contingency. The 
warshipbuilders had an ally in the Admiralty, which shared their 
interest in preserving naval capacity, but the naval authorities 
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were powerless to do more than distribute the available work as 
equitably as possible. Even then the Admiralty's room for 
manoeuvre was strictly limited. While it was able to arrange 
for the contracts for two destroyers which ought to have gone to 
Beardmore's on price considerations alone to be switched to 
Hawthorn Leslie's on the Tyne an account of the higher level of 
unemployment in that district in 1929,32 the Controlle_r of the 
Navy could only note with regret that differences in price ruled 
out the possibility. of awarding any of the destroyer contracts to 
Yarrow Ia in 19 28 and 19 29 . 
33 
Against this background the warshipbuilders' response to the 
revival in warshipbuilding was instinctively defensive and an 
unofficial rots, drawn-up with the Admiralty's assistance in 
November 1926, was the first step towards the formation of the 
Warshipbuilders' Committee which became the forum for 
co-ordinating bids and sharing out the work among member firms in 
the 1930@S. 34 In consequence, the shortage of work did not 
result in ruinous competition for warship orders and, at least in 
the short run, all warshipbuilding yards were able to stay in 
business. On the other hand it did not add to the volume of 
demand and, apart from the five cruisers, the Clyde's share of 
naval work in the 1920's comprised only two 1,475 ton Odin class 
submarines laid down at Dalmuir in 1927,35 four river gunboats 
aggregating 1,144 tons built at Yarrow's in 1926-27 36 and a 
total of seven destroyers - Yarrow's 1,173 ton HMS AMBUSCADE, one 
of two prototypes ordered by the Admiralty in 1924, four 'A' 
class ships of 1,350 tons each laid down in 1928 (two each by 
Clydebank and Scott, g)37 and two 1,360 ton 181 class ships laid 
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down at Cly-debank in 1929.38 Further, the operation of the rota 
was not entirely-successful in raising prices to an economical 
level. Fairfield lost L1,375 on the contract for the machinery 
for the cruiser HMS LONOON, Beardmore's thought it necessary to 
provide L35,252 for losses on the two submarines in 1928 and 1929 
39 and neither Clydebank nor Scott's did well out of their 
destroyer contracts. Clydebank, which had quoted a price 'as 
low as prudence would permit'. to provide work for its machine 
shop. 40 suffered a pet loss of L99537 on the contract for the two 
'A' class ships. The outcome-of the order for Clydebank's two 
181 class ships was rather better, but the contribution to 
overheads and profit was still only 11.8% (compared with 7.1% on 
the earlier order) and, although Scott's earned a contribution to 
overheads and profit of 13.5% on its two IBI class ships, the 
result was a net loss of L516. 
Under these circumstances no firm could hope to prosper on 
warshipbuilding alone. Yarrowls, which had reopened its 
shipyard in 1922, survived by applying its expertise to the 
manufacture of land boilers. In the 1920's these often 
represented more than half the firm's production. 41 Beardmore's 
attempt to find a substitute for munitions work at Dalmuir was 
less successful and L241t499 spent on setting up a locomotive 
department in 1919-21 only added to Dalmuir's problems. 
Conceptually Beardmore's locomotive project could not be 
faulted. Although the firm had no previous experience of the 
business Parkhead had made wheels, axles and steel tyres for 
other manufacturers before the war. 42 the product suited the 
firm's expertise in heavy engineering and it was hoped to gain 
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some competitive advantage by applying techniques of 
interchangeability of parts developed in the manufacture of 
munitions during the war. 43 Unfortunately locomotives, unlike 
land boilers, suffered from-the fatal flaw that demand collapsed 
once railway companies had replaced their wartime losses and 
renewed run-down rolling stock and, from 1920 onwards, the 
industry faced the same combination of depressed demand and 
excess capacity which plagued the shipbuilding industry. 
Subventions from a 'locomotive pool' arganised to share out the 
benefits of such contracts as were available brought Dalmuir 
credits of L34,973 in 1924, L26,104 in 1925 and 00,308 in 
1927,44 but locomotive manufacturing was not a success. Even in 
1920-22, there had been losses of L77,389 an locomotive 
contracts, apparently because two. of the first four contracts had 
been taken at fixed prices to gain a foothold in the market, 45 
and according to figures prepared for Securities Man_pgement Trust 
in 1930, the department suffered a trading loss in every year bar 
one from 1923 onwards. 46 
This failure was all the more serious because, apart from 
Yarrow'st Beardmore's was the yard which was most vulnerable to 
the lack of demand for naval vessels. For Dalmuir the order for 
a single cruiser in 1926 was too little and too late. As Table 
8.4 showsq Beardmore's output of merchant ships was broadly 
comparable with that of the other three big naval yards on the 
Clyde down to 1927. 
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TABLE 8.4. 
OUTPUT OF MERCHANT SHIPS 1920-27 INCL6SIVE 
NO. HULLS ENGINES 
TONNAGE H. P. 
BEARDMORE 28 196,955 217,595 
BROWN 27 223,251 200,900 
FAIRFIELD 17 181,090 199,700 
SCOTT 30 176,758 126,400 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix DV) 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a major warship order, the 
shipyard remained hopelessly uneconomic. Excluding Head Office 
charges, trading losses before depreciation amounted to L545,598 
in the four years to December 1927. The engine department did 
rather better with the help of the contract for the machinery of 
the cruiser HMS LONDON but, here too there were trading losses in 
two years out of four and an overall loss of L151,826 in these 
four years. 47 Losses an this scale could not be sustained 
indefinitely. Although there was some improvement in 1928, and 
both the shipyard and the engine department reported trading 
profits before depreciation in 1929, the year in which the 
cruiser HMS SHROPSHIRE was completed, Dalmuir's chances of being 
able to take advantage of the upturn in merchant shipbuilding 
were not improved by the uncertainties which surrounded the 
financial stability of Beardmore's even before the appointment of 
a Committee of Investigation in March 1927.48 
In some respects Dalmuir was a special case. First, it was 
said to be at a particular disadvantage in lacking 'co-operative 
arrangements with lines such as other naval yards have had'. 49 
The formal link with Lloyd Sabaudo in which Beardmore invested 
E2099375 was of limited value. Judging by the modest profit of 
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L28 057 an the Ll 516 378 contract for the- CONTE ROSSO, completed 
in 1922, any business was taken at prices which allowed Dalmuir 
little if any profit and there were no further orders after the 
CONTE BIANCAMANO as Mussolini insisted that Italian shipping 
lines should place their business with Italian shipyards. 50 In 
addition Beardmore's appears to have lacked the informal links 
which resulted in other yards being treated as preferred 
suppliers. Second, Beardmore's commitment to 6 policy of 
technical innovation after the war was expensive. While the 
1,250 h. p. six-cylinder four-stroke single-acting Beardmore-Tosi 
diesel engines fitted in the PINZON and PIZARRO in 1922-23 and a 
modified version supplied to the Blythswood Shipbuilding Company 
for the SILURIAN in 1924, and also fitted i-n three 5,000 ton 
cargo ships built at Dalmuir for Brazilian owners in 1927-28,51 
all appear to have been technically successful, they did not 
result in repeat orders and Dalmuir's trading results were 
adversely affected by the losses incurred in their development. 
In 1920j Beardmore's had taken the opportunity of providing 
L32,220 against possible losses on the PINZON and PIZARRO, the 
contracts having been taken at fixed prices. 52 presumably as a 
means or winning acceptance ror new and untried products. Eight 
years laterv the contracts for the three Brazilian ships required 
provisions of-at least L75,339 against losses incurred up to 
August 1928 with the likelihood that a rurther L20-L25,000 would 
be needed by the time the ships were completed 53 and, judging by 
provisions in the 1923 accounts, some L16,000 had been lost on 
the contract for the engines or the SILURIAN. 54 Third, there is 
some evidence that Dalmuir remained fundamentally 
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uncompetitive. Despite the opening of the East Yard to 
facilitate the building of smaller ships, Beardmore's was unable 
to secure a single tanker order after 1924 and iý was indicative 
of the costs in the big naval yard that the contract for the 
20,119 ton Canadian Pacific liner DUCHESS OF-ATHOLL, the only 
major merchant order taken in co-mpetition with other Clyde yards 
after the end of the post-war boom, was reported to have resulted 
in a loss of L138,000 in December 1928.55 
Dalmuir was not the only warshipbuilding yard on the Clyde 
to be plagued with persistent losses once post-war order books 
were exhausted. Scott's which had been kept reasonably 
well-employed throughout the post-war slump with a succession of 
orders from Alfr, ed Holt and China Navigation, finally ran out of 
profitable work in 1926. In nine successive years from 1925 
the Company was to report a trading-loss before depreciation and 
interest. After 1925, Scott's still had first refusal of any 
business that Holt's and China Navigation had to offer but the 
work was not plentiful, and as Table 8.5 shows, any orders which 
were forthcoming were much less profitable. 
TABLE 8.5 
PROFITABILITY OF SELECTED CONTRACTS COMPLETED BY SCOTT'S 1919-1929 
1919-24 
No. INVOICE CONTRIBUTION 
VALUE TO OVERHEADS 
AND PROFIT 
LL% 
ALFRED HOLT 13 4,442,185 954,773 21.5 
CHINA NAV. 9 1,183,764 258,110 24.3 
1925-29 
No. INVOICE CONTRIBUTION 
VALUE TO OVERHEADS 
AND PROFIT 
L VM 
5 1,246,899 108,617 8.7 
1 141,778 21,173 14.9 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix FV) 
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Scott's also experimented with new forms of propulsion in 
the hope of augmenting its product range, but with little 
success. The development of a Scott-still oil engine was 
abandoned after a prototype had been fitted in Alfred Holt & 
Co. 's DOLIUS, the engine works having lost L22,287 on the 
contract. 56 Latert Scott's pioneered the' building of 
diesel-electric powered ships on the Clyde. The tanker 
BRUNSWICK, completed at, Greenock in 1928, was the largest such 
vessel yet built anywhere 57 and Scott's subsequently built two 
more diesel-electric tankers 58 for the same owner - the Atlantic 
Refining Company - but three tankers made only a marginal 
difference to the yard's order book. 
Apart from the orders from Alfred Halt and China Navigationt 
the three tankers and the single destroyer orderg Scott's orders 
in the five years 1925-29 were for a succession of modest cargo 
boats which provided little work and made only a mod'est 
contribution to overheads and profit. Unlike some other yardst 
Scott's appears to have been unwilling to accept orders which 
made no contribution to overheads. Only one contract failed to 
cover prime costt but only six out of twenty-threi merchantmen 
ordered in the five years 1925-29 recovered their full share of 
overheads and three of these were for Alfred Holt and China 
Navigation. 59 
Clydebank and Fairfield were better placed, if only because 
they had the lion's share of the naval orders placed an the 
Clyde. Major Admiralty orders came their way when most needed, 
but, even when the demand for merchant ships revived, they still 
experienced great difficulty in obtaining sufficient merchant 
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work at remunerative prices. Their difficulties were partly 
attributable to the lack of demand for the big passenger liners 
which alone were comparable in work content to a large warship. 
Since most liner companies had replaced their fleets at the end 
of the war, and the transatlantic passenger business was 
adversely affected by the restriction of immigration into the 
United States. 60 few owners were in the market for additional 
tonnage. But for Canadian Pacific, the Clyde yards would have 
been wholly devoid of major passenger liners from the launching 
of the CONTE BIANCAMANO at Dalmuir in 1924 until the laying down 
of the QUEEN MARY at Clydebank in 1930. 
Canadian Pacific favoured the Clyde yards with a large 
amount of work. Apart from the 25,800 ton EMPRESS OF JAPAN 
built by Fairfield and the 42,500 ton EMPRESS OF BRITAIN built by 
Clydebank, they placed orders for three 18,000 tons passenger and 
cargo liners and a ferry with Clydebank, 61 three more ferries- 62 
and the reconstruction of the EMPRESS OF AUSTRALIA and the 
EMPRESS OF CANADA with Fairfield, an 18,000 ton passenger and 
cargo liner with Beardmoress, 63'and a 4,000 ton ferry with 
Denny, S, 64 all within the space of five years. Denny's also 
built one of three 10,000 ton cargo liners ordered from Clyde 
yards in the same period. 65 Canadian Pacific contracts were, 
however, subject to competitive tender. As many as nine firms 
were reported to have been invited to tender for the four 18,000 
ton liners in 1926. In consequence, profit margins were at best 
slight, and in the case of the more prestigious contracts they 
were non-existent. The contract for the 'EMPRESS OF BRITAIN' 
yielded Clydebank a contribution to overheads and profit of only 
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L63,485 an an invoice price of L2,130,723 and the L112680647 
'EMPRESS OF JAPAN' failed to recover Fairfield's prime costs by 
L84,395. 
The demand for slower liners of the passenger and 
refrigerated cargo variety was more buoyant and this was the only 
segment of the market which offered large yards any prospect of 
obtaining a substantial volume of work at reasonable prices. 
Here too, orders were not plentiful and prices were poor. 
Fairfield, which was reported to have the advantage of receiving 
all of Bibby Brothers work without competition, 67 showed a net 
profit on only the last of the four contracts received in this 
period, 68 the first three ships yielding an average contribution 
to overheads and profit of only 8.67% on invoice price. 
Clydebankq whose definition of 'profit' was less exacting, showed 
the three 18,000 ton liners for Canadian Pacific as having been 
prof! -table although the average contribution to overheads and 
profit had been only 8.9%. Even in the years 1925-28, when the 
demand for merchant ships was at its best, Clydebank was able to 
secure 'profitable' work from only a handful of customers - the 
Blue Star Line, L. N. E. R., and Canadian Pacific. Additional 
I business could be obtained only at prices which, at best, made 
little if any cbntribution to overheads and could end in 
disastrous losses if anything went wrong, as Clydebank found out 
when it accepted such a contract from the New Zealand Shipping 
Company. This contract, in which they had first become 
interested when the owner's intention had been to build two large 
'mail steamers' costing LIA millions, 69 eventually turned into 
an order for three 17,000 tons refrigerated cargo and passenger 
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liners. 70 A combination of a loosely'worded contract, confusion 
over the specification and 'rapacious agents', compounded by a 
serious miscalculation on the part of Brown's own employees, 
which resulted in instability and a shortfall of 25% in the 
-specified 
draught, 71 produced a nightmare contract an which 
Clydebank failed to recover prime cost by L235,014. 
Fairfield's experience was similar and in this case the 
company's costing system, which provided for all contracts to be 
charged with overheads at a predetermined fixed rate 
proportionate to their direct labour cost, helps to define the 
problem. First, contracts were coated on a consistent basis and 
it was easy to identify orde. rs which did not recover their fair 
share of overheads. Apart from the fourth ship for Bibby 
Brothers, the only profitable merchant orders taken by the firm 
in the six years to June 1929 were two 8,000. ton refrigerated 
cargo liners for the Shaw Savill Line and another of 9,500 tons 
for the British and Argentine Steam-Navigation Co., 72 all ordered 
in February 1927. All of the other twelve merchant ships 
ordered between February 1924 and June 1929 73 resulted in 
losses, three of the four contracts for Canadian Pacific taken 
towards the end of the period being accepted at prices which 
failed to recover prime cost. 74 Second, the use of a fixed rate 
of overhead recover y resulted in some balance of overhead being 
left over to be written off to departmental trading accounts at 
the end of a year and in every year from 1923-24 to 1928-29 v 
output consistently failed to match up to management's perception 
of 'normality' leaving overheads under-recovered by a substantial 
amount. Details are in Table 8.6. overleaf 
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TABLE 8.6 
OVERHEAD RECOVERY AT FAIRFIELD. 
YEAR OVERHEADS RECOVERED 
LE 10, 
L923-24 160,296 70,529 44.0 
1924-25 193,842 165.018 85. L 
1925-26 206,942 142,588 68.9 
1926-27 230,023 193,509 84.1 
1927-28 244,267 171,258 70. L 
1928-29 218,309 199,757 91.5 
(Source: Details abstracted from UCS 2/31/10-11) 
While Clydebank and Fairfield were the most successful of 
the Clydeside warshipbuilders in the 19201s, even they had little 
reason to feel confident about a future which depended primarily 
on their success as merchant shipbuilders. It was therefore a 
matter of serious concern when, in the summer of 1929, the 
incoming Labour Government announced its intention of curtailing 
naval programmes still further in advance of summoning a 
conference to negotiate another round of naval disarmament. 75 
This move was not entirely unexpected. Clydebank which had 
obtained the contract for two 181 class destroyers in March 1929, 
had taken the precaution of ordering 'as muchý material as 
possible ... to preclude the possibility of any cancellation of 
these contracts'. 76 Beardmore's had the misfortune of having 
work on the submarine HMS ROYALIST suspended and then cancelled 
and, with the government pledged to do something to ameliorate 
the situation of the Royal Dockyards which bore the immediate 
brunt of the cuts, 77 it was all too apparent that the prospects 
of the private sector obtaining any significant volume of naval 
orders in the future had taken a marked turn for the worse. 
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This would have been an unappealing prospect at the best of 
times. Coming as it did at a time when the industry was already 
experiencing the beginnings of what was to become the worst slump 
in the industry's history, it was a potentially crippling blow. 
By the late 1920's it was generally acknowledged that the 
shipbuilding industry was sufferring from chronic overcapacity. 
The Committee on Industry and Trade had- remarked in January 1928: 
Since the end of 1921 the shipyards of 
the United Kingdom could have produced 
the whole of the new tonnage constructed 
in each year in the world and still not 
have exhausted their capacity. 78 
By 1929 a Shipbuilding Conference, set up in 1928 to pool tenders 
and re-imburse shipbuilders with the cost of preparing 
unsuccessful bidsv was already contemplating the elimination of 
surplus capacity and a sub-committee chaired by Sir James-Lithgow 
was considering how the industry might finance the purchase of 
any shipyards which went out of business to prevent their being 
reopened under new management. 79 This scheme, which was to 
reach fruition with the formation of National Shipbuilders 
Securities Limited in the spring of 1930, had been conceived as a 
means of affecting a gradual and orderly reduction in capacity 
over a number of years. It was powerless to prevent the 
widespread distress which followed when the industry had to deal 
with a catastrophic slump in demand and an international 
financial crisis which destabilised the banking system and 
brought trade to a virtual standstill. 
Under these circumstances the closure of large and well 
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equipped yards, which would have been unthinkable only a few 
years before, becCLme unavoidable. It was no longer a question 
of whether some part of the industryshould be sacrificed in the 
interest of the remainder but how much of it might be saved when, 
after a decade during which the combination Of 3dverse trading 
conditions, costly investments and abortive attempts at 
diversification had taken their toll of their financial 
resources, few firms in the industry were in any condition to 
bear the strain of the further losses unaided. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
1929-1934 ; FINANCIAL CRISIS. 
Any lingering hope that the cuts in naval expenditure announced 
in 1929 would prove to be temporary was dispelled by the outcome 
of the London Naval Conference in 1930. With the ban on the 
construction of capital ships extended for another five years 
and further limitations imposed an the size of other warships. 1 
a review of Britain. 's future naval requirements published in 
July 1930 spelled out the implications for the future level of 
demand. 2 A projected five-year building programme containing 
only three or four cruisers and a maximum of three submarines 
was barely sufficient to keep the Royal-Dockyards employed and, 
at best, the private warshipbuilders could expect little more 
than token orders for these types of ship. - Destroyer orders 
promised to be more plentiful, as the building of two flotillas 
of nine destroyers each per annum was admitted to be necessary 
to replace the large numbers of destroyers nearing the end of 
their working lives, but there was no sense of urgency and the 
1930-31 programme provided for the building of only one 
flotilla. 3 In these circumstances the future of the private 
warshipbuilding industry looked increasingly bleak. The 
industry could not be sure of receiving orde-re for more than the 
machinery of dockyard-built cruisers and an indeterminate and 
possibly modest number of destroyers, a volume of work which was 
hopelessly inadequate in relation to the capacity available. 
Armstrong's Walker yard 4 had already been put on a 'care and 
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maintenance' basis following the amalgamation of Vickers and 
Armstrong-Whitworth's armament interests in 1927, but, in the 
absence of any demand for the larger types of warship, further 
casualties among the major warshipbuilding yards seemed 
inevitable. The announcement by Beardmore's of the closure of 
their Dalmuir yard in September 1930 occasioned little surprise. 
William Beardmore & Co, had been in financial difficulties 
for some time. In retrospect, the company's financial 
stability had been compromised by its attempt to reduci its 
dependence an armaments. Embarking an an ambitious p: ogramme 
of expansion and diversification at the end of the war had 
involved a high level of investment, when costs were at their 
highest. Together with the outlay involved in honouring 
contractual obligations to take over armaments plants erected at 
the expense of the Ministry of Munitions during the war, 5 the 
post-war expansion imposed intolerable strains on the company's 
liquidity. When an attempt to raise additional long-term 
capital failed in 1920, Beardmore's was saddled with a crippling 
burden of short-term debt which left insufficient room for 
manoeuvre when trading conditions deteriorated. 6 To compound 
the difficulties, arms limitation deprived the company of what 
remained of its most lucrative busness and Vickers, which had 
seen Beardmore's through difficult periads before the war, was 
no longer in any condition to help. 7 After relations with 
Vickers were finally severed in 1926.8 the company kept going 
for a time with the assistance of its bankers, but, a comm ittee 
of inquiry appointed in 1927 at their insistence was unable to 
devise a workable scheme of capital reconstruction. 9 By 1929, 
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with the company's bankers refusing to extend it any more 
credit, Beardmore's was only saved from insolvency by the 
intervention of the Bank of England. 10 
With the involvement of the Bank of England in June 1929, 
Dalmuir's fate was effectively sealed. The primary purpose of 
-the Bank of England's intervention was to save Beardmore's main 
business at Parkhead and Montagu Norman, the Governor of the 
Bank of England, had insisted on being given a free hand to 
dispose of any of the company's other assets before he would 
agree to provide the capital which enabled Beardmore's to 
continue trading. 11 Dalmuir, whose abysXmal trading record had 
contributed to Beardmore's plight, was expendable. A report 
ubsequently prepared for the Bank of England's Securities 
anagement, Trust showed that on the most favourable 
interpretation none of Dalmuir's three departments had a 
: atisfactory trading record in the six years to 31st December 
928.12 Even excluding the costs of operating and selling the 
WULSTY CASTLE, Dalmuir's share of head office expenses, and any 
provision for depreciation, the shipbuilding department had not 
earned a profit since 1923, the locomotive department had lost 
oney in every year since 1924 and even the engine department, : 
he most successful of the three, had suffered a loss in four 
years out of six. In all, the losses had amounted to L765,367 
and the shipbuilding department alone had cost Beardmore's 
L526,524 in the space of six years. Following Lewis Ord's 
appointment as joint'managing director in 1928,13 there was some 
improvement in the situation and, both the shipbuilding 
department and the engine works reported trading profits in 
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1929. The improvement coincided with the building of the 
cruiser HMS SHROPSHIRE, completed in 1929, and it was unlikely 
that the improvement could be sustained. There was no prospect 
of another major Admiralty contract being awarded to the 
shipyard in the foreseeable future, the demand for merchant 
ships was again falling and Beardmore's chances of securing a 
share of the limited amount of work available could not have 
been improved by the publicity surrounding its financial 
difficulties. 14 The engine depariment with its investment in 
diesel engine technology stood a chance of paying its way, 
particularly if it secured a share of Admiralty contracts rue 
the ? ngines of dockyard-built cruisers, but the outlook for the 
shipbuilding department was bleak. In the circumstances, the 
decision to retain the engine works and close down the shipyard 
was the only one possible. 
Some aspects of the decision to close the shipyard down 
permanently rather than put it on a 'care and maintenance' basis 
might have aroused controversy if all the facts had been known 
at the time. Norman, who had come to believe that the revival 
of the depressed industries depended on the ruthless elimination 
of surplus capacity, used Dalmuir to promote the rationalisation 
of the shipbuilding industry. Anxious to ensure the s'uccess of 
: scheme devised by the shipbuilding industry itself for the 
etirement of surplus capacity, he had agreed in principle to 
the sale of the Dalmuir shipyard in November 1929, before all 
the details of the industry*s proposals had been fully worked 
()Ut. 15 The Bank or England provided National Shipbuilders 
Securities Ltd. with L300,000 to purchase Dalmuir, pending the 
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raising of a levy on the members of the Shipbuilding 
Conference. 16 Contemporaries were only in a position to-judge 
the ends and not the means and the permanent closure of Dalmuir 
aroused little controversy at the time. Newspapers took their 
cue from Beardmore's press release which blamed the closure on: 
The postwar curtailment of warship work 
and the absence of an adequate volume of 
the high class mercantile work for which 
the yard was suitable. 17 
Typically, The Glasgow Herald described Dalmuir as 'the victim 
of changing circumstances' and concentrated on the particular 
difficulties faced by a yard 'chiefly created for the 
construction of ships of war': 
Before the war warship work represented 
twenty-five per cent of the entire British 
output. Warship--work-un hand today is 
little more than one-twentieth of the prewar 
amount. It is only a fifth of what it was at 
the end of 1928.18 
While it was to be regretted that a famous firm was closing 
down, its closure was in accord with economic realities. No 
one anticipated that Dalmuir's warshipbuildin-g capacity would 
ever be needed again. The permanent closure of unwanted 
capacity was to be welcomed as a step towards correcting a 
chronic jMbalance between supply and demand which was seen as 
being the fundamental cause of the shipbuilding industry's 
problems. 
Although Dalmuir was in many ways a special case and none 
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of the other Clyde warshipbuilders had as unenviable a record, 
neither Clydebank nor Fairfield had reason to be complacent 
about their own chances of survival if they too should find 
themselves in similar difficulties. By 1930 both were 
suffering from the effects of the decline in the demand for 
warships and both of them were wrestling with problems created 
by the disintegration of the prosperous pre-war armaments 
industry. 
As at Dalmuir, Clydebank's affairs were inextricably linked 
with those of a parent whose own fortunes were adversely 
affected by the decline in the demand for armaments. Although 
John Brown & Co had been more circumspect than William Beardmore 
& Co in its approach to post-war reconstruction, involvement in 
the troubled coal and steel industries, coupled with the 
depressed demand for armour plate, had sapped its financial 
strength and, by the winter of 1929-30, with the holders of 
L481,000 of short-term notes unwilling to renew them, it faced a 
major financial crisis. 19 To overcome its difficulties it was 
proposed to write down the ordinary share capital by L293759000, 
to raise new capital by the issue of a debenture, 20 and to merge 
the company's steel interests with those of its Sheffield 
neighbour Thomas Firth. There was no guarantee that the scheme 
would succeed; if it should fail the consequences. for both John 
Brown and Clydebank were incalculable. 
Unlike Dalmuir, Clydebank had not drained its parent 
company's resources. On the contrary, figures prepared for Sir 
Thomas Bell, Clydebank's managing director, showed that the yard 
had generated a positive cash flow of L1,468,163 since April 
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1919.21 Further, although an Bell's own figures trading 
profits before depreciation and losses an demolitions etc. had 
averaged only L30,515 per annum in the five years to 31st March 
1929 compared with an average of L132,686 per annum in the 
previous five years, the business had consistently produced 
trading surpluses rather than trading losses. Nevertheless, by 
the spring of 1930, the mere 125 skilled ironworkers on the 
payroll was indicative of the state of the yard's order book 22 
and it was an enormous relief when Clydebank secured the 
contract for the 73,000 ton Cunard liner QUEEN MARY. During 
the previous winter there was some concern that Clydebank would 
suffer from John Brown's financial situation and Bell was 
worried by the behaviour of Vickers, which seemed intent on 
competitive underpricing in the hope of securng enough 
first-class work to justify re-opening Armstrong's Walker 
yard. 23 In the event, Clydebank's long standing connection 
with Cunard and its recent experience of building the EMPRESS OF 
I BRITAIN, the largest passenger liner built in Britain since 
1913, told in its favour. 24 Apart from providing Clydebank 
with much needed work, the Cunard contract contributed to the 
uccess of John Brown's reconstruction which was carried through 
n the summer of 1930. During the winter of 1929-30 it was 
: uggested that Clydebank's assets ought to be written down to 
eflect their current earning power. The proposal raised the 
pectre that the reconstruction of John Brown would fail, as it : 
as pointed out that John Brown's ordinary share capital 'would 
have to be wiped out completely,. 25 With the timely arrival of 
the order for the QUEEN MARY, Clydebank's prospects appeared to 
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take a decisive turn for the better. The proposed scheme of 
reconstruction proceeded according to plan and with its success 
C lydebank's position became more secure. Thereafter the yard 
enjoyed a greater measure of autonomy and Bell, who complained 
that John Brown's had failed to hanour a post-war undertaking to 
put aside a sum, equal to two years' profits at Clydebank, which 
could be 'drawn on' in future years if the need arose, 26 
arranged an overdraft facility of L200,000 with the Union Bank 
of Scotland. 27 -This, together with advanced payments an the 
Cunard contract, spared Clydebank further financial embarassment 
in the difficult years ahead. 
While Clydebank's point of maximum danger passed with the 
reconstruction of John Brown & Co. Fairfield's was yet to 
come. Paradoxically, its difficulties originated in the 
post-war resolution of the problem of its investment in the 
Coventry Ordnance Works. By itself, the decision to 
discontinue the manufacture of armaments and turn Coventry's 
facilities over to peacetime production was wholly beneficial 
and a merger with Dick, Kerr & Co and the Phoenix Dynamo Co to 
form the English Electric Co Ltd in 1919 left Fairfield with 
L195,000 of ordinary shares in the new company and L96,159 of 4 
1/2% debentures in Coventry Ordnance Works Ltd. 28 Although the 
nominal value of Fairfield's shares in the English Electric Co. 
was L67,500 less than the amount of its investment in the 
ordinary shares of the Coventry Ordnance Works, and the 
reconstruction led to L36,250 being written off in Fairfield's 
1918-19 accounts, (01,250 having already been written off in 
1914-15), it relieved Fairfield of an investment from which it 
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had derived little benefit over the years. In the absence of 
major warship orders for foreign governments, part ownership of 
a major armaments company served little useful purpose. All 
Fairfield had to show for an investment, which had caused it 
acute financial embarrassment before the war, was ordinary 
dividends of L720 in 1905, L5,937.50 in 1906 and 1907 and 
L19,000 in 1918. On the other hand, a mutual interest in the 
Coventry Ordnance Works had been the bond holding Cammell Laird 
and Fairfield together and the dissolution of their joint 
venture opened the way for Cammell Laird to dispose of its 501. 
holding in Fairfield. In June 1919 Cammell Laird proceeded to 
do so. Since the Dowager Lady Pearce's death in 1918 had 
already released a large parcel of Fairfield shares on the 
market 29 and the other major shareholder, Trinity College 
Cambridge, which had fallen heir to Sir William George Pearce's 
fortune, had begun to dispose of its holding in December 1918,30 
Cammell Laird's action was decisive in giving control of 
Fairfield to the Northumberland Shipbuilding Co., which emerged 
as the owners of more than 806. of Fairfield's ordinary shares in 
December 1919.31 
In the short run the change of ownership appeared to be in 
Fairfield's beat interest. The company stood to gain little 
from the maintenance or the connection with Cammell Laird. 
There was a potential conflict of interest as both firms were 
likely to be involved in tendering for the same classes of work, 
Including any Admiralty contracts which became available. By 
contrast, there was no obvious conflict of interest in a group 
which initially compromised only Northumberland itself, 
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Fairfield and William Doxford & C0.32 Even after the group was 
expanded to incorporate Workman Clark & Co. the Belfast 
shipbuilder&, the former national shipyard at Chepstow, which 
became the Monmouthshire Shipbuilding Co., and the Blythswood 
Shipbuilding Co., the Clydeside tanker specialists, 33 Fairfield 
could expect a clear run in tendering for the highest classes of 
work. Economies of scale in the purchase of supplies of steel 
were in prospect when contracts covering group requirements were 
negotiated in Harch. 1920.34 Other companies in the group also 
provided Fairfield with work: four sets of endines for 
Doxford's, the machinery for an oil tanker and for three barges 
being built at Chepstow and, most important, four tankers for 
the group's Globe Shipping Company. 35 Four new directors 
joined the Fairfield board and Robert A Workman replaced Sir 
Alexander Gracie as chairman 36 but there was no indication that 
the new owners intended to make any significant changes in 
company policy. The new board authorised the completion of the 
West Yard extension and the modification of building berths at a 
cost of E50,171,37 there was no increase in the dividend paid on 
the ordinary shares in 1919-20, and the firm continued to 
accumulate cash. By June 1920, following the sale of the 
company's holdings of War Loan and Cammell Laird's decision to 
exercise an option to buy out Fairfield's interests in the 
English Electric Co and the Coventry Ordnance Works, 38 the 
company had no bank borrowings and cash on hand amounted to 
L310,331. 
The flaw in the now arrangements was that the combine was a 
highly speculative venture whose success depended on a 
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continuation or the post-war boom. The series or deals 
whereby, in the space or less than a year* Messrs. Sperling & Co 
turned a relatively modest Tyneside firm, the Northumberland- 
Shipbuilding Co, into the lynch-pin or a vast shipbuilding 
combine resulted in the creation or an under-financed and highly 
geared group, ill-equipped to tackle a6y reversal in the 
industry's fortunes. 39 The prolonged slump wh ich rollowe'd the 
ending or the post-war boom was ratal to its chances or 
uccess. or all the members or the group, only Fairfield 
urvived the ensuing debacle with its credit relatively 
unimpaired. Northumberland itseir ended in the hands of a 
receiver -in 1926.40 When a new concern, the Shipbuilding 
Investment Co Ltd, purchased Northumberland's assets in May 
1927, Sir Alexander Kennedyv who had been Chairman of Fairfield 
since 1923 and was now the designated chairman of the new 
company, stressed that the prospects of success depended largely 
on Fairfield and on a new company being formed to operate 
Northumberland's yard at Howden, since 'the shares of Workman 
Clark & Co and William Doxford & Co are considered to have no 
present saleable value,. 41 While Fairfield remained solvent, 
the Sperling Combine had taken a heavy tall of its financial 
resources. First, there were the claims arising from the 
cancellation of the group's orders for steel. These 
liabilities, which largely arose from contracts with Dorman, 
Long & Co Ltd. the Cargo Fleet Iron Co Ltd and the South Durham 
Steel and Iran Co Ltd, obliged Fairfield to provide Liga, oco in 
the accounts for the year to 30th June 1920 and to make further 
provisions of L133,740 in the following year. The size of 
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these provisions was discreetly glossed over in the company's 
published accounts and payments were spread over a number of 
years, the profit and loss account being credited with L63,343 
an a final settlement in 1928, but, by 1929, when the company 
quietly wrote off a balance of L220937 owing by Sperling & Co in 
respect or payments made to it for 'guaranteeing' the 
performance of these contracts, 42 Fairfield was the poorer by 
L283,334 in total. 
Second, there were the losses arising from the cancellation 
of two or the Globe Shipping Co's tankers in 1921. When work 
an the two tankers was suspended at Globe's request in 
March-April 192,43 the Fairfield board's first concern was to 
recover the amount Globe already owed, 44 but, since the ships 
could not be sold and Globe was unable to pay its bills, it was 
eventually forced to agree to the outright cancellation of the 
orders and to allow Globe to settle its outstanding account with 
six-month bills. 45 Cancellations were common at the time as 
the most reputable shipping companies were obliged to review 
their plans in the light of the slump in trade, but these 
cancellations were unusual in causing losses to the builder. 
One of the tankers was subsequently completed and sold at a 
known loss of L17,858 in 1925,46 and it is probable that total 
losses were much greater. 47 
Third, there was the difficulty in obtaining payment for 
the work done for the Monmouthshire Shipbuilding Co. In October 
1922, the customer returned a bill for L32,765 in respect of 
work done on the engines for the oil tanker 'on the grounds that 
the vessel was unsold, 48 and in January 1923, it was reported 
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that L53,375 was outstanding on the machinery for the three 
barges built at Chepstow for the Port of London Authority. 
49 
In this case Fairfield avoided a book loss by taking over the 
Chepstow yard for L25,000 and writing up its value by L66,349 to 
cover the outstanding debt. Superficially the-deal was good, 
as the Chepstow yard was valued at L178j750 
50 but Fairfield 
Iready possessed more shipbuilding capacity than it could 
se. Chepstow had no future as a shipyard and its shipbuilding 
rights were eventually sold in 1937 to National Shipbuilders 
Securities for L7,500.51 Although the site was given over to 
general engineering including the manufacture of railway wagons, 
Fairfield suffered a trading loss an its operation in every year 
until 1935. 
Finally and most onerous of all, there were the losses 
suffered in supporting Northumberland itself. In October 1921 
Fairfield had been required to subscribe L400,000 to a 
L5,000,000 issue of 6% non- cumulative preference shares in its 
parent company. 52 By 1923 the affairs of the Northumberland 
Group were so precarious that it was deemed necessary to provide 
in full against its loss. 53 Although a temporary loan of a 
further L100,000 in April 1922, and part of a further advance of 
L 28,000 in June 1923, were subsequently applied to the 
settlement of part of Fairfield's share of the Group's steel 
contracts, a balance of L21,179 had to be written off as 
irrecoverable when the receiver was appointed at Northumberland 
in 1926.54 While Fairfield's management contrived to minimise 
the damage by offsetting the loss of L400,000 an the 
Northumberland investment against a surplus provided by 
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revaluing Fairfield's fixed assets which had not been revalued 
since 1889,55 the damage was irreparable. Although there was 
no immediate liquidity crisis, Fairfield had been stripped of 
all the cash which it had accumulated in its years of prosperity. 
One -consequence of the Northumberland debacle was that it 
became essential for Fairfield to faster an image of 
stability. With the judicious use of a 'contingency fund', 
created out of provisions for taxation no longer required, the 
public had no grounds for thinking that all was not well. 
Apart from 1923-24, when work was seriously -disrupted by the 
boilermakers' strikev the company's published profit after 
depreciation and before meeting debenture interest and dividends 
ranged from L31,724 to L59,105 between 1921-22 and 1928_29.56 
Further, after a four year period during which the company had 
only once paid a dividend on the ordinary shares, the directors 
recommended the payment of a dividend of 51. in each of the three 
years to 30th June 1929. This was not an accurate reflection 
of the company's true situation. Profits in the three years to 
30th June 1926 had been struck without making any provision for 
depreciation an the grounds that the company had already made 
adequate provision by not taking full credit for the surplus 
arising on the revaluation of fixed assets in 1923.57 In 
a ddition, -1tems which otherwise would have been charged to the 
profit and loss account were charged to the 'contingency fund', 
nd in the year to 30th June 1929 profits were boosted by 
rawing an the 'contingency fund' itself. In reality the 
company's underlying situation was far from satisfactory. 
Trading profits before depreciation had fallen from L132,661 in 
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1922-23 to L19,088 in 1923-24, recovired to L100,944 in 1924-25 
and then averaged only L49 . 624 per annum in the four years to 30 
June 1929. With debenture interest and preference dividends 
absorbing L38,750 per annum, this left no room for manoeuvre and 
in theyear to 30th June 1930 the scale of the"losses suffered 
an the Canadian Pacific contracts made the situation 
unmanageable. Despite drawing a further L150,000 from the 
secret 'contingency fund', and omitting any provision for 
depreciation, the ordinary dividend had to be passed and 
shareholders' approval sought to borrow up to L500,000.58 
Armed with the requisite authority, the Fairfield board 
negotiated a cash credit of L300,000 from the Bank of Scotland 
in March 1931.59 which enabled it to keep going for the time 
being but the outlook became increasingly bleak as Fairfield 
like the other Clyde warshipbuilders faced the worst slump in 
the shipbuilding industry's history. 
The downturn in demand for merchant ships, which had been 
apparent in 1929, gathered momentum in 1930. The new tonnage 
launched in the year was only one-half of what it had been in 
1929, the tonnage commenced was only one-h alf of the tonnage 
completed and unemployment almost doubled, leaving nearly one 
out of every two shipyard workers on the Clyde out of work. 60 
Worse was to follow. In 1931, the tonnage laid down in British 
yards amounted to one-sixth of the tonnage laid down in the 
previous year 61 and, by December 1931, it was reported that, 
apart from the great Cunarder an the stocks at Clydebank, the 
total tonnage under construction on the upper Clyde amounted to 
only 15,000 tons. 6Z At the end of a further year, during which 
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there had been little sign of any improvement in the situation, 
work was in progress in only 50.1 of the shipbuilding berths in 
Britain. 63 Demand began to recover in 1933 but, even in 1934, 
when output included the QUEEN MARY, the total tonnage of ships 
launched an the Clyde was still less than half of what it had 
been in 1929.64 
Under these circumstances merchant work was virtually 
unobtainable. Fairfield, which managed to secure orders for 
only four small pleasure steamers between the summer of 1929 and- 
the spring of 1'931,65 did not obtain any further merchant orders 
until the autumn of 1934 when it received the contracts for two 
more pleasure steamers and the 11,660 ton motor vessel 
DERBYSHIRE for Bibby Brothers. Denny's likewise had only a 
number of small ferries and pleasure steamers on its books. 
Scott's total output in 1932 and 1933 was two small vessels for 
the China Navigation Company. 66 Clydebank, which had received 
the order for the QUEEN MARY in the summer of 1930, had to wait 
until February 1934 before obtaining its next merchant order for 
the Commonwealth and Dominion Line's 8,800 ton refrigerated 
cargo liner PORT WYNDHAM. Meanwhile work an the great Cunarder 
itself was at a standstill for two years from December 1931 
fter Lloyds Bank had refused to join in a guarantee that Cunard 
ould be able to discount three million pounds worth of bills 
while the liner was under construction. 67 
Up to 1933 the demand for warships was little better. In 
the three years 1930-32, the Clyde's share of Admiralty work was 
: single gunboat of 372 tons and two sets of engines for 
ockyard-built sloops at Yarrowes. 68 two 1,375 ton IDI class 
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destroyers at Fairfield 69 and the machinery of the 
dockyard-built destroyer leader HMS DUNCAN supplied by 
Beardmore's. In the autumn of 1930, when Fairfield's work on 
hand consisted of only three merchant ships aggregating 14,000 
tons, 70 its chairman suggested that the government should 
'anticipate rather than delay their necessary replacement 
programme'. 
71 His appeal fell on deaf ears. Naval programmes 
continued to provide for the building of only one flotilla of 
destroyers each year, and as a result of the financial crisis of 
1931, no orders were placed under the 1931-32 programme until 
the autumn of 1932.72 
Faced with such exceptionally adverse conditions the 
manage, ments of individual firms responded by laying off workers 
and cutting overheads to the bone, but even the most frugal 
managements were unable to run their businesses profitably. At 
Fairfield, where spending on overheads other than depreciation 
and interest was cut from L244,231 in 1927-28 to L81,877 in 
1932-33,73 the board reported a bre'ak-even situation in the year 
to 30th June 1931 but only by omitting any provision for 
depreciation and by drawing a further L15,720 from the 
'contingency fund'. Such action could not continue and in two 
or the three following years the company was forced to report 
heavy trading losses. Scottts, which had been operating at a 
loss since-1924, continued to do so up to 31st December 1933o 
Clydebank's trading situation deteriorated steadily, trading 
profits before depreciation of L38,948 in 1931-32 and of L16,187 
in 1932-33 were followed by a trading loss of L44,394 in 
1933-34. Only Yarrowls, which was kept relatively well 
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employed by destroyer orders for Yugoslavia and Portugal 
74 
throughout the period, managed to stay in profit. 
Falling profits took a heavy toll of what remained of the 
warshipbuilders' reserves. Denny's had to draw L35,000 from 
reserve in 1934 alone to keep its profit and loss account in 
credit. 75 In the same year Clydebank was-reduced to the 
expedient of covering its loss by taking credit for a 'surplus' 
of L53,000 on its workmen's compensation account, which had 
stood at L65,748 since 1921. By the winter of 1933-34 some of 
the leading firms appeared to be heading towards bankruptcy. 
Scott's, which had used up reserves and retained profits 
totalling L480,650 in twelve years, had only L15,000 left in 
reserve in addition to a balance of L3,269 an its profit and 
loss account at 31st December 1933. At 30th June 1934, 
9'airfield still had a general reserve of L200,000 dating back to 
19ZO bui, including the surplus on the revaluation of fixed 
assets in 1923, the company had depleted its resources by 
L829,370 since 1920 and, apart from the general reserve and a 
balance of L5,041 on the profit and loss account, all that 
remained was an amount of L33,237 in the 'contingency fund' 
which was now a matter of public record. 76 
Illiquidity added to the shipbuilders' problems. Over the 
years Clydeside firms had evolved a system whereby their working 
capital requirements were not only kept to a minimum but in some 
cases trade creditors also provided part of the fixed capital 
employed in the business. Since it was customary for 
work-in-progress to be subject to regular payments on account of 
the work done, and contracts generally provided for debts to be 
2A7 
covered by bills which could be discounted, work-in-progress was 
virtually saff-financing and debtors were minimal. In 
consequence, the amount owing to trade creditors ror materials 
and services tended to be greatly in excess or the amount tied 
up In current assets which, apart from work-in-progress and 
debtors, consisted principally of modest stocks or raw materials 
and loose tools. These arrangements invariably caused problems 
when trade was depressed. Any reduction in the intake of 
materials resulting rron the contraction in the volume or work 
In hand was not balanced by a corresponding decrease in the 
amount tied up In either work-in-progress or in debtors and any 
reduction In the stocks of raw materials and loose tools was 
Insufficient to balance the fall in the amount owing to trade 
creditors. In a period such as the early 1930's, when an 
exceptionally severe downturn in trade was accompanied by 
trading losses, the cash outflow assumed astronomical 
Proportion@. Fairfield suffered a not cash outriow or L443,351 
in the two years to 30th June 1931.77 
Faced with this situation, the Clyde shipbuilders had 
customarily been able to rely an their bankers to see them 
through their Wricuities. On this occasion credit was not so 
readily available. Shipbuilders were no longer good risks, 
their recovery could no longer be taken for granted, the banks 
were already over-conaLttsd to the depressed industries and 
confidence had been badly shaken by the international financial 
crisis of 1931. Fairfield in particular experienced the 
greatest dirricuity In raising the cash It needed to keep 
going. After being granted a cash credit of L300,000 by the 
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Bank of Scotland In March 1931, the company met with a frosty 
response to an attempt to borrow a further L200,000 two years 
later. $Owing to their limited resources' the Bank of Scotland 
felt unable to accede to the request for more credit and 
Fairfield had to turn to the Bank of England for assistance. 
It was forthcoming but, before Fairfield was given an advance of 
L150,000, the Bank of England required the security of a prior 
charge over the company's heritable property. 
78 To meet this 
condition Fairfield was obliged to repay existing debenture 
holders a proportion of their Investment to gain their agreement 
to forego their prior claim. The only way the company could 
raise the necessary L40,000 to do so was to sell to National 
Shipbuilders Securities the building rights to the West Yard for 
L30,000.79 Although Fairfield had escaped being closed down 
altogether, It had only secured the finance it needed to survive 
by closing down part of its capacity. It was not an exercise 
which could be repeated and Fairfield was close to exhausting 
Its credit. It was nýt alone. Scott's had an overdraft of 
L87,387 In December 1933 after realizing its only marketable 
security -a holding of War Loan. Clydebank, which had the 
advantage of Cunard's prepayments to see It through, was spared 
comparable dLffLculties. Few shipyards could feel entirely 
safe. 
Against this sombre bockgroundq the resumption of novel 
construction by the Admiralty In the winter of 1932-33 provided 
all of the Clyde wershipbuilders with a welcome measure of 
relief. Under the 1931-32 and 1932-33 programme*, Scott4s had 
orders for two OEG aloes destroyers 
80 and for the 5,220 ton 
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Arethusa class cruiser HMS GALATEA; Clydebank for two 
minesweepers and two OF$ class destroyers; 
81 Beardmore's for the 
4 schinery for two dockyard-built Apollo class cruisers; 
82 
Fairfield for the 8,750 ton destroyer depot-ship HMS WOOLICH and 
the machinery for a dockyard built destroyer; 
83 Denny's for two 
'E' class destroyer* 
84 and Yarrow's for a gunboat and a 
destroyer leader. 85 Clydebank, which had been virtually closed 
down by the suspension or work on the QUEEN MARY in December 
1931, teas able to reopen Its West Yard following the receipt of 
the order fat the two minesweepers in September 1932 and during 
the winter of 1932-33 their Ironwork gave employment to foremen 
and chargehands for whom the fire had no other work. 
86 Most of 
the others were in a similar situation. Fairfield and 
Beardmore had no work to follow the naval orders taken in 1931 
and for two years running Scott's total output had consisted of 
a single ship for the China Navigation Co. 
Perhaps surprisingly, in view of the state of demand, the 
naval work was profitable. Despite the intensity of the 
competition for the two minesweepers, no less then twenty-nine 
firms being invited to tender for them. 81 Clydebank earned a 
contribution to overheads and profit of 16.2% on the contract, 
a nd no other Admiralty contract undertaken by Clydebank, 
reirfield or Scott's at this time yielded a contribution to 
overheads and profit of less than twenty percent. The success 
may have owed something to the quality of the labour used and to 
the attention which could be lavished on these contracts in the 
absence of other work, but was also a testimony to the growing 
effectiveness of the unofficial Wershipbuilders Committee in 
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preventing cut-throat competition. " Clydebank, which had 
tendered Oss low as prudence would permit' to secure the order 
for two *A' class destroyers In 1927, was paid 10.9% note for 
two *F1 class destroyers in 1933. In so far as the later ships 
incorporated an improved hull design and three boiler rooms 
instead of twov some increase In price could be justified but, 
In substance, the later ships were little more then enlarged 
versions of their predecessors and, as shown in Table 9,19 9 
Clydebank's costa were lower than those on two IBI class boats 
which had all the advantages of being repeat orders. 
TABLE 9.1 
DESTROYER PRICES AND COSTS AT CLYDEBANK 
NO. CLASS ORDERED INVOICE MATERIALS LABOUR CONTRIBUTION 
VALUE TO aVERHEADS 
AND PROFIT 
LLL 
2 IAO MARCH 1928 441,690 244,789 164,151 32,810 
2 981 MARCH 1929 437,619 245,594 138,202 54,023 
2 'F9 MARCH 1933 489,996 245,194 124,852 119,950 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix F111) 
The problem which faced the warshLpbuilders in 1933 and 
1934 was thatq while the resumption of naval construction was 
encouraging, the level of demand was Insufficient to provide 
them with more than a leavening of profitable work. During 
1933 the volume of naval work an hand In Clyde yards was higher 
then It had been at any time since the end or the war 89 but the 
warships laid down as a result of two years naval progresses 
still amounted to only 25,716 tons. The 1933-34 programme 
added a further 21,865 tons to Clyde order books but the work 
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was again shared between six firms. Clydebank had the 9,100 
ton cruiser HMS SOUTHAMPTON and a sloop; 90. Fairfield had two IGI 
class destroyers and a patrol veosel; 91 Yarrow's had the 19465 
ton destroyer leader HMS GRENVILLE and a netlayerj92 and Scott's 
had the 670 ton Shark class submarine HMS SEAWOLF. Alexander 
Stephen* & Son*, with an order for two 'GO class destroyers, 93 
and William Hamilton & Sons, with an order for a 
minesweeper, 94 joined the number of Clyde firms among which the 
available work had to be shared. In consequence the resumption 
of novel construction did little more then afford the 
warshipbuilders a measure or relief. Typically, the chairman 
or Fairfield's, which had taken orders for the patrol vessel in 
December 1933 and two 'GO class destroyers in April 1934, had to 
report a trading loss before depreciation of L16,982 for the 
YO*r to 30th June 1934. The results had not benefited from the 
orders received In the latter part of the year and he could only 
Say that the prospects for the current year were lbetter'. 95 
Meanwhile firms which found themselves in financial 
difficulties were still being closed down. Palmer's of Jarrow, 
which had been In financial difficulties for some time996 was 
finally closed down In the summer of 1934. William Beardmore*s 
engine works which had survived the closure of the DalmuLr 
shipyard In 1930 suffered the some fatV. Although the works 
had succeeded In securing orders for the machinery or rour 
warships (the destroyer leader HMS DUNCAN and the Apollo close 
cruisers HMS AMPHtON and HMS APOLLO, all built In the Royal 
Dockyards, and the minesweeper HMS SPEEOVELL, built by 
Hamilton$*) they had attracted no other work. A proposal to 
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merge with Fairfield had been blocked by the other engine 
manuracturers who objected to the engine works being kept in 
existence when their Interests demanded the elimination of 
'suicidal competition. ' Accordingly they were closed down 
under the terms or an agreement whereby a consortium of other 
Admiralty contractors acting through the agency of National 
Shipbuilders Securities paid L200,000 for the residual rLghts. 
97 
A surprisingly high proportion of private warshipbuildLng 
capacity survived the years of area limitation but, without a 
major. change In Government policy, further closures appeared 
Inevitable. There was still Insufficient Admiralty work to 
provide employment for all or the warshipbuLldLng capacity which 
remained In existence and by 1934, Admiralty orders an hand were 
all that stood between several of the loading Clyde yards and 
Insolvency. 
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CHAPTER TEN. 
1934-1939 ; REARMAMENT AND RECOVERY. 
In the years leading to the outbreak of the Second World War in 
1939 the fortunes of the private warshipbuilding industry took a 
marked turn for the better as the worsening international 
situation forced the government to abandon its pursuit of arms 
limitation and to set about rebuilding Britain's defences by- 
embarking on a programme of rea7rmament. While the highest 
priority was accorded to re-equipping the air force, which had 
become Britain's first line of defence, and naval rearmament did 
not begin in earnest until 1936-37, the decisive turning point 
came in March 1935 with the publication of a White Paper 
announcing the National Government's decision to increase 
spending on defence. 
Behind the scenes, the state of Britain's defences had been 
under review since October 1933 when Germany had announced its 
withdrawal from both the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the 
League of Nations. Up to October 1933, the National 
Government, in common with its Labour predecessor, had been 
prepared to turn a blind eye to deficiencies in Britain's 
defences in the mistaken belief that civilised nations would 
never again resort to war as an instrument of national policy. 
The uncomfortable example of Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 
September 1931 was largely ignored. Following that event the 
Cabinet had reluctantly acceded to the Chiefs of Staff's request 
for the cancellation of the 'Ten-Year Rule' 1 but this was never 
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intended to be more than a gesture. In lj32, when the 
Admiralty produced a comprehensive 'Review of the Present 
Condition of the Navy and General Remarks on Future Policy' 
incorporating a ten-year building programme for the years 
1933-1942 its efforts were not well received. 2 The Cabinet had 
only agreed to the cancellation of the 'Ten-Year Rule' on the 
strict understanding that: 
This must not be taken to justify an expanding 
expenditure by the Defence Services without 
regard to the very serious financial and economic 
situation which still obtains. 3 
Britain's straitened financial circumstances ruled out the 
assumption of responsibility for maintaining the peace of the 
world single-handed and, in the absence of any direct threat to 
Britain's vital interests in the Far East, the National 
Government was not prepared to-entertain the possibility of war 
with Japan. 
The threat to the peace of Europe which was implicit in 
Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933 was not so easily 
ignored and when Germany withdrew from both the League of 
Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference in October 1933 
the Cabinet was sufficiently alarmed to set up a Defence Review 
Committee to examine the state of Britain's defences with a view 
to making good the worst of the deficiences. 4 This committee, 
which reported in February 1934, recommended the expenditure of 
an extra L76 millions an defence over the next five years but 
the government had not given up hope that peace could be secured 
by diplomatic means and, in the absence of any immediate threat 
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of war, Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
was instumental in reducing the proposed expenditure to E50 
millions and no action was taken until-1935.5 However the 
tone of the Defence White Paper which was finally published 
over the initials of the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in 
March 1935, reflected the fundamental change in the 
government's attitude to defence: 
Notwithstanding their confidence in the 
ultimate triumph of peaceful methods, in 
the present troubled state of the world, 
they realised that armaments cannot be 
dispensed with. They are required to 
preserve peace, to maintain security and 
to deter aggression. ... His Majesty's 
Government felt that they would be failing 
in their responsibilities if ... they 
delayed the initiation of steps to put our 
armaments on a footing to safeguard us 
against potential danger. 6 
From 1935 until the outbreak of war in 1939 the level of 
defence spending mounted inexorably in the face of a 
progressive deterioration in the international situation. 
By March 1936 a futile attempt to halt Italian aggression in 
Abyssinia by means of economic sanctions added Italy to the 
ranks of Britain's potential enemies; Hitler had not been 
ppeased by the signature of an Anglo-German Naval Treaty in 
une 1935; and all hopes or continuing naval arms limitation 
after December 1936 disappeared when Japan walked out of a 
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second London Naval Conference in January 1936. Accordingly, 
the National Governemnt, which had been re-elected in October 
1935 on a platform which committed it 'to do what is necessary 
to repair the gaps in our defencesl, 7 found itself issuing a 
second Defence White Paper outlining further measures of 
rearmament: 
We have really no alternative in the 
present state of the world but to review 
our defe. nces and to provide the necessary 
means both of safeguarding ourselves and 
of playing our part in the enforcement of 
international obligatio ns. 8 
Up to December 1936 the government insisted on observing the 
terms of the Washington Treaty and the London Naval Treaty to 
the latter. 9 with the result that no new capital ships could be 
laid down until January 1937 but, from 1916-37 onwards, the pace 
. of rearmament quickened and, in February 1937, the government 
took powers to borrow L400 millions to finance a rearmament 
programme estimated to cost L1,500 millions over the next five 
years. 10 
Despite the steadily worsening international situation 
spending on defence continued to be subject to financial 
constraints right up to the outbreak of war in 1939.11 Since 
there was never enough money to satisfy the demands of all three 
services, the Admiralty was not able to build all the warships 
which it considered necessary. Two battleships and two 
cruisers had to be left out of the 1938-39 programme to help 
keep expenditure within the limit of L410 millions allocated to 
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the Royal Navy for the three years 1938-39 to 1940-41.12 
Nevertheless, from 1936-37 onwards warshipbuilding was on a 
massive scale. In 1934-35 and 1935-36 programmes of new 
construction amounted to only 148,237 tons in total but, in 
1936-37, the inclusion of two battleships and two aircraft 
carriers in the programme resulted in 214,935 tons of warships 
being laid down and in 1937-38 provision for the building of 
another three battleships and another two aircraft carriers 
resulted in a building programme of 267,020 tons. In all, the 
building programmes for the five years 1934-35 to 1938-39 made 
provision for the building of five battleships, six aircraft 
carriers, twenty-eight cruisers, fifty-nine destroyers, 
twenty-four submarines, six sloops, one survey vessel, two 
escort vessels, eight patrol vessels, four minelayers, sixteen 
minesweepers, five depot-ships and five river gunboats, a grand 
I 
total of one hundred and sixty-nine warships aggregating 754,332 
tons. 
With Rosyth and Pembroke Dockyards closed down 13 and 
Portsmouth and Plymouth heavily committed to modernising old 
capital ships. 14 this programme necessarily entailed extensive 
use of private shipyards and over the five year period one 
hundred and fifty warships aggregating 698,922 tons and one 
hundred and sixty-four sets of warship engines aggregating 
5,988,425 horse power were awarded to private firms. 15 
Forty-nine warships aggregating 357,118 tons were laid down in 
private yards in 1937 alone. 
The revival in the demand for warships was reflected in the 
growing volume of Admiralty work in Clyde yards. As shown in 
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table 10.1, the tonnage on hand, which had been rising steadily 
since 1932, exceeded the previous post-war peak of 52,555 tons 
during 1936 By the end of 1938 it was approaching the record 
peacetime level achieved in 1913. 
TABLE 10.1 
ADMIRALTY WORK ON HAND IN CLYDE YARDS 
YEAR ON THE FITTING TOTAL 
-END STOCKS -OUT 
TONS TONS TONS 
1923 nil nil nil 
1924 10,923 nil 10,923 
1925 30,663 nil 30,663 
1926 20,884 9,750 30,634 
1927 23,065 29,490 52,555 
1928 6,823 21,280 28,103 
1929 2,720 18,273 20,993 
1930 372 2,720 3,092 
1931 2,750 nil 2,750 
1932 nil 1,375 1,375 
1933 24,901 815 25,716 
1934 17,960 19.325 37,285 
1935 28,590 7,535 36,125 
1936 39,523 22,280 61,803 
1937 107,349 46,987 154,336 
1938 139,279 25,632 164,911 
(Sourcet Abstracted from Appendix ClVb)16 
On Clydesidev Fairfield and Clydebank, which ranked 
alongside Vickers-Armstrong's Barrow and Elswick yards, Cammell 
Laird's Birkenhead yard and Harland & Wolff's Belfast yard as 
the only private shipyards capable of building the largest 
warships following the closure of Dalmuir and Palmer's, had the 
largest share of these orders. Apart from Fairfield which 
received orders for one battleship, one aircraft carrier, two 
cruisers and four destroyers and Clydebank which received orders 
for one battleship, one cruiser, three depot-ships and four 
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destroyers, four other Clyde firms each received orders for more 
than 10,000 tons of warships over the five year period - 
Scott's, Stephens', Denny's and Yarrow, s. 17 
of Admiralty orders was as follows ; 
TABLE 10.1 
The distribution 
CLYDE'S SHARE OF ADMIRALTY CONTRACTS 1934-1939 
FIRM HULLS 
No. TONNAGE 
FAIRFIELD a 82,615 
CLYDEBANK 9 80,467 
SCOTTOS 14 46,528 
STEPHENS' 8 30,248 
DENNY'S 11 14,523 
YARROWIS 11 14,480 
OTHERS 5 4,075 
66 
. 
172.936 
ENGINES 
No. I. H. P. 
8 570,500 
10 427,000 
16 608,980 
a 374,200 
11 251,500 
11 263,800 
5 8,750 
ý9 2.504,730 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix CIVa) 
The early stages of rearmament were accompanied by an 
upturn in merchant demand and, as in the years before the First 
World War, the combination of a revival in merchant shipbuilding 
with a boom in naval demand resulted in a sharp rise in costs of 
production. Typically, the time rates paid to skilled and 
unskilled shipyard workers increased from sixty shillings per 
week and forty-one shillings per week respectively at the end of 
1935 to sixty-eight shillings per week and forty-nine shillings 
per week at the end of 1938 18 
and the average wages per man per week at Clydebank increased by 
18.01. between 1935 and 1938.19 Percentage increase in the 
costs of materials and overheads appear to have been of a 
similar order. The cost of a new 9,000 ton deadweight tramp 
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steamer was reckoned to have risen from L83,500 in February 1936 
to L101,000 in February 1939, - an increase of 20.96.. 
20 
The upturn in demand resulted in shortages of vital raw 
materials and components. As early as September 1937 Stephen 
Piggott, who succeeded Sir Thomas Bell as Clydebank's managing 
director, spoke of a general shortage of steel plates 21 and the 
warshipbuilders faced the particular problem that the 
dismemberment or the armaments industry during the years of arms 
limitation had left. Britain short of capacity to produce armour 
plate, guns and gun mountings. In consequence the rearmament 
progranme soon ran into difficulties. In February 1938, 
following consultations with John Brown's armour plate 
department in Sheffield on the delivery of armour plate, the 
Clydebank board was advised that the new battleship under 
construction in the yard could not be completed until June 1940, 
some five months after the contract date and four-and-a-half 
years after the ship was laid down. 22 Two months later the 
Admiralty was forced to extend the time allowed to build a 
destroyer from twenty-seven months to thirty months 23 - the 
time taken to build a Queen Elizabeth class battleship a quarter 
of a century earlier. By June 1938, a chronic shortage of gun 
mountings for Tribal class destroyers forced the Admiralty to 
issue detailed instructions dealing with the maintenance of 
completed ships pending the delivery or the missing equipment. 24 
Despite these problems Admiralty work continued to be 
profitable. In contrast to the period before the First World 
War, when rising costs had an adverse effect on the 
profitability of naval contracts, 25 profit margins on Admiralty 
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contracts in the years loading up to the outbreak of the Second 
World War tended to become better rather than worse as war 
approached. The improvement was most most noticeable in the 
case of Denny's. As is shown in table 10.3, the contribution 
to overheads and profit from the firm's destroyer contracts rose 
steadily from 7.9% of invoice price on two IEI class destroyers 
completed in 1934 to 31.51. of invoice price on the IJI and IKI 
class destroyers completed in 1939. 
TABLE 10.3 
DESTROYER CONTRACTS COMPLETED BY DENNY'S 1934-1939 
YEAR CLASS BATCH INVOICE CONTRIBUTION 
COMPLETED SIZE PRICE TO OVERHEADS 
AND PROFIT 
LL va 
1934 'El 2 495,433 39,109 7.9 
1936 'H' 2 508,616 72,315 14.2 
1938 ITRIBALS' 2 718,340 150,127 20.9 
1939 131&'Kl 2 802,598 252,653 31.5 
(Sources Abstracted from Appendix FVII) 
While there is no evidence of a comparable improvement in the 
profitability of Admiralty contracts undertaken by Clyde yards 
which had been more regularly employed in warshipbuilding since 
the end of the war, neither is there any evidence of any 
significant contraction in profit margins. On the contrary, 
apart from the orders for the engines of dockyard-built 
cruisers, all of the Admiralty contracts undertaken by 
Clydebankg Fairfield and Scott's in 1935 and 1936 yielded 
cdntributions to overhead and profit of between 21.56. and 30.1% 
of invoice price and Fairfield's records show that contracts 
f 
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undertaken In 1937 were more rather than less profitable than 
their immediate predecessors. The cruiser HMS PHOEBE, the 
destroyers HMS JUNO and HHS KELVIN and the battleship HMS HOWE 
yielded contributions to overheads and profit of 30.9%, 33.9%v 
38.1l. -and 29.9.1 respectively. 
In part the continuing profitability of Admiralty contracts 
in the face of rising costs of production may have reflected the 
astuteness of the warshipbuilders but in a large measure it was 
attributable to the- effectiveness of the Warshipbuilders 
Committee in regulating prices. By 1936-37, when rearmament 
began in earnest, collusion an prices had rendered the whole 
system or competitive tendering meaningless. 26 The Admiralty 
had to rely increasingly on comparisons with the cost of 
dockyard-buLlt ship's as its only check an the reasonableness of 
contractors' prices, a procedure which proved hopelessly 
inadequate as a means or ensuring that the Admiralty was 
obtaining value for money. Apart from the limited range of 
warships still being built in the Royal Dockyards, their costs 
were subsequently shown to be much higher than those of private 
yards. 27 In 1941, following an investigation of selected 
contracts undertaken by private firms from 1936 onwards, the 
Admiralty sought recompense 'for having been overcharged 28 but, 
in view of the problems created by the lack of naval work in 
earlier years, the wershipbuilders could hardly be blamed for 
having made the most of their opportunity. 
By 1939 the plentiful supply of profitable Admiralty orders 
had transformed the financial situation of the Clyde 
warshipbuilding industry and the firms involved in it. 
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For Fairfield the improved outlook for warshipbuilding came 
none too soon. In the year to 30th June 1935 the company 
managed to earn a trading profit before depreciation of L62,394 
but the collapse of the Anchor Line in the summer of 1935 
occasioned a major crisis in Fairfield's affairs. As was 
customary when a reputable customer required credit, Fairtield 
,, ed Irawn bills an the Anchor Line in part payment for the 
liners TUSCANIA and TRANSYLVANIA built by the yard in the 
192019. Under normal circumstances all of these bills would 
have been redeemed by the customer as they fell due but by 1930 
the Anchor Line was in financial difficulty and Fairfield had 
been obliged to agree to a moratorium on outstanding bills 
amounting to L145,000.29 These bills were still outstanding 
when the affairs of the Anchor Line were placed in the hands of 
a receiver in June 1935 and Fairfield, which had discounted the 
bills in the normal course of business, was faced with the 
problem of finding L145,000 to meet the claims of the 
billholders when the bills were formally dishonoured and 
returned to drawer. Fairfield's neighbour Alexander Stephen 
& Son, which had also discounted Anchor Line bills in the 
1920, st3O was in a similar situation but, following the sale of 
its interest in the Steel Company of Scotland in 1934,31 
Sf-ephen's had the means to meet its obligations. Fairfield, 
which remained chronically illiquid despite the improvement in 
its trading situation, did not and 'as no part of the funds 
available at the Bank of England could be used to discharge 
these bills' a serious situation ensued. 32 Technically the 
Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd. was insolvent. 
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It was rescued from its predicament only by. the intervention of 
the Lithgow brothers, who agreed to assume responsibility for 
the company's overdraft and to meet the claims of the 
billholders in full in return for being sold the controlling 
interest of 24,260 ordinary shares previously registered in the 
name of Sir Alexander Kennedy - presumably as the nominee of the 
Shipbuilding Investment Co. Ltd. 33 
It is doubtful whether the Lithgow brothers would have been 
prepared to mount such a rescue bid ir rearmament had not been 
In the offing. As the chairman of National Shipbuilders 
Securities Ltd. which had been instrumental in closing down 
other major warshLpbuilding yards which had found themselves in 
financial dirficuities, Sir James Lithgow personal involvement 
in the rescue of a bankrupt yard would have been controversial 
had the national interest not made a further reduction in 
warshipbuildLng capacity undesirable. As a member of the 
Industrial Panel set up in January 1934 to assist the 
government's Principal Supply Officers' Committee in preparing 
contingency plans for rearmament, 34 Sir James Lithgow was privy 
to information which was not available to the general public. 
He knew that the Eleventh Annual Report or the Principal Supply 
Officers' Committee dated 7th January 1935 had cast doubt on the 
ability of the shrinking shipbuilding industry to meet all the 
demands which were likely to be made upon it in the event of war: 
Investigations have revealed that many 
of the shipyards on which reliance had 
been placed have now closed down and that 
the existing active building slip capacity 
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is insufficient to meet the combined naval 
and mercantile marine programmes. It is 
however considered probable that for the 
near future at least sufficient of the 
shipyards now unuse. d could be reopened to 
meet requirements provided the necessary 
skilled labour were available. 
35 
Further, no one was in a better position to judge how the 
closure of Fairfield would be received in official circýles and 
It can safely be assumed that he did not act without the 
government's tacit blessing if not at its behest. 
Whatever the motives which prompted the Lithgow brothers to 
intervene, their purchase of Fairfield proved to be a sound 
investment. 36 When they took over, dividends an the Company's 
preference shares were five years in arrears, the firm owed the 
Bank of Scotland L295,034 37 and, after providing for the losses 
on the Anchor Line bills, the balance of unused reserves and 
undistributed profits amounted to only L96,694. Less than four 
years later, in June 1939, bank borroVings had all been repaid, 
provision had been made for the elimination of the arrears of 
preference dividends and, while no dividend had yet been 
declared on the ordinary shares, reserves and undistributed 
profits amounted to L544,897. 
The improvement in Fairfield's situation was gradual. At 
the Annual General Meeting held on 27th November 1935 the 
company's chairman, Sir Alexander Kennedy, spoke of a 'slight 
improvement' in demand which 'raised hopes of an early return to 
days of prosperityt38 but, apart from a recent order for the 
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9,400 ton Gloucester class cruiser HMS LIVERPOOL, the firm had 
no work on hand due to be completed after June 1936. At the 
time of the Lithgow takeover early in November 1935, the firm's 
entire order book had comprised only the two IGI class 
destroyers ordered as long ago as April 1934, the 11,660 ton 
motorship DERBYSHIRE ordered by Bibby Brothers in September 1934 
and the 449 ton Clyde pleasure steamer MARCHIONESS OF GRAHAM 
ordered in September 1935. Apart from HMS LIVERPOOL, the only 
new order received. in the interval was for the 314 ton pleasure 
steamer ST. SILIO. A year later evidence of recovery was more 
substantial. The firm was able to report a trading profit 
before depreciation of L74,196 for the year to 30th June 1936 
and the order book had benefited from the receipt of orders for 
the 1,959 ton Tribal class destroyers HMS GURKHA and HMS MAORI, 
the 11,137 ton passenger and cargo liners CIRCASSIA and CELICIA 
for the reconstructed Anchor Line and the 642 ton- paddle- 
steamers JUNO and JUPITER for L. M. S., an order intake worth in 
all LI, 828,352. As the c hairman reported at the 1936 Annual 
General Meetings 
The present position of the Shipbuilding 
Industry and the outlook for the next 
few years are encouraging ... -The revival 
is due to the renewed confidence of 
shipowners in the future of Shipping as 
evidenced by the activities of the home 
market and the placing of many contracts 
for now vessels, assisted by the recent 
decision of the National Government to 
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restore the Navy ýo its former high 
standard of efficiency. 39 
From then until the outbreak of war in 1939, Fairfield 
enjoyed a growing measure of prosperity. Apart from the 
twin-screw motor troopship DEVONSHIRE ordered by Bibby Brothers 
in June 1937, the firm took no further merchant orders but from 
November 1936 onwards Fairfield's resources were increasingly 
given over to meeting the growing. demand for naval work as the 
pace of rearmament quickened. Between December 1936 and June 
1937, Fairfield was awarded the contracts for the 5,600 ton Dido 
class cruiser HMS PHOEBE, two 1,760 ton destroyers - HMS JUNO 
and HMS KELVIN - and the 36,727 ton King George V class 
battleship HMS HOWE as well as being asked to supply a new set 
of engines and boilers for the old battleship HMS QUEEN 
ELIZABETH. Further orders, for the 23,450 ton Implacable 
class aircraft carrier HMS IMPLACABLE and for two IN' class 
destroyers, HMS NAPIER and HMS NESTOR, followed in October 1938 
and May 1939 respectively. None of the orders received after 
November 1936 were completed by June 1939 but from 1936-37 
onwards the firm adopted the practice of taking profits an 
account of unfinished contracts. Trading profits before 
depfeciation of L219,299 in 1936-37, L290,010 in 1937-38 and 
Z751,882 in 1938-39 fully reflected the profitability of the 
growing volume of Admiralty work an hand. 
Fairfield's recovery was not entirely due to Admiralty 
work. In contrast to the merchant orders on hand at the time 
of the Lithgow take-over, all of the merchant contracts 
undertaken by the firm from November 1935 until the outbreak of 
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war were profitable. 40 In' particular, the liners CIRCASSIA and 
CELICIA yielded net profits of L24,090 and L55,475 respectively 
and made a total contribution to overheads and profit of 
L196,198 or 19.9% of their combined invoice price. In 
addition, from 1935-36 onwards, a rising volume of jobbing work 
made a useful contribution to overheads and profit. 
Nevertheless, the critical importance of Admiralty work is 
apparent from an analysis of all the contributions to overheads 
and profit in the three years to 30th June 1939 in Table 10.4. 
TABLE 10.4 
FAIRFIELP CONTRIBUTIONS TO OVERHEADS AND 
PROFIT lat JULY 1936 to 30th JUNE 1939. 
L va 
ADMIRALTY CONTRACTS 1,530,276 75.8 
MERCHANT CONTRACTS 318,763 15.8 
JOBBING WORK 170,352 8.4 
2.019.391 100.0 
(Source: Details abstracted from UCS 2/31/12)41 
Clydebank's experience was very 'similar to that of 
Fairfield. Following resumption of work on the QUEEN MARY in 
April 1934 and the receipt of orders for the 9 100 ton 
Southampton class cruiser HMS SOUTHAMPTON in May 1934 and for 
the machinery of the dockyard-built cruiser HMS BIRMINGHAM in 
Decembeir 1934, the yard earned a trading profit before 
depreciation of L29 . 254 in the year to 31st March 1935 but it 
remained desperately short of work. In February 1935, with 
only the cruiser HMS SOUTHAMPTON on the stocks, Sir Thomas Bell, 
nearing the end of his long career as Clydebank's managing 
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director, reported that tanker orders were only available at 
prices which 'cannot possibly contain any charges' and, that 
while contracts were on offer for one or two rerrigerated-cargo 
ships, the 'wild tendering' of Workman Clark and Harland & Wolff 
made their prices labsurd'. 42 Neverthelessv fears of a serious 
shortage of skilled labour when demand picked up, led Clydebank 
to accept orders for the 6,837 ion oil tanker COMANCHE fr_om the 
Anglo-American Oil Co. and for the 11,063 ton cargo liners ESSEX 
and the SUSSEX from P&0, to provide-employment for skilled 
ironworkers in the shipyard and skilled machinemen in the 
engine works. 43 None of these contracts was remunerative. 
The price of the COMANCHE failed to cover the costs of materials 
and labour by L12,331 and the L714,284 contract for the ESSEX 
and SUSSEX yielded only a contribution to overheads and profit 
of, L32,099. 
8y the summer of 1936 Clydebank's situation was more 
encouraging. During the winter the yard had taken orders for 
two 1,370 ton III class destroyersq HMS ICARUS and HMS ILEX, the 
8,900 ton submarine depot-ship HMS MAIDSTONE and two destroyers 
for Argentina; 44 following a decision to take credit for E85,000 
on account of the expected profit on the contract for the QUEEN 
MARYt45 the yard was able to report a trading profit before 
depreciation of L204,924 for the year to 31st March 1936 and the 
tate of the yard's merchant order book was transformed by the 
eceipt of the order for the 85,000 ton Cunard liner QUEEN 
ELIZABETH in July 1936. By December 1936, with the new 
Cunarder on the stocks and a battleship order in the offing, the 
situation was so changed that inquiries from the Royal Mail 
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Line, Shaw Savill & Albion and the Gracie Line of America were 
turned away on the grounds that the yard could not accommodate 
the building of a third large vessel. 46 From then until the 
outbreak of war in 1939 Clydebank too was increasingly given 
over to naval work. By the summer of 1937 work on hand 
included the 36,727 ton King George V class battleship HMS DUKE 
OF YORK, the 9,050 ton submarine depot-ship HMS FORTH and the 
1,760 ton IJI class destroyers HMS JACKAL and HMS JAVELIN. 
Orders for the 8,530 ton Fiji class cruiser HMS FIJI and for the 
11,000 ton destroyer depot-ship HMS HECLA followed in 1937-38 
and 1938-39 respectively*and the order for the 11,145 ton cargo 
liner SUFFOLK from the Federal Steam Navigation Co. in May 1938 
was accepted only because the vessel could be delivered to the 
fitting-out basin in time for completion before the space was 
needed for HMS DUKE OF YORK. 47 
From 1936 onwards, Clydebank increasingly assumed the 
character of a naval dockyard. The confidence which the naval 
authorities reposed in the yard was reflected in the regularity 
with which the Admiralty entrusted it with the building of lead 
ships of a class - the cruiser HMS SOUTHAMPTON in 1934, the 
depot-ship HMS MAIDSTONE in 1935 and the cruiser HMS FIJI in 
1937 - and there was the closest co-operation between the firm's 
management and the Admiralty in making maximum use of the yard's 
capacity for naval production. One aspect of the relationship 
was the early warning which Clydebank received of the impending 
order for the battleship. Though the official invitations to 
tender were not sent out until December 1936, space for a 
battleship was reserved at Clydebank as early as March 1936 48 
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and the firm was given verbal permission to commence work on HMS 
DUKE OF YORK in November 1936 on the strict understanding that 
this was 'to be kept as quiet as possible' until April 1937.49 
Another aspect of the relationship was the extent to which the 
Admiralty was prepared to co-operate in providing Clydebank with 
a steady flow of work. The order for the two IJI class 
destroyers received in January 1937 was expressly designed to 
provide employment for Clydebank's dock engineers in the summer 
of 1938 pending the. launch of larger warships. 50 In March 1937 
it was reported thatt 
In order to provide work for our framing 
squads until such time as more rapid 
progress is possible on the battleship, 
we have arranged with the Admiralty to 
proceed with a repeat Maidst-one. 51 
In contrast to Fairfield, the upturn in naval demand was 
not fully reflected in Clydebank's trading results up to 1939 as 
the yard did not normally take profit on contracts until they 
were completed and none of the contracts taken after April 1936 
were finished by March 1939. Nevertheless Clydebank's trading 
profits before depreciation averaged L225,968 per annum in the 
three years to 31st March 1939. The link between the upturn in 
naval demand and the yard's renewed prosperity is apparent from 
an analysis of the contract profits credited to the profit and 
loss account between Ist April 1935 and 31st March 1939. 
Excluding the QUEEN MARY on which Clydebank earned a net profit 
of L155,414, merchant contracts resulted in net losses of L7,279 
while naval contracts yielded net profits of L403,931. 
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Further, net profits alone do not do full justice to the 
importance of warshipbuilding to Clydebank in these years. In 
1928 management consolidated the yard's overheads into two 
elements: one element - 'Power and Insurance' - included all 
those overheads which tended to fluctuate with the level of 
output - electricity, gas, oil, coal, hydraulic and pneumatic 
power, national insurance, workmens' compensation insurance, the 
upkeep of tools etc.; the other element - 'General Charges', 
comprised all other. overheads except depreciation, 
directors1fees and interest - effectively the yard_ls fixed- 
overheads. By the mid-1930's it was standard practice to 
apportion the annual cost of 'Power and Insurance' among all 
contracts in progress in proportion to the direct labour costs 
incurred during the year but 'General Charges' were applied more 
selectively. 52 In the five years to 31st March 1939 merchant 
contracts bore their fair share of 'Power and Insurance', 
accounting for L250,469 out of the L470,855 charged to all 
contracts, but warship contracts accounted for V58,657 out of 
the total of L895,870 of 'General Charges' applied to all 
contracts, none of the latter having at that point been charged 
to the contract for the Queen Elizabeth. 53 As a result the 
breakdown in Table 10.5 of the total contribution to overheads 
and profit at Clydebank in the three years to 31st March 1939 is 
strikingly similar to that of Fairfield in Table 10.4 above. 
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TABLE 10.5 
CLYDEBANK CONTRIBUTION TO OVERHEADS AND 
PROFIT Ist APRIL 1936 TO 31st MARCH 1939 
L%' 
ADMIRALTY CONTRACTS 1,149,157- 77.8 
MERCHANT CONTRACTS 238,868 16.2 
JOBBING WORK 89,035 6.0 
1,477,050 100.0 
(Source:. Detail abstracted from UCS 1/7/3,4 & 6)54 
Of the other four-firms the improvement in Yarrow's trading 
performance was the. least spectacular. The firm did not lack 
Admiralty orýers. The orders for the destroyer flotilla 
leaders HMS FAULKNOR and HMS GRENVILLE and for the 2820 ton 
netlayer HMS PROTECTOR, received in 1932-33 and 1933-34 
respectively, were followed by-Admiralty orders for a further 
six destroyers, two escort vessels, two river gunboats and a 
patrol vessel between 1935-36 and 1938-39. However, since 
destroyers for Yugoslavia and Portugal and five sets of engines 
for destroyers built in Portugal 55 to Yarrow's design had 
helped keep the firm profitable in the period before Admiralty. 
demand picked up, the effect of the rising volume of Admiralty 
work on hand was correspondingly muted. The company's earnings 
after depreciation increased from an average of L13,563 per 
annum in the five years to 30th June 1933 to an average of 
L36,084 per annum in the five years to 30th June 1938. 
The growing prosperity associated with rearmament was more 
apparent in the case of Denny's. In the year to 31st December 
1934, when the firm completed the 'El class destroyers HMS ECHO 
and HMS ECLIPSE, it suffered a trading loss before depreciation 
of L52,519. The following year Denny's suffered a trading loss 
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before depreciation of only L8,010. The improvement continued 
over Me following three years with trading'profits before 
depreciatio n rising from L16,587 in 1936 to L103,510 in 1937 and 
L135,531 in 1938. The favourable trend of profits was the 
product oi rising activity and the increasing profitability of 
individual contracts. Both were attributable primarily to the 
revival in naval demand. The orders for the 1,340 ton IHI 
'class destroyers HMS HASTY and HMS HAVOCK and the 1,190 ton 
sloop HMS STORK received in 1934-35, as with the earlier order 
for the two IEI class destroyers, did no more than make a useful 
contribution to overhead recovery but up to 1936, the' 
improvement in Denny's performance was almost wholly 
attributable to the higher level of activity. The annual 
overhead recovery account which had been L62,333'in deficit in 
1934 was L8,471 in surplus by 1936. Similarly, from 1937 
onwards, when the continuing improvement in Denny's trading 
situation reflected the profits being earned on individual 
contracts, the profitability of Admiralty contracts was 
critical. The contracts for the 1,959 ton Tribal class 
destroyers HMS ASHANTI and HMS BEDUOIN and the 1,250 ton sloop 
HMS AUCKLAND accounted for 75.7% of the profits earned on all 
contracts completed in 1938 and the contracts for the 1,760 ton 
'J' and 'K' class destroyers HMS JAGUAR and HMS KANDAHAR and for 
the 580 ton patrol vessels HMS GUILLEMOT and HMS PINTAIL yielded 
net profits Of L238,288 in 1939 when the company earned a 
trading profit before depreciation of L378,345. 
Scott's had a similar experience with the important 
difference that the impact of the renewed demand for warships 
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was reflected in the firm's accounts as early as the year to 
31st December 1934, when a trading profit before depreciation of 
E105,383 was entirely due to the net profit of L70,196 earned an 
the IEI class destroyers HMS ESCAPADE and HMS ESCORT laid down 
in 1933 and to L40,000 taken on account of the anticipated 
profit on the contract for the cruiser HMS GALATEA, which had 
also been laid down in 1933.56 Over the next four years 
trading profits before depreciation averaged L151,022 per annum 
and in the year to. 31st December 1939 the company was to report 
a trading profit before depreciation of no less than L275,548. 
This period of prosperity, which had no parallel in the 
company's long history, was almost entirely due to the steady 
stream of Admiralty orders with which the firm was favoured from 
1935 onwards. The 9,100 ton Southampton class cruiser HMS 
GLASGOW and the 1,340 ton IHI class destroyers HMS HOSTILE and 
HMS HOTSPUR laid down in 1935 were followed by the 1959 ton 
Tribal class destroyers HMS MATABELE and HMS PUNJABI and the 
1,520 ton Grampus class submarine HMS CACHELOT in 1936; the 
5,600 ton Dido class cruiser HMS BONAVENTURE, the engines for 
the dockyard-built cruiser HMS SIRIUS and the 1,090 ton Triton 
class submarines HMS TRIBUNE and HMS TARPON in 1937; the 11,000 
ton Destroyer depot-ship HMS TYNE, the 1,920 ton ILI class 
destroyers HMS LOOKOUT and HMS-LDYAL and the 1,090 ton Triton 
class submarine HMS TUNA in 1938 and the 5,600 ton Dido class 
cruiser HMS SCYLLA in April 1939. None of the warships laid 
down after 1936 were completed by the end of 1939 but L288,850 
on account of the profits on these uncompleted naval contracts 
contributed to the firm's profitability 57 and Scott's merchant 
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business in these years counted for very little. From the 
beginning of 1935 to the outbreak of war in 1939, the firm's 
total intake of merchant work amounted to a single 9,700 ton 
ship for Alfred Holt. 58 which yielded Scott's a net profit of 
only L4,400, and four diesel-powered cargo/passenger ships for- 
Elder Dempster, 59 three of which ended in losses. ' The total 
contribution to overheads and profit from all four ships 
mounting to only L56,913 on an invoiced price of L637,267. In 
0 nsequence naval contracts accounted for no less than 93.4% of 
the total contribution to overheads and profit from all the work 
done on contracts in the five years to 31st December 1939.60 
Alexander Stephen & Son Ltd. was something of a special 
case in being a newcomer to warshipbuilding in peacetime. In 
common with the leading warshipbuilders, Stephen's had enjoyed a 
period of exceptional prosperity in the boom conditions which 
prevailed in merchant shipbuilding after the First World War. 
In the two years to 31st March 1921, ship-repairing added 
Z234,869 to trading profits before depreciation of L343,209. 
After 1921 the firm's ship-repairing business dwindled but 
Stephen's still managed to earn trading profits before 
depreciation averaging L79 . 767 per annum over the next four 
years. The period of prosperity came to an end in 1925-26 when 
the yard finally exhausted its post-war order book by completing 
the 17,00o ton liner CALEDONIA for the Anchor Line. Following 
a trading profit before depreciation of L185,320 in the year to 
31st March 1926, Stephen's suffered total trading losses of 
L81,660 over the next two years, largely because of a loss of 
L72,560 on two 11,400 ton tankers built for the Imperial Oil 
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Co. 61 The. company returned to profit in 1928-29 but trading 
profits before depreciation totalled only L73,829 over the next 
three years, the L985,388 contract for the 19,648 ton P&0 
liner VICEROY OF INDIA , completed in March 1929, yielding a net 
profit of only L1,049. Net profits of L179,288 on the 
contracts for the 14,300 ton P&0 liners CARTHAGE and CORFU 
resulted in a trading profit before depreciation of L186,616 in 
1931-32 but by March 1932 work in progress comprised only a 
sailing yacht and a small car'go ship 62 and the directors took a 
gloomy view of the prospects: 
Notwithstanding the substantial profit 
shown, the Directors regret that in view 
of the serious position existing; the 
certainty of a heavy loss in the current 
year and the future outlook for the industry, 
they cannot see their way to recommend the 
payment of a dividend dven on the Preference 
Shares. 
- 
They have no doubt it will be 
recognised that they have no option but 
to adopt this course at a time when the 
adequacy of the Company's liquid resources 
to see it through the depression cannot but 
be a matter of serious anxiety. 63 
The company's liquidity problems were eased by the sale of its 
shares in the Steel Company of Scotland to the Lithgow brothers 
for Ll5lt875 in 1934-35.64 but the directors pessimism on the 
trading outlook was amply justified by the trading results. In 
the three years to 31st March 1935 Stephen's suffered trading 
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losses before depreciation amounting to L155,548. 
Against this background the directors, apparently at the 
instigation of Alexander Murray Stephen who became chairman in 
1933, decided to seek a share of Admiralty contracts. 65 In the 
winter of 1933-34 the company secured the orders for the 1,350 
ton IGI class destroyers HMS GALLANT and HMS GRENADE. 
Contracts for the 510 ton patrol vessels HMS MALLARD and HMS 
PUFFIN followed in 1934-35 and the more important contracts for 
the Tribal class destroyers HMS ZULU and HMS SIKH were added to 
the order book in 1935-36. Stephen's, which had not built a 
warship since the and of the First World War apparently found 
the work congenial and, following a report that work on HMS ZULU 
was well ahead or all other Tribal class destroyers in February 
1937,66 the firm was rewarded with a succession of major orders 
- the 5,600 ton Dido class cruiser HMS HERMIONE and the 8,530 
ton Fiji class cruiser HMS KENYA in 1937-38 and-the 8,530 ton 
Fiji class cruiser HMS CEYLON and the 2,650 ton minelayer HMS 
MANXMAN in 1938-39. None of these major contracts were 
compketed by 31st March 1939 and it does not appear to have been 
Stephen's practice to take credit for profits before contracts 
were completed but a not profit of L38,109 on the two IGI class 
destroyers enabled the company to earn a trading profit before 
depreciation of 05,129 in 1935-36. Profits taken on the 
completion or the two patrol vessels and the two Tribal class 
destroyers were reflected in trading profits before depreciation 
of L22,952 in 1936-37, L99,378 in 1937-38 and L94,466 in 1938-39, 
Stephen's was more successful than Scott's in striking a 
balance between merchant and naval work and nineteen merchant 
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ships aggregating 81,243 tons were launched from the yard in the 
five years 1934-1938 inclusive, but the incomplete data 
available suggests that naval contracts played the major part in 
the improvement in Stephen's trading performance, While the 
merchant output included the 16,033 ton P&0 liner CANTON and a 
succesion of nine refrigerated cargo ships for the Union 
Steamship Company of New Zealand, eleven of the twenty-one 
merchant contracts completed in the five years to 31st March 
1939 67 resulted in losses and there was an overall loss of 
L36,901 on merchant work, the L779,532 contract for the liner 
CANTON yielding a net profit of only L6,664. 
The revival in the demand for warships solved the Clyde 
warshipbuLlders' (inancial difficulties. Of the four 
independent companies which had been in financial difficulties 
prior to the upturn in naval demand, Scott's was exceptional in 
being in a position td-eesume the payment of ordinary dividends 
as early as 1934. The other three - Fairfield, Stephen's and 
Denny's - took longer to recover. Each of them had to pay off 
arrears of preference dividends before they were able to declare 
a dividend on their ordinary shares. The speed with which they 
were able to do so depended on the magnitude of their financial 
problems. Denny's, whose preference dividend was only one year 
in arrears in 1935, cleared the backlog in 1936; Stephen's, 
which was five years in arrears by the time it resumed payment 
in 1936, paid off the backlog in 1937; Fairfield, which was also 
five years in arrear in 1935, felt unable to resume payment 
until 1937 and the whole of the backlog was not paid off until 
1939. As Fairfield's chairman, Sir Alexander Kennedy, warned 
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the company's Annual General Meeting in November 1936: 
Following the long unprecedented 
depression in the industry ... the 
cash resources of the Company must 
first be strengthened and the creditor 
position dealt with. 68 
With the payment or the arrears or prererence dividend by 
Fairfield in 1939 the financial rehabilitation of the Clyde 
warshipbuilders was virtually complete. Typically, Fairfield, 
which. owed its bankers L316,064 at 30th June 1935 had a-massed a 
cash balance of L506,000 by 30th June 1939. While the company 
was not as comfortably placed as the cash balance suggested, 
since creditors included L78,475 for preference dividends and 
debenture interest unpaid and large tax bills were in the offing 
(provisions for taxation having amounted to L40,000 in 1937-38 
and L350,000 in 1938-39), liquidity was no longer a problem. 
The other Clyde warshipbuildera were in a similar position. As 
is shown in table 10.6, in every case where the data is 
available, liquidity ra-tios (debtors + cash + short-term 
investments / creditors * tax liabilities + short-term 
borrowings) in 1938-39 were not only better than in 1934-35 but 
also significantly better then in 1913-14. 
TABLE 10.6 
LIQUIDITY RATIOS 
FIRM 1913-14 1934-35 1938-39 
FAIRFIELD 0.29 0.14 0.81 
SCOTT'S 0.08 1.07 1.50 
STEPHEN'S 0.47 0.56 1.72 
(Sourcet Calculations based on 
figures given in Appendix E) 
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To some extent the improvement in liquidity was achieved at 
the expense of neglecting capital investment. Large a ums were 
expended in refurbishing plant and facilities which had been 
allowed to fall into disrepair when trade was bad. Scott's 
which had spent only L4,882 an maintenance in 1932 was spending 
-L58,344 by 1938; 69 Fairfield*which had spent only L6,755 an the 
maintenance of plant and buildings in 1932-33 was spending 
L109,904 by 1938-39 70 and Clydebank which was spending as 
little as L7,554 on"the maintenance of property-and the upkeep 
of machinery as late as 1933-34 was spending L64,119 on the same 
accounts by 1938-39.71 Firms still remained reluctant to 
purchase now equipment or to modify their existing facilities 
except when it was absolutely necessary to do so. At 
Clydebank, a proposal to spend L20,000 on new machines to expand 
the capacity of the engine works in February 1937 was. approved 
only after a high-powered sub-committee comprising Sir Thomas 
Bell, Stephen Piggott and the engineering directorg Sir Holberry 
Mensforth had examined it and assured the board that the 
increase in capacity was lessential,. 72 At Fairfield, when 
the board approved plans to spend L27,000 on equipping the yard 
to build its first aircraft-carrier in November 1938, the 
secretary was instructed to: 
Bring before the Board after the 
completion of the Aircraft Carrier 
the question of considering the 
special writing off of any capital 
expenditure so incurred. 73 
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The warshipbuilders' caution was reflected in the 
relatively modest increases in balance sheet figures for net 
fixed assets. In the five years preceding the outbreak of war 
in 1939, net additions to fixed assets less provisions for 
depreciation amounted to only L31,661 at Clydebank, to Z31,793 
at Scott's and to L75,179 at Stephen's. At Fairfield, where 
the management apparently decided to provide for additional 
depreciation to compensate for the lack of any provision over 
the previous five years, provisions for depreciation exceeded 
net additions to fixed assets by L243,232. 
While capital expenditure was higher in the five years to 
1938-39 than it had been at any time since the end of the 
post-war boom, total expenditure on net additions to fixed 
assets at Clydebank, Fairfield and Scott's in the decade 
preceding the outbreak of the Second World War was markedly 
I 
lower than it had been in the decade preceding the outbreak of 
the First World War. This could be attributed in part to the 
absence of any technical stimulus comparable to that provided by 
the introduction of the steam turbine and the advent of the 
1dreadnought' in the decade before the First World War. 
However, the absence of a major technical stimulus does not 
account entirely for the low level of capital expenditure. 
There is reason to doubt whether the quality of the productive 
capacity was being maintained when, as table 10*7 shows, 
expenditure on net additions to plant and machinery in the three 
biggest warshipbuilding yards was no greater in the decade 
1929-39 than it had been a quarter of a century earlier when 
costs were very much lower. 
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TABLE 10.6 
NET ADDITIONS TO PLANT & MACHINERY 
1904-14 1929-39 
LIM L1000 
CLYDEBANK 216.2 202.2 
FAIRFIELD 110.5 108.0 
SCOTT's 157.5 126.9 
(Source: Abstracted from Appendix E) 
The warshipbuilders' caution was understandable. Naval 
demand remained vul, nerable to shifts in government policy: - 
Britain's economic weakness limited the size of the navy which 
she could afford to maintain; the opposition Labour Party was 
averse to spending on armaments in principle. Further, the 
gradual recovery in merchant shipbuilding which accompanied the 
early stages of rearmament petered out by 1939. Even in 
January 1938, with rearmament in full swing and the, demand for 
merchant ships relatively buoyant, only 63% of the total plant 
and berth capacity of the United Kingdom's shipbuilding industry 
was gainfully employed. 74 During 1938, the Clyde shipbuilders 
were reported to have received only one new merchant order for 
every four ships which were launched and in December 1938 there 
was no sign of the decline being arrested. 75 A memorandum 
prepared an behalf of the Shipbuilding Conference in the winter 
of 1938-39, which noted the fall in the United Kingdom's share 
of world output from 60.5% in 1904 to 34% in 1938,76 the 
reduction in the size of the British merchant fleet from 
20,322,000 tons in 1930 to 17,675,000 tons in 1938 and the 
steady decline in the proportion of world tonnage owned by 
British firms from 41. lv. in 1914 to 26.4% in 1938,77 put 
278 
rearmament in perspective. The demand for merchant ships was 
falling at an alarming rate, the stimulus provided by the 
rearmament programme was likely to be of short duration and: 
If the trade cycle takes a normal 
course, it is possible that the years 
1939-42 will be a period of severe 
depression in merchant shipbuilding, 
and that such a condition will remain 
at the time of the completion of the 
warship programme. 78 
Against this background, the Clyde warshipbuilders had no 
reason to take an optimistic view of their own prospects. 
Rearmame-nt had brought them ienewed prosperity but no one 
expected the period of prosperity to outlast the rearmament 
programme. The outlook for merchant shipbuilding was bleak and 
the experience of the interwar years had shown that, even when 
merchant work was relatively plentiful, it was rarely very 
profitable. In consequence, prudence dictated that the 
warshipbuilders should use their renewed prosperity to prepare 
themselves for a possible collapse in profits when rearmament 
ended. Improving liquidity rather than investing in fixed 
assets might not be in thej= best long-term interest of the 
Clyde warshipbuilders but it greatly improved their chances of 
survival. 
In the quarter of a century preceding the outbreak of the 
First World War in 1914, warshipbuilding had been one of the 
fastest growing sectors in an expanding Clydeside shipbuilding 
industry. It was symptomatic of the extent to which the 
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situation had changed that, twenty-five years later, 
warshipbuilding could do little more than provide some of the 
leading shipyards on the Clyde with the means to survive another 
slump. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
The practice of sub-contracting naval orders to private firms 
Oul, 
grew foom of technical necessity. In the age of wooden 
sailing ships the Royal Dockyards were more than adequate to 
undertake the building or such new warships as the Admiralty 
was pleased to order but the application or steam power to 
marine propulsion and the introduction or the iron hull in the 
mid-nineteenth century called for skills which the Royal 
Dockyards did not possess and the Admiralty was forced to 
employ better qualified outside contractorst first to design 
and manufacture the engines for naval ships and later to build 
the ships themselves. 
On Clydeside, where a modern shipbuilding industry was in 
process or being created by enterprising engineers, Robert 
Napier accepted the technical challenge or meeting the 
Admiralty's exacting standards and the success or engines built 
by him and his early experience or iron shipbuilding led to his 
being entrusted with the building or one or the Royal Navy's 
first lironclads' - HMS BLACK PRINCE - laid down in 1859. 
From then until his death in 1875, Robert Napier built a 
succession or major warships for both the Admiralty and 
foreign powers. Napier does not appear to have round naval 
work financially rewarding and the next generation of Clyde 
shipbuilders was less inclined to pursue technical excellence 
regardless or cost but this did not prevent other leading firms 
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from following his example in seeking Admiralty contracts, 
particularly when other work was in short supply. 
Up to 1889 the opportunities for private shipbuilders to 
undertake work for the Admiralty were limited. By the end of 
the 1860's the Royal Dockyards had been reformed and 
re-equipped to enable them to build iron warships and in the 
1870's and 1880's the Admiralty had little need of the services 
of private firms except to manufacture engines and to augment 
the shipbuilding resources of the Royal Dockyards in an 
emergency. In consequence demand was irregular and only firms 
which made a particular specialisation or manufacturing engines 
for warships were regularly employed on ýdmiralty work. 
Nevertheless, the Clyde's output ot warships grew steadily and, 
by 18899 most of the firms which subsequently became major 
warshipbuilders had shown themselves willing and able to build 
warships. when the opportunity arose and when it suited them to 
do so. 
The opportunity to translate an interest in 
warshipbuilding into a regular and profitable business was 
provided by the massive expansion of the Royal Navy from 1889 
onwards. Technical uncertainties and the desire of successive 
governments to keep the Naval Estimates to a minimum militated 
against large programmes-of new-construction in the 1870's and 
1880's but growing doubts as to whether the existing fleet was 
capable of upholding Britain's naval supremacy in the event of 
war with another major power, far less a possible combination 
of the fleets of France and Russia, forced the government to 
act. A programme of new construction, begun in 1889, 
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succeeded in its immediate purpose or providing Britain with an 
effective modern fleet but, in an age or great power rivalries 
and rapid technical change, it afforded Britain no lasting 
measure or security. Further massive programmes or new 
construction followed and, with governments or both parties 
committed to maintaining a 'Two-Power' standard, the 
maintenance or Britain's naval supremacy ultimately entailed 
the laying down or more than three million tons or warships 
between 1889 and the outbreak or the First World War in 1914. 
The expansion in the demand for warships worked. to the 
advantage or private contractors. First, the growth in demand 
resulted in private firms being allocated a growing share of 
Admiralty shipbuilding programmes and, after the turn of the 
century, congestion in the Royal Dockyards forced the Admiralty 
to allow contractors to complete warships in all respects 
rather than leave some of the fitting-out until after the 
Admiralty had taken delivery of them. Second, technical 
developments created a demand for new types of warship which 
the Royal Dockyards were ill-suited to build and the Admiralty 
found it expedient to leave the development of destroyers and 
submarines to private firms. Third, while Admiralty contracts 
continued to be subject to competitive tender, the building of 
large numbers of warships as quickly as possible forced the 
Admiralty to abandon its pre-1889 practice of trying to 
incorporate the latest technology in ships already under 
construction. In consequence, contractors were spared the 
frequent changes in specification which had made efficient 
production impossible and firms with the technical capability 
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to produce work of the required standard were able to tender 
with reasonable confidence that their efforts would not be 
frustrated by unforeseen technical difficulties. 
Under these conditions the Clyde warshipbuilders found 
Admiralty work attractive. The boom years of the early 
18801s, when the Clyde's output reached a peak of 419,664 tons 
in 1883, were followed by a severe depression which lasted for 
most of the 18801s. By the 1890's the firms which undertook 
naval contracts had great need of profitable work. Demand was 
recovering by 1889 but steam power and iron ships were no 
. longer novelties, the Clyde shipyards which 
had pioneered these 
innovations faced growing competition from other yards at home 
and abroad, and Clydebank, Fairfield and Napier's all suffered 
crippling losses on major-liner contracts undertaken in the 
late 1880's and early 1890's as the most prestigious merchant 
contracts were obtainable only an terms which were extremely 
onerous in the event of anything going wrong. Even the 
receipt of major Admiralty contracts under the 1889 building 
programme did not prevent the partners of J&G Thomson and 
Robert Napier & Son from becoming insolvent and the latter 
business no longer had the resources to take advantage of the 
opportunity. On the other hand profitable naval contracts 
were instrumental in enabling Clydebank to be reconstructed 
successfully as a limited company; they also provided Fairfield 
with the means of recovery from the potentially crippling loss 
of L89,022 incurred in building the liners CAMPANIA and LUCANIA 
for Cunard; and they restored the London & Glasgow's flagging 
financial fortunes. By the turn of the century all of these 
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yards were prospering on naval work and Scott's were actively 
seeking Admiralty orders to supplement a declining volume of 
merchant work, the most profitable part of which consisted of 
orders provided by the China Navigation Co. in which the Scott 
family were major shareholders, . 
From then until the outbreak of the rirst World War, 
Admiralty work constituted the most profitable part. of the 
output of all of these firms and of Robert Napier & Sons' 
business which re-emerged as a serious contender for Admiralty 
contracts after being taken over by William Beardmore & Co. in 
1900. They had limited success in translating their success 
as Admiralty contractors into the more lucrative markets for 
warships for foreign governments. Apart from a number of 
contracts for Spain and Japan, undertaken by Clydebank in the 
189019, most of the Clyde's output of warships for foreign 
powers was the work of Alfred Yarrow & Co. the destroyer 
specialists, who moved to the Clyde from the Thames in 1907. 
Further, their success as Admiralty contractors was based 
largely on their efficiency in building cruisers and other 
large warships to Admiralty design. Clydebank in particular 
had little success with early destroyers whose detailed 
specification and design was left to individual builders. 
Nevertheless, a steady stream of major Admiralty contracts 
yielded the Clyde warshipbuilders handsome profits and, 
although all of them sought to combine naval work with merchant 
shipbuilding, they had only moderate success in finding a 
comparable volume of remunerative merchant orders. The demand 
for passenger liners, the only class of merchant work 
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comparable in quality and size to a major warship, was limited 
and Harland & wairr, s involvement in a rash of mergers among 
liner companies after the turn or the century lert little work 
for other firms. Fairfield developed a useful connection with 
Canadian Pacific; Clydebank, which had lost Cunard's custom in 
the 1880's, regained it after the turn of the century; but 
profit margins on the most prestigious contracts did not 
compare favourably with those an Admiralty contracts and the 
demand was irregular. Lesser merchant contracts were more 
plentiful, but they were not always profitable and, in 
practise, much or the warshipbuilders' profitable merchant work 
was provided by a handful of customers with whjWh they had 
long-standing connections. 
In consequence, the warshipbuilders become increasingly 
dependent on naval work and increasingly committed to it. The 
success of Clydebank and Fairfield as warshipbuilding yards in 
the 1890's led directly to their absorbtion by powerful 
armamen ts manufacturers seeking to emulate the example of 
Armstrong Whitworth's and Vickers in creating vertically 
Integrated armaments businesses. A third armaments 
manufacturer - William Beardmore & Co. - ac quired the failing 
business of Robert Napier & Sons in 1900 for the same end. In 
the short run neither Clydebank nor Fairfield was greatly 
affected by a change of ownership, which did little more than 
reinforce their existing commitment to warshipbuilding, but the 
intervention or Beardmore's resulted in the creation of a great 
new shipyard at Dalmuir. This and the heavy capital 
investment required of all the warshipbuilding yards to 
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accommodate major innovations in warship design, most notably 
the introduction of turbine-powered machinery and the building 
of ldreadnoughts', resulted in a massive increase in capacity 
and in the creation of facilities which were technically 
unsuitable for all but tho'highest classes of merchant work. 
During the First World War this capacity was fully extended ih 
meeting the demand for warships, and the Admiralty had to 
design small warships which could be built in other_yards, but, 
even before the war, there were signs of overcapacity. 
Despite the surge in the volume of warship orders placed witti 
private yards as a result of the arms race with Germany, 
warshipbuLlding was less profitable-between 1909 and 1914 than 
it had been earlier in the century before the expansion in 
capacity took place and one of the Clyde warshipbuilders - the 
London & Glasgow - dropped out of the business altogetýer after 
being taken over by Harland & Wolff in 1913. Nevertheless 
Naval work remained more profitable than merchant work 
undertaken in the same yard at the same. time and the problem of 
overcapacity surfaced only in the inter-war period when the 
demand for warships contracted-sharply. In 1914 
warshipbuilding was one of the cornerstones of the prosperity 
of the Clyde shipbuilding industry, albeit one confined to a 
minority of firms, and in the quinquennium 1909-1913 almost one 
quarter of the Clyde's merchant output by tonnage and a larger 
proportion by value was being produced by yards which combined 
merchant shipbuilding with more profitable naval work. 
The full extent of the warshipbuilding yardst dependence 
on naval contracts became apparent in the inter-war period when 
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a policy of arms limitation deprived them temporarily of a 
large part of their naval business. Apart from a brief period 
immediately after the war, when merchant work was abnormally 
plentiful and contracts were available on a cost-plus basis, 
the warshipbuilding yards enjoyed no real measure of prosperity 
until the late 193019 when rearmament provided them with the 
large volume of naval orders which they had lacked since the 
and or the war. 
At the end or the First World War the outlook for the 
major warshipbuilders was encouraging. During the war the 
warshipbuilding yards, as Admiralty controlled establishments, 
had been allowed to undertake very little merchant work and 
-when the war ended they were still full of naval work which had 
to be cleared out or the way before any other work could be 
undertaken. As Admiralty contractors engaged in vital war 
work, they had been assured of the highest priority in the 
allocation of scarce resources of manpower and material during 
the warl a combination of high production and cost-plus 
contracts had ensured that the war years' work was profitable; 
and wartime taxation did not prevent all of them from emerging 
from the war with their finances in much better shape than they 
had been at the outset. Furthert the wartime emergency had 
precluded the replacement of tne large number of first-class 
merchant ships lost during the war and the three big 
warshipbuilding yards Z Clydebank, Fairfield and Dalmuir -all 
had major liner contracts awaiting execution as soon as berths 
were available. Under these circumstancest the primary 
concern of most of the warshipbuilders at the end of the war 
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was to secure their release from Admi'ralty control as quickly 
as possible so that they would be free to take advantage of the 
postwar boom in merchant shipbuilding. 
The post-war boom did not last. By 1921 a downturn in 
merchant demand, amplified by deflationary pressures. was 
causing even the biggest yards major problems as order books 
afforded then little protection when costs began to fall and 
shipowners were unable or unwilling to proceed with cost-plus 
contracts for ahi-ps for which there was no prospect of 
employment. Most of the liner contracts were eventually 
completed but, by the end or 1921, work on many of them was at 
a standstill. New work was virtually unobtainable and 
Clydebank, Fairfield and Dalmuir were grappling with the 
painful task of cutting overheads to levels commensurate with 
the reduced level of work on hand, when the Washington Treaty 
deprived each of them of a battlecruiser order which had 
promised to see them over their immediate difficulties. From 
then until the beginning of rearmament in the mid-1930's, the 
affect of a shortage of warship orders became increasingly 
apparent. 
From 1921 to 1925 merchant orders were virtually 
unobtainable. When demand did eventually recover, the results 
were disappointing. Despite the foresight of the 
warshipbuilders in equipping themselves for the building of 
de1381-powered ships after the war, there was insufficient work 
to fill all of the capacity freed for merchant shipbuilding by 
the decline In the demand for warships. As a result 
competition was fierce and profit margins thin. Had it not 
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been for the profits earned in completing the liners ordered 
during and immediately after the war and the profitability or a 
handful or cruiser contracts put out to contract between 1925 
ans 1927, it is doubtful if any of the leading warshipbuilding 
yards would have earned profits after 1921. As it was, 
Dalmuir can up huge losses and Scott's, whose share of naval 
orders in the 192009 amounted to two destroyers, traded at a 
loss in every year from 1925 onwards. 
By 1930, It was apparent that there was insufficient work 
to keep all of the shipbuilding capacity in existence 
profitably employed, further cuts in naval programmes reduced 
the flow of naval work to a trickle and all the major 
warshipbuilding yards were in financial difficulties. 
Fairfield, whose links with the armaments industry had been 
severed immediately after the war, when Cammell Laird sold out 
their controlling--Interest to the ill-fated Northumberland 
Shipbuilding Co., had been stripped of most of its liquid 
assets In the ensuing collapse of its new owners. Up to 1930 
the firm was able to project an image of modest prosperity and 
financial stability by drawing on secret reserves left over 
from the settlement of wartime tax liabilities but, by 1930, 
these reserves were nearing exhaustion and the company was 
trading at a loss as a result of unprofitable merchant 
contracts. Clydebank, whose trading record was no better than 
that of Fairfield, despite a much larger volume of merchant 
work, faced a more immediate crisis. By 1930 it was running 
out of work of any kind and the future of the yard was in 
danger of being compromised by the liquidity problems of its 
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parent, John Brown & Co., which had been deprived of most of 
its profitable armour plate business by the post-war decline in 
the demand for armaments. In the event neither they nor any 
or the other warshipbuilding yards on the Clyde suffered the 
fate of Dalmuir, which was closed down in 1930 but, in the 
extraordinary conditions which prevailed in the early 1930's, 
they were fortunate to survive. The timely arrival of the 
order for the QUEEN MARY at the end of 1930 combined with the 
successful reconstruction of the finances of John Brown & Co. 
in the summer of 1931 to avert an immediate crisis at 
Clydebank, and Fairfield was able to borrow L200,000 to tide it 
over its immediate difficulties, but their problems were far 
from over. In 1931, the onset of the world financial crisis 
brought merchant shipbuilding to I standstill. As always when 
demand slumped, firms which had long relied on creditors to 
provide part of their capital were subjected to a fierce 
liquidity squeeze while the availability of bank credit could 
no longer be taken for granted. Following the creation of 
National Shipbuilders Securities in 1930, any shipyard which 
found itself in financial difficulties was liable to be closed 
down in the interests of eliminating unwanted Capacity and by 
1934 all the warshipbuilders except Yarrow's. which was 
sustained by destroyer orders for foreign governments, were 
nearing the end of their tether. Had it not been for the 
deteriorating international situation and a growing awareness 
that a further reduction in defence capability was not in the 
national interest it is unlikely that further closures would 
have been everted. 
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Fairfield was saved from bankruptcy only by the 
intervention or the Lithgow brothers. It and the other 
warshipbuilding yards survived the crisis and recovered their 
financial equilibrium by the outbreak or the Second World War 
almost entirely because or the revival in the demand for 
warships once rearmament began in earnest in the late 1930's. 
Apart from the QUEEN MARY and the QUEEN ELIZABETH, both of 
which were built with the help or government subsidies, the 
Clyde was denuded of major liner contracts after 1932. A 
gradual revival in the demand for lower classes of merchant 
work, which started in 1935 and showed signs of petering out in 
1938, made only a modest contribution to the warshipbuilders' 
recovery. By contrast, warshipbuilding again proved to be 
profitable and, although the warshipbuilders had no reason to 
suppose that the demand for warships would be sustained 
indefinitely, it afforded them the opportunity to refurbish 
their neglected plant and equipment and to accumulate the 
reserves which experience had shown to be necessary for 
survival when warship orders were less plentiful. 
The detailed analysis of the financial performance of the 
warshipbuilders enables a histori . an with the knowledge of 
hinsight to identify several possible sources of future 
concern. Firstq there is some evidence that cost control was 
not always as effective as it might have been. Second, much 
of their merchant shipbuilding depended on the loyalty of a few 
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customers with whom they had long-standing connections. When 
these customers switched their allegiance or went out of 
business, the warshipbuilders were unable to replace them. 
Third, their custom was almost wholly domestic. They 
attracted relatively few overseas orders for merchant ships 
and, with the notable exception of Yarrow's. they were 
remarkably unsuccessful in winning overseas orders-for 
warships. Fourth, and most important, they allowed themselves 
, to became inordinately dependent on Admiralty work, a highly 
specialised market which sufrered from the defect that it was 
vulnerable to shirts in public policy. 
A rational defence of the warshipbuilders is still 
possible. Apart from suiting their existing scale of 
operation and their bias towards the production of first-class 
ships and high-powered engines, naval work was more profitable 
than merchant work. As Table 11.1 shows, the years during and 
immediately after the First World War, when merchant work was 
available on a cost-plus basis, was virtually the only time 
between 1894 and 1936 when the profitability of merchant work 
came close to matching the profitability of naval work 
undertaken in the same yard at the same time. 
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TABLE 11.1 
PROFITABILITY OF NAVAL AND MERCHANT WORK UNDERTAKEN BY 
THREE MAJOR WARSHIPBUILDING YARDS 1894-1936. 
ORDERS CONTRIBUTION TO OVERHEADS AND PROFITS 
TAKEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF INVOICE PRICE 
CLYDEBANK FAIRFIELD SCOTT'S 
NAVAL MERCHANT NAVAL MERCHANT NAVAL MERCHANT 
VM OM, Ve 
1894-1898 23.5 13.7 19.3 13.6 
1899-1903 29.9 14.4 28.6 16.0 27.9 16.6 
1904-1908 23.3 13.6 20.7 14.7 19.4 11.6 
1909-1914 15.6 4.1 14.1 10.0 11.1 11.2 
WAR YEARS 22.5 21.9 23.0 25.1 23.8 21.8 
1919-1923 b 16.6 22.1 21.8 
1924-1928 15.0 4.3 20.6 6.0 13.7 8.5 
1929-1933 16.9 10.1 20.0 10.4 25.2 12.1 
1934-1936 22.9 2.2 27.6 14.0 25.9 8.4 
a: 1900-1903 only. 
b: including orders booked for post-war completion 
(Sourcet Based an details abstracted from Appendix F) 
In the fif ty years to 1939 the warshipbuilders had no 
reason to regret their choice of specialisation. Apart from 
reviving their fortunes in the 1890's. it was the basis of 
their prosperity before and after the First World War. , Even 
in the 1920's and early 1930's when the demand for warships was 
weak, a leavening of naval work provided firms with a base load 
of profitable work. Finally, iri the 1930's. it was the basis 
of the renewed prosperity which enabled them to recover their 
-financial stability after the lean years which went before. 
Nothing in their experience suggested that an alternative 
strategy would have been more effective. On the contrary, the 
reality of their situation was that much of their merchant 
output was effectively subsidised by more profitable naval work. 
The warshipbuilders may have drifted into a situation in 
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which any reduction in naval demand put their future at risk, 
but'from 1889 to 1914 wershipbuilding was a growth industr y 
and, apart from a brief period in the 1920's, the demand for 
warships held up better than the demand for merchant ships in 
the inter-war period. Under these circumstances it is 
dirficuit to see how the warshipbuilders could have acted 
differently from the way theldid. In so far as success in 
business depends an an ability to recognise profitable 
opportunities and to exploit them, the Clyde warshipbuilders 
deserve credit for their enterpriset even. if it was the product 
of necessity, and built up problems for the future. The only 
Possible condemnation of their policy is that they were 
shprt-sighted and, in the final analysis, their only real 
failure was that they did not foresee how, in the long-run, the 
decline in Britain's economic power would make it impossible 
for her to continue to support what was still in 1939 the 
largest navy in the world. 
Any account of the history of the Clyde shipbuilding 
industry must needs take account of the warshipbuilders' 
experience. They may be untypical of the majority of Clyde 
firms, which confined themsilves to lower classes of work, but 
collectively and individually they are too important to be 
ignored. The evidence derived from the systematic collection, 
collation and analysis of financial and costing data relating 
to these firms shows that for good or ill warshipbuilding 
played a significant part in the history of the Clyde 
shipbuilding industry between 1889 and 1939. 
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